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Pricing Grade A Milk 
Used in Manufactured Dairy Products 
ROBERT E. JACOBSON, JEROME W. HAMMOND, and TRUMAN F. GRAfl 
AN EMERGING PROBLEM 
The production and marketing of milk in the 
United States is steadily moving toward an all Grade 
A supply. The proportion of the U. S. milk supply 
accounted for by manufacturing grade milk decreased 
from 39% i_n 1950 to 19% in 1976. Approximately 
22 billion lb of manufacturing grade milk were mar-
keted in 1976, a decrease of 12 billion lb in the 1966-
1976 period. In 1976, 53% of the U. S. supply of 
manufacturing grade milk was located in Wisconsin 
and Minnesota. This is significant because compe-
titive pay price series for manufacturing grade milk 
are drawn normally from the Wisconsin-Minnesota 
area. However, conversion to the Grade A market 
also is continuing to occur in Wisconsin and Minne-
sota, and in 1976 m~nufacturjng grade milk had 
dropped to 35 % of the milk supply in Wisconsin and 
54% of the milk supply in Minnesota. 
There is no certainty as to whether Grade A con-
version will continue at its recent pace, nor is it clear 
when available supplies of manufacturing grade milk 
might be so limited that the appropriateness of pricing 
milk in regulated markets based on a competitive pay 
price in the unregulated manufacturing grade milk 
markets should be seriously questioned. A primary 
factor in conversion to Grade A milk is the difference 
between the Grade A blend price and the Grade B 
price. In 1976 in Wisconsin, blend prices averaged 
46 cents per cwt higher than Grade B prices, and 
ranged from 35 cents higher (East Central Crop Re-
porting District) to 58 cents higher (Southwest). 
In Minnesota, the Grade A blend price averaged 62 
cents per cwt higher than the Grade B price, and 
ranged from 42 cents per cwt higher (West Central) 
to 7 4 cents per cwt higher (Southeast). 
One observation that can be advanced from 
these data is that at least in the short run, manufac-
turing grade milk plants in the upper Midwest may 
be able to hold their procurement at a 40 to 50 cents 
per cwt price lower than Grade A blend prices. It 
is not likely that the price differences will increase in 
real terms in the next few years. As noted in a recent 
study, " ... it appears that a farge proportion of the 
Grade B producers find important limitations to shift 
to Grade A production. . . One reason for no major 
'Professors of Agricultural Economics at The Ohio State Univer-
sity and Ohio Agricult\)ral Research and Development Center, Univer-
sity of Minnesota, and University of Wisconsin, respectively. 
,. 
acceleration of the shift is the lack of a large Grade A 
to Grade B price differential in Minnesota."2 
While it is not ~lear that price incentives will 
prevail that will induce Grade A conversion, it is ap-
parent that other factors such as quality considera-
tions, market access, dual handling problems, and 
technological advances in milk production are ex-
planatory in the convt;rsion process. The dairy in-
dustry needs to anticipate further shifts toward a 
total Grade A situation and evaluate the implications 
of that shift to the pricing and marketing of produ-
cer milk. 
The successful operation of the classified pricing 
system, as administered in regulated milk markets 
historically, has depended principally upon the exis-
tence of a nonregulated competitive price-making 
market for milk used for manufactured dairy prod-
ucts. Prices for reserve milk supplies in regulated 
markets generally have been established at levels 
equal to the unregulated manufacturing grade milk 
price. The pricing of reserve Grade A milk at the 
manufacturing grade milk price level assures that 
milk used for manufactured dairy products in regu-
lated markets also will be priced at a level that nor-
mally will accomplish the market clearing function. 
When most milk is Grade A, it is likely that com-
petitive pay prices comparable to those now gener-
ated from manufacturing grade milk price data will 
not be available, and new pricing mechanisms for 
milk used for manufactured dairy products will be 
needed. The non-existence of manufacturing grade 
milk will eliminate the need to relate prices for reserve 
milk in regulated markets to prices in the unregu-
lated manufacturing milk sector. The emerging 
question is: What should be the pricing basis for milk 
used for manufactured dairy products in Federal 
order markets? The question also extends to Class I 
pricing because of the widespread establishment of 
Class I prices in dire.ct relation to competitive pay 
prices for manufacturing grade milk. 
Since ·it is apparent that the present means of 
establishing reserve milk prices is in a process of being 
dissipated, the question emerges as to what alterna-
tive means of establishing reserve milk prices ·can be 
developed. In this study, four alternatives are spe-
'Hardie, W. C. and J. W. Hammond. June 1977. Characteris-
tics of Milk Production in Minnesota, 1967 -197 6 and Projections. 
Univ. of Minn., ER-77-6, pp. 30, 36. 
cified for consideration and are analyzed. These 
alternatives include: 1) arbitrary retention of a com-
petitive pay price series in a situation where all milk 
is Grade A and is pooled; 2) formulation of an ap-
propriate product price formula ( s) ; 3) considera-
tion of the public hearing process for direct establish-
ment of reserve milk prices; and 4) adoption of an 
economic index procedure for moving reserve milk 
prices. 
BACKGROUND OF PROBLEM 
Before World War I, sanitary regulations apply-
ing to milk for fluid use were little, if any, stricter 
than milk for use in manufactured dairy products. 
Production costs for milk for fluid use and milk for 
manufacturing were about the same. Producers in 
most areas were not organized effectively enough to 
price bargain with milk handlers. Because cif the 
lack of special sanitary standards for fluid milk and 
the lack of bargaining power on the part of the pro-
ducers, prices paid for milk by fluid milk handlers 
were about the same as prices paid by manufacturing 
handlers. Thus, the pricing of reserve milk supplies 
did not present serious problems. Some premiums 
were paid in the low production fall months, but gen-
erally volumes of reserve milk were small and not dis-
ruptive in the fall. Furthermore, handlers would 
stop buying from some producers if supplies were 
seriously out of line with requirements. This prac-
tice occurred particularly during the high production 
months in spring and early summer. 
During the first 3 decades of the 20th century, 
stricter sanitary standards relating to milk for fluid 
use were enacted in most city milk markets. To meet 
the requirements of city or state health authorities, 
producers had to invest money in improving their 
milk producing facilities. To encourage producers 
to make these improvements, milk dealers had to pay 
premiums to producers for milk meeting the higher 
Grade A standards. 
.Milk dealers found that they could not induce 
producers to go to the extra expense of meeting sani-
tary requirements: 1) jf they did not pay higher 
prices for Grade A milk, and 2) if they did not offer 
their producers a year-round market for their milk. 
Producers would not make the additional investment 
to produce Grade A milk without some assurance of 
a higher price for their Grade A milk throughout the 
year. Dealers no longer could cut off some of their 
regular producers when their milk was not needed 
and still be assured of adequate supplies of milk meet-
ing sanitary requirements at other times. 
On the other hand, milk dealers could not agree 
to accept unlimited quantities of milk at prices higher 
than its value for manufacturing. They were will-
2. 
ing to pay a higher price for that portion of their pro-
ducers' Grade A milk utilized in fluid form, but were 
understandably unwilling to pay more than the 
manufacturing milk value for supplies above their 
fluid requirements which they had to process into 
manufactured dairy products. 
It was necessary to develop some means of pric-
ing reserve supplies of milk that would be acceptable 
to both producers and dealers. Producer coopera-
tives, in order to obtain outlets for their members' 
milk at all seasons of the year, began to bargain for 
different prices for different uses of milk. Under 
this procedure, a price was established for milk for 
fluid use and a lower price related to manufacturing 
values was established for milk in excess of fluid re-
quirements. This plan became known as the classi-
fied pricing plan and is used throughout the country 
today in Federal and State milk marketing orders, 
and in unregulated markets as well. 
As it evolved, the plan presented and still pre-
sents numerous problems of equity among producers 
and handlers. Nevertheless, the plan has provided 
a milk pricing framework that is generally acceptable 
to producers and distributors alike. It has enabled 
orderly disposition of reserve milk supplies, and at the 
same time has provided a means of pricing Class I 
milk at levels high enough to assure adequate sup-
plies throughout the year. Classified pricing prob-
ably has provided more stable prices to producers, 
handlers, and consumers than would otherwise exist. 
OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 
The problem of pricing reserve milk must be 
analyzed in terms of the overall objectives of milk 
order regulations. The objectives of Federal order 
pricing are to: 1) establish prices to producers which 
will assure an adequate supply of high quality milk 
for a market, and 2) promote the orderly marketing 
of milk in fluid milk markets. 
With these legislative objectives in view, the fol-
lowing research objectives are noted: 
1. To appraise existing U. S. Department of 
Agriculture policies and objectives for pric-
ing reserve milk in Federal milk orders. 
2. To specify objectives that must be recog-
nized in the pricing of reserve milk. 
3. To analyze three basic questions that over a 
long period of time have been central to the 
problem of pricing reserve milk. 
a. Should the same reserve milk price or 
prices be used in all regulated milk mar-
kets? 
b. To what level of efficiency should re-
serve milk prices be keyed? 
c. What should be the number of reserve 
milk class prices, and which products 
should be included in each class? 
4. To evaluate alternative methods for pricing 
reserve milk, including competitive pay 
prices, product price formulas, ·public 
hearings, and economic indices .. 
OBJECTIVES OF RESERVE MILK PRICING 
In order to systematically analyze alternative 
procedures for establishing reserve milk prices, it is 
necessary that the several objectives of reserve milk 
pricing be defined as precisely as possible. A review 
of reserve milk pricing policy indicates that it has 
largely been directed at achieving the following pri-
mary objectives: 
1. To price reserve milk at a level that encour-
ages the. maintenance of adequate manufac-
turing outlets for the disposition of reserve 
supplies. 
-
2. To price reserve milk at levels closely related 
to the value of milk used for manufactured 
dairy products. 
a. To price reserve milk at a level that does 
not encourage it to be withheld from 
Class I usage when needed. 
b. To price reserve milk at a level that does 
pot effectively under-cut unregulated 
manufacturing milk prices and thereby 
draw additional and unnecessary sup-
plies into the marketwide pool. · 
c. To price reserve milk at a level that as-
sures that all such milk will be utilized, 
i.e., will clear the market. 
3. To price reserve milk so that reserve supplies 
will be allocated to those product uses that 
command the highest total return. 
4. To price· reserve milk at a level that does not 
arbitrarily affect resource allocation, i.e., 
does not draw resources into milk produc-
tion nor drive resources out of milk produc-
tion, except as competitive ~anufacturing 
milk prices affect resource· allocation. 
5. To price reserve milk at a level that will pro-
vide equity within a market in terms of the 
costs of handling reserve milk, and will pro-
vide equity among markets in terms of com-
petitive costs for raw milk. 
It is evident that the several objectives of reserve 
milk pricing are not necessarily consistent with one 
another. Therefore, compromise among objectives 
is finally essential in order to establish precise regula-
tions for establishing the actual class price ( s) for re-
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serve milk in administered markets. For example, it 
may be impossible to relate the reserve milk price to 
manufacturing grade milk prices and, at the same 
time, provide for the maintenance of adequate manu-
facturing facilities for reserve milk in given fluid mjlk 
markets. Or it may be impossible to provide for 
equitable price treatment for interests handling re-
serve milk in a market and. also assure that prices for 
reserve milk among markets reflect competitive price 
relationships. 
The conflict among, objectives of reserve milk 
pricing presents a dilemma that defies any easy solu-
tion. In fact, a de-emphasis or by-passing of some 
objectives is required, even while the other objectives 
are advanced, because decisions on pricing reserve 
milk have to be made. As the milk industry contin-
ues to undergo change, the several objectives of re-
serve milk pricing will provide an essential framework 
for making decisions on reserve milk pricing that best 
accommodate the situation. The emphasis on each 
of the objectives may change as conditions change. 
Alternative mechanisms for pricing reserve class 
milk must be evaluated in relation to the five objec-
tives of pricing reserve milk. In addition, the price 
mechanisms must be evaluated on a pragmatic basis 
in terms of three administrative criteria. The admin-
. istrative criteria are: 
1. The price mechanism must generate reserve 
milk prices on a current, continuing, and 
efficient basis. 
2. The price mechanism must avoid undue 
complexity and be generally understood. 
3. The price mechanism must lend itself to 
practical operation as an essential provision 
in market order regulations, i.e., it must be 
workable. 
COMPLEXITIES OF ESTABLISHING 
RESERVE MILK PRICES 
The prices of the so-called "hard" manufactured 
products (butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk) are 
established in a national market and, in periods of ex-
cess milk supplies, are strongly influenced by CCC 
purchase prices. Regulated handlers producing such 
products have no opportunity to adjust prices at 
which they sell such products to assure adequate mar-
gins relative to the price for reserve milk established 
under a milk order. Therefore, the level of the re-
serve milk price relative to the more or less fixed 
revenues on manufactured prodm:ts, as determined 
by the national market, tends to prescribe the mar-
gins a processor realizes on reserve milk. If all the 
reserve supplies of milk are to be marketed in an or-
derly way and the market cleared, the price for re-
serve supplies of milk over time must be closely re-
lated to net revenues available from the sale of manu-
factured products. 
Volumes of reserve milk handled vary substan-
tially between markets and between individual hand-
lers in a market. In addition, there are wide differ-
ences among and within markets in the variability of 
the amount of reserve milk processed from day to day 
and seasonally. This influences reserve milk proces-
sing costs. There also are differences in plant efficien-
cies among and within markets. Further, there are 
differences among and within markets in the kinds of 
products for which surplus milk is utilized. Different 
products, at times, have considerably different use 
values. All of these factors make it difficult to arrive 
at a single reserve class milk price which will be accep-
table to all parties. Because of these differences, the 
level of price for reserve milk affects different produ-
cer organizations differently and has a significant im-
pact on competitive relationships. Thus, some par-
ties favor a low price for reserve milk and others a high 
price. 
Reserve milk class prices over time must track 
average net revenues from manufactured products. 
If the prices do not correspond closely to the average 
net revenues obtained from the sale of- manufactured 
products, mis-allocations in processing capacity or the 
utilization of milk may result. For example, if re-
serve milk prices are too low relative to product prices 
and costs of processing, unduly wide profit margins 
will result. Added manufactured product capacity 
may be attracted by such a pricing error. Regulated 
handlers may procure additional supplies of milk sole-
ly for manufacturing purposes. The extra milk 
could reduce blend prices which eventually might re-
quire Class I price increases to induce adequate sup-
plies. Also, contrary to both producer and public 
interest, milk supplies may be held for manufactur-
ing rather than being made available for fluid use, 
resulting in excessive handling charges for milk for 
fluid use. 
Unregulated manufacturing plants tend to be 
placed at a competitive disadvantage if Federal order 
reserve milk prices are lower than going prices for 
manufacturing grade milk. With the specialization 
that exists in the handling of reserve milk, too low a 
reserve milk price places those handling the reserve 
supplies at an advantage relative to other handlers in 
the market. 
Too high a reserve milk price relative to product 
prices creates equally serious consequences. If the 
reserve milk price is too high, handlers will generally 
be less willing to handle such milk because of the loss-
es involved and disorderly marketing may result. It 
also may mean that cooperatives will be forced to 
4 
handle the reserve, even if at a loss, since one impor-
tant function of a cooperative is to guarantee a mar-
ket for the milk of its members. When cooperatives 
are forced to handle reserve milk supplies at a loss, 
inequities are created between members of operating 
cooperatives who handle the reserve, and bargaining 
associations and nonmembers. The inequity is un-
desirable since cooperatives, or others handling re-
serve supplies, provide a necessary service for the mar-
ket in balancing supplies. 
The problem of pricing milk used for manufac-
tured dairy products can finally be defined in four 
dimensions: 1 ) the need to determine an appropriate 
price level for reserve milk; 2) the need to specify a 
pricing mechanism that will effectively establish re-
serve milk prices on a continuing basis; 3) the need 
to determine the extent to which the price of milk for 
manufacturing may vary a) spatially, and b) among 
producer groups; and 4) the need to define the num-
ber of reserve price classes appropriate to the several 
manufactured dairy products. 
EXPERIENCE WITH RESERVE MILK PRICING 
IN FEDERAL ORDER MARKETS 
In the early years of the Federal milk order pro-
gram (1937-1945), order regulations covered a 
limited number of widely separated metropolitan 
markets. Because milk was delivered to markets ex-
clusively in cans, and transportation and refrigeration 
equipment were not dependable, shipments of indi-
vidual dairy farmers were associated with particular 
plants where the milk was received each day. 
The objective of reserve milk pricing policy 
through the 1940's was to price reserve supplies at a 
level which would provide an outlet for all milk not 
needed for fluid use. The basic principle in estab-
lishing prices for milk in manufacturing uses was to 
relate the pricing to the "going" or "competitive" 
value of milk for such use. Prices were based on 
formulas reflecting prices paid by unregulated plants 
making .manufactured dairy products or upon whole-
sale prices of one or more manufactured dairy prod-
ucts. In 1948, 23 order markets based prices of milk 
used in manufacturing classes, at least in part, on the 
prices paid by specified manufacturing plants, either 
the Midwestern Condensery price series or local plant 
averages. A butter-nonfat dry milk combination 
was used in formulas in 24 markets, and a butter-
cheese combination was in use in 12 markets. Other 
formulas were based on cheese alone, cream-nonfat 
dry milk, and butter-casein.3 
In a number of markets, multiple manufacturing 
use classes were established. In some markets where 
'Harris, Edmond S. and Irwin R. Hedges. Dec. 1948. Formula 
Pricing of Milk for Fluid Use. Farm Credit· Administration, USDA, 
p, 6. 
Laboratory testing of nonfat dry milk for moisture content at reserve milk manufacturing plant. 
surpluses tended to be large and plants scattered and 
of various types, milk for evaporating was classified 
in a category above that for milk used for butter and 
cheese. In several markets, cottage cheese was in a 
separate use classification. To facilitate the disposal 
of surplus milk, some orders permitted milk in a given 
class to be segregated for pricing purposes. In the 
Boston market, for example, milk for both butter and 
cheese was specially priced below the Class II cate-
gory on a seasonal basis. This permitted milk to be 
moved to manufacturing plants outside the market 
when the usual manufacturing facilities could not 
handle all of the surplus milk. 
By the end of 1941, 5 of 1 7 orders provided for 
one manufacturing use class and 12 orders provided 
for two or more manufacturing use classes. By 1945, 
8 of 26 markets had one manufacturing use class and 
the other 18 had two or more manufacturing use 
classes.4 
At one time, as many as eight separate manufac-
turing use classes were employed under the New York 
order to: 1) reflect the use value of milk in such 
products individually, and 2) insure that the milk 
associated with each plant would be accepted for 
processing. 
'Purce ll , Margaret R. and Louis F. Herrmann. Dec. 1958 . Ex-
perience w ith Class ification of Milk in Federal Order Markets. AMS, 
USDA, MRR No. 288, p. 18. 
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About 1950, a growing feeling developed that the 
number of reserve milk classes should be limited and 
more emphasis should be placed on returning to pro-
ducers the highest possible price for reserve supplies 
going into manufacturing uses. This could best be 
achieved with a single reserve class. By the end of 
195 7, 56 of the 68 orders in effect provided for only 
two use classifications-one for fluid use and one for 
manufacturing use. 
In the late 1950's, a disenchantment with prod-
uct price formulas emerged. In part, this was due 
to the tendency for product price formulas to remain 
in effect for long periods of time without a change in 
the make allowance. The make allowance and oth-
er elements of the formula may have reflected compe-
titive pay prices in an area at the time of adoption, 
but as time went on, new technology and other factors 
affecting plant operating costs brought about signi-
ficant changes in costs and the make allowance be-
came obsolete. 
By the early 1960's, the problem associated with 
the use of different measures of price for reserve milk 
in different areas began to emerge. The Northeast-
M idwest problem involved a concern on the part of 
the M idwest manufacturing industry regarding prices 
for reserve milk in the Northeast that were established 
at significantly lower levels than the going value of 
manufacturing milk in the M idwest. This situ ation 
appeared to place Midwest firms at a competitive 
disadvantage in selling dairy products in the East. 
The Northeast-Midwest situation brought into 
focus the problems and pressures that d~velop ·if re-
serve milk is priced at different levels in different mar-
kets. In·attempting to resolve the problem, empha-
sis was put on need for uniformity and consistency 
in order provisions, including those for pricing re-
serve milk. A decision following a hearing on the 
Northeast markets in 1962 contained the following 
statement: 
"In the present hearing, the evidence presented, 
taken in its entirety, represented a broad, almost 
nationwide viewpoint concerning the implica-
tions on the national markets for dairy products 
when prices in the Northeastern markets for milk 
in manufacturing uses tend to depart from the 
· general level and trend of prices to dairy farmers 
g~nerally for milk in these uses. The milk used 
in iTI,anufactured products under these orders, 
and particularly Order No. 2, represents signi-
ficant quantities. The large urban areas of the 
'.Northeast represent principal markets for manu-
factured dairy products such as butter and 
cheese produced in other parts of the nation. 
Thus, on the basis of the evidence presently be-
fore the Secretary, the pricing of reserve milk to 
producers in the Northeastern Federal ord:r 
markets is no longer a matter of local economic 
interest only and, therefore, cannot be dealt with 
simply in local terms." 5 
Another consideration in shifting away from 
product formulas was the elimination of problems as-
sociated with make allowances. Competitive pay 
prices automatically reflect changes in plant efficien-
cies; they also reflect prices reported paid by plants 
rather than prices that plants could afford to pay. 
The widespread adoption of the Minnesota-Wiscon-
sin manufacturing grade milk price series as the basis 
for pricing reserve milk grew out of these conside~a­
tions. The 1961 Chicago decision on reserve milk 
pricing stated: 
"The use of the competitive pay price method of 
pricing milk is based upon the premise that in a 
highly competitive economy, dairy concerns will 
tend to purchase milk at prices commensurate 
with the more efficient concerns' ability to pay 
for the product. As shifts occur in the relation-
ship between finished product prices, one group 
of processors may be able to pay higher prices. 
The other processors must meet or approximate 
these prices, or lose their supplies. If a dairy 
'Federal Register, Jan. 26, 1962, 27:308. 
concern fails to make the necessary adjustments, 
it will, in time, be forced out of business. In-
creasing labor and other costs will tend to re-
duce prices paid for milk. On the other hand, 
the use of new assembling, processing, packag-
ing, and marketing techniques, which reduce 
costs or increase product returns, will tend to in-
crease prices paid for milk. These upward or 
downward adjustments in costs would be auto-
matically reflected in reserve milk prices by us-
ing the competitive pay_ prices method of pric-
• "G mg. 
In effect, since the early 1960's USDA policy 
has been to move toward the establishment of essen-
tially uniform prices for reserve milk supplies in· all 
markets and to keep such prices up to date with 
changes in conditions in the dairy industry, as mea-
sured by prices paid for such milk in the open-com-
petitive market. 
Some special situations continued to be observed. 
The butter-powder "snubber" price was specified in 
a number of markets where butter-powder plants 
handled most of the reserve milk. This option pro-
vided relief to butter-powder plants at times when 
the value of cheese was high relative to the value of 
butter and powder. The findings and conclusions 
of the decision to adopt the butter-powder snubber 
in the Puget Sound market included the following: 
"Recognition should be given, nevertheless, to 
the possibility that a particular segment of the 
manufactured milk industry may be unduly in-
fluenced occasionally by certain supply-demand 
conditions not affecting the remainder of the in-
dustry. Such conditions may not be reflected 
sufficiently in the Minnesota-Wisconsin price 
series. Because of the importance of butter and 
powder manufacturing in this market, it is de-
sirable that the Puget Sound Class II price not 
exceed a price level based on a butter-powder 
formula. Using a butter-powder price as a ceil-
ing will insure that the Class II price will continue 
to reflect the product values of butter and pow-
der in the· event of an undue divergence in the 
relationship bet~een such values and the Minne-
sota-Wisconsin prices. If the Class II price is 
too high relative to the value of the residual uses 
for surplus milk, the associations cannot handle 
such milk except at a financial loss. In this cir-
cumstance, members of the associations would 
be penalized relative to nonmember producers 
on the market."7 
6Ibid, August 9, 1961, 26:7136. 
7 Ibid, May 13, 1966, 31 :7066. 
. In :he early 1970's, hearings were held to pro-
vide umform classification provisions. During the 
course of the hearings, considerable attention was fo-
cused on the pricing provisions for reserve milk which 
varied among the markets. While emphasis was on 
the classification provisions, it became apparent that 
the Federal order program could not deal with classi-
fication provisions without considering the pricing of 
reserve milk supplies. Reserve milk pricing provi-
sions were thus subject to extensive review. As a re-
sult of the hearings, uniform classification provisions 
and adoption of the M-W price as the sole factor in 
moving prices for Class III and Class II mill~ were 
implemented in 39 Federal order markets. 
A number of markets not involved in the classi-
fication hearing used the lower of the butter-powder 
formula price or the M-W price as the Class II price. 
When the butter-powder snubber price began run-
ning substantially below the M-W price in the last 
quarter of 1973, immediate action was needed to 
eliminate the competitive disparity. The decision to 
remove the butter-powder snubber provided the fol-
lowing explanation: 
"A compelling reason that immediate action be 
taken is to eliminate the competitive disparity 
that currently exists between processors of re-
serve milk in the eight markets under considera-
tion and similar processors in other Federal or-
ders and unregulated processors of manufac-
tured dairy products. The competitive market 
for products manufactured from reserve milk is 
essentially national in scope. Hence, dairy pro-
ducts manufactured from Federal order priced 
reserve milk compete with products made from 
unregulated manufacturing grade milk. In 
recognition of this fact, it is essential that prices 
for reserve milk be maintained at comparable 
levels among Federal order markets with prevail-
ing competitive pay prices for manufacturing 
grade milk at plants buying such milk. 
"Under existing circumstances, the current 
prices of reserve milk, as established by the but-
ter-powder price formula in the eight markets 
under consideration, are substantially below the 
competitive market value of milk for similar uses 
in other Federal orders and unregulated proces-
sors of manufacturing grade milk. Processors 
of reserve milk in the eight markets have a sub-
stantially lower milk cost, and thus, higher gross 
margins are available to them than for their 
competitors. This disparity, if permitted to 
continue, will lead to dislocation of normal effi-
cient marketing channels. To achieve competi-
tive equality, it is necessary to provide uniform 
pricing of reserve milk under the eight orders 
herein considered and the adjacent nearby or-
ders to the West, as well as align such prices with 
the competitive pay prices being paid for the ma-
jority of the unregulated manufacturing grade 
milk in the United States. It is concluded, 
therefore, that this objective can best be achieved 
through the use of the Minnesota-Wisconsin 
price series. It is quite evident that current re-
serve milk prices in the eight markets herein con-
sidered are not providing producers a return for 
that portion of their milk utilized in manufac-
tured dairy products reflecting its full use value. 
Producers should not be expected to continue to 
accept less for their milk not needed for Class I 
uses than its full value."8 
Over the years, changes in the pricing of milk 
used in manufactured products have included: 1) re-
'lbid, March 29, 1974, 39:11567-8. 
TABLE 1.-Pricing Factors Used for Reserve Milk Pricing in Federal Order Markets ·for Selected Periods 1956 
to 1978. · ' 
No. of Markets 
December October October January 
Price Factors 1956 1967 1971 1978 
Minnesota-Wisconsin price only 0 31 30 42 
U. S. manufacturing price only 8 2 0 
Local plant price only 11 0 0 0 
Product price: 
One 16 10 7 0 
More than one 4 4 4 0 
M·W price in conjunction with: 
Another competitive pay price 0 2· 0 0 
Product price 0 15 18 5 
Other competitive pay price(s) 
and product price(s) 37 4 0 
Total number of markets 68 74 62 47 
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placement of product price formulas with competi-
tive pay price formulas, 2) elimination of local plant 
averages as a competitive pay price factor, 3) substi-
tution of the Minnesota-Wisconsin manufacturing 
5rade milk price for the Midwestern Condensery price 
and the U. S. Average Manufacturing Grade Milk 
price as the competitive pay price, 4) adoption of the 
M-W price in all markets as the price mover for milk 
used in manufactured products, and 5) placement of 
greater reliance on regional hearings to deal with re-
serve milk pricing because of the problems of making 
price decisions on a piecemeal basis. Table 1 shows 
the pricing factors used for reserve milk pricing in 
Federal order markets for selected periods from 1956 
to 1977. 
At the present time, as shown by the data in 
Table 1, the Minnesota-Wisconsin price is the sole 
factor used for pricing reserve milk in 42 of the 4 7 
Federal order markets. In the other five markets, 
all in the Northwest, the Minnesota-Wisconsin price 
is used in conjunction with the butter-powder snub-
ber to price reserve milk. However, the butter-pow-
der snubber has not been the effective price in those 
five markets since March 1976 because the specified 
make allowances no longer fit the situation. 
COMPLEX ISSUES IN RESERVE MILK PRICING 
Two difficult questions complicate the adminis-
tration of reserve milk prices. These are: 1) Should 
the same reserve milk price be implemented in all 
regulated markets, even when reserve milk handling 
costs may vary among markets? and 2) Should one 
reserve milk price class be defined, or would reserve 
milk pricing policy be better served by defining mul-
tiple reserve milk use classes? While an attempt is 
made to keep these two matters separate, several simi-
lar factors relate to each question. The underlying 
matter of what efficiency level reserve milk prices 
should be geared to is implied in both questions. 
Reserve Milk Prices in Different Markets 
A continuing issue in the question of reserve milk 
pricing is whether or not the same reserve milk price 
should be used in all regulated markets. Since there 
is a general presumption that reserve milk in differ-
ent markets is processed into similar products, and 
these products, such as butter, nonfat dry milk, and 
cheese, move in national distribution at very low 
transfer costs, the apparent answer to the question is 
that, indeed, the same price for reserve milk should 
be adopted in all markets. Otherwise, handlers of 
the manufactured dairy products would be arbitra-
rily advantaged or disadvantaged in different markets, 
depending on the specific reserve milk price they were 
charged. However, several questions complicate the 
issue. 
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Three of these questions include: 1) What kinds 
of variations exist in the usages of reserve milk by 
type of product among markets? 2) What kinds of 
variations exist in the volumes and costs of reserve 
milk among markets? 3) What kinds of variations 
exist in terms of who is responsible for disposition of 
reserve milk among markets? 
Product Differences Among Markets 
In some markets and in some regions of markets, 
considerable product specialization occurs in the pro-
cessing of reserve milk. In such cases, a strong ra-
tionale can be advanced for establishing the reserve 
milk price primarily in relation to the specific prod-
ucts manufactured in that market. For example, if 
most of the reserve milk in a market is manufactured 
into butter and nonfat dry milk, it makes sense from 
a market clearing viewpoint to price the reserve milk 
in that market on the basis of the value of milk for 
butter-powder. Otherwise, the reserve milk price 
may differ substantially from what local handlers 
economically could afford to pay; or, in the opposite 
situation, the reserve milk price may be at levels that 
give local manufacturers a substantial economic ad-
vantage. 
In fact, there is substantial product specializa-
tion in many markets. The state of California, which 
is not a participant in the Federal milk order pro-
gram, establishes a reserve class price using a butter-
powder formula because the dominant usage of re-
serve milk in the pool is for butter and nonfat dry 
milk. Processors of reserve milk in California main-
tain that they would be in an untenable marketing 
position if they were subject to a reserve price that 
was not sensitively geared to wholesale prices for but-
ter and nonfat dry milk. 
Similarly, in some Federal order markets where 
butter and nonfat dry milk dominate the usage of 
Class III (reserve) milk, butter-powder price options 
have been made available and continue to be avail-
able as a means of assuring that reserve milk will be 
priced at levels that will not penalize those interests 
who have the responsibility for disposition of reserve 
milk. 
The Federal order program has detailed data on 
the extent to which there is product specialization of 
reserve milk usage by market. Increasing propor-
tions of reserve milk have been used for cheese manu-
facture in recent years, while usage for butter has 
been trending downward. In 1970, 67% of the re-
serve milk used for manufacturing butter and cheese 
in Federal order markets was used for manufacturing 
butter. By 1975, butter and cheese were using al-
most equal volumes of reserve milk. However, 
among individual markets, considerable variation 
exists in how Grade A reserve supplies are utilized. 
Data on the differences among markets in 1975 are 
shown in Table 2. For the 34 markets identified in 
Table 2, butter accounted for more than two-thirds 
of the butter-cheese milk usage in 13 of the markets. 
In six markets, cheese accounted for more than two-
thirds of the butter-cheese usage of milk. In 15 of 
the markets, butter and cheese together accounted 
for more than two-thirds of the butterfat utilization. 
Volume Differences Among Markets 
Different volume factors in different markets af-
fect the quantities and costs of reserve milk available 
for manufacture. As a result, the costs of processing 
reserve milk in plants in different markets vary. In 
some TI;_arkets, the total annual volumes of reserve 
milk are much greater than in other markets. Also, 
volume fluctuations associated with .Production sea-
sonality, consumption seasonality, and daily market 
operations differ among markets, causing higher costs 
of handling reserve milk in some markets as compared 
to others. The differences in reserve milk volume fac-
tors among markets which are associated with cost 
differences in handling reserve milk among markets 
lead inevitably to the question of whether or not such 
differences should be recognized in establishing re-
serve milk prices. 
Volume and Utilization Differences Among 
Markets. The percentage of producer deliveries used. 
in manufactured dairy products varies substantially 
TABLE 2.-Butterfat in Butter and Cheese as Percentages of Total Butterfat 
Used in the Production of the Two Products and as a Percentage of Total Butterfat 
Used in the Production of Manufactured Products, Federal Order Markets, 1975. 
Percent of Two-product P.ercenl of Total 
'total Butterfal Used in Manufactured Product Butterfat Used in 
Bulter Cheese Butter and Chees,e 
Eastern South Dakota 100.0 0 80.2 
Chattanooga 95.1 4.9 41.5 
Oklahoma Metropolitan 94.6 5.4 68.8 
Nebraska-Western Iowa 75.9 24.1 73.4 
Minnosota-North Dakota 74.7 25.3 89.6 
Indiana 73.5 26.5 60.0 
Ohio Valley 71.0 29.0 43.3 
North Central Iowa 70.9 29.1 51.2 
Nashville 68.5 31.5 68.2 
Puget Sound 68.5 31.5 68.9 
Georgia 67.5 32.5 47.3 
Kansas City 67.5 32.5 86.4 
Des Moines 66.9 33.1 82.5 
Southern Illinois 65.2 34.8 77.9 
Lou isvi I le-Lexington-Evansvi I le 64.8 35.2 66.6 
Paducah 59.9 40.1 52.9 
Southern Michigan 59.2 40.8 51.I 
Oregon-Washington 58.5 41.5 70.5 
Middle Atlantic 50.7 49.3 33. I 
Eastern Colorado 50.0 50.0 52.5 
Central Illinois 48.9 51. I 56.8 
Quad Cities-Dubuque 48.8 51.2 82.4 
St. Louis-Ozarks 47.5 52.5 45.4 
Minneapolis-St.· Paul 44.0 56.0 92.4 
Appalachian 42.2 57.8 50.4 
Northern Louisiana 38.6 61.4 42.7 
Texas 36.8 63.2 35.7 
New York-New Jersey 36.7 63.3 45.5 
Boston Regional 31.6 68.4 43.8 
Eastern Ohio-Western Pennsylvania 24.5 75.5 41.5 
Great Basin 23.7 76.3 71 .4 
Southeastern Minnesota-Northern Iowa 22.1 77.9 40.2 
Chicago Regional 21.2 78.8 78.4 
Texas Panhandle 4.3 95.7 8.5 
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TABLE 3.-Distribution of Federal Order Markets According to the Volume and Percentage of Milk Used in 
Other Than Class I, 1975. 
Percent of Milk in 










among markets. In 1975, the percentages of milk 
in other than Class I usage ranged from 8 % to 77 % . 
In 21 markets, the percentage of milk used for non-
Class I products was less than 30%, while 6 markets 
reflected reserve milk usage of more than 50% 
(Table 3). It is also evident from Table 3 that, in 
general, larger markets had higher percentages of 
milk used for other than Class I purposes. For ex-
ample, the 21 markets showing less than 30% of their 
milk going for non-Class I usage accounted for only 
2.32 billion lb (8%) of the reserve milk category. 
At the same time, the six markets showing more than 
50% of their milk going for non-Class I usage ac-· 
counted for 9.28 billion lb ( 32%) of the reserve milk 
category. 
Since higher unit manufacturing costs are usual-
ly associated with smaller and more variable volumes 
of milk, it has been observed that the cost of handling 
reserve milk in some of the smaller and higher Class I 
utilization markets may be higher than in other fluid 
milk markets. The question of whether or not an 
adjustment in the reserve class price should be im-
plemented in order to wholly or partially offset the 
cost differences must then be considered. 
Vol. of Milk 
Percent of Markets (bil. lb) Percent of Volume 
7 0.13 
20 0.75 2 
11 1.44 5 
27 8.45 29 
24 9.10 31 
5 1.19 4 
4 7.47 26 
2 0.62 2 
100% 29.15 bil. lb 100% 
Another dimension of this problem is that, with-
in a given market, the responsibility for processing re-
serve milk or non-Class I usage falls disproportion-
ately on the different handlers in the market. The 
data in Table 4 illustrate the situation. 
To use the Georgia and Kansas City markets as · 
an example, in both markets there were three handlers 
with less than 20% Class I utilization. However, in· 
the Georgia market these handlers apparently were 
small and accounted for only 12% of the market's 
reserve supplies, while in the Kansas City market the 
three handlers accounted for nearly one-half of the 
reserve supplies. Since the disposition of reserve milk 
represents an essential service to the total market, it 
has been argued that the price obligations of the non- / 
Class I handlers should be "fair" or economic not 
only in terms of the market values of the products 
manufactured, but also fair in terms of the principle 
that all handlers in a market have a responsibility for 
the necessary reserve requirements in the market. It 
is argued that some relief in the costs of handling re-
serve milk should be provided by establishing reserve 
class prices that offer some counter-balance to the 
higher costs. 
TABLE 4.-Distribution of Handlers by Percentage oi' Handlers' Receipts Used in Other Than Class I, and 
Percentage of !Receipts Handled by Those Handlers with Class I Utilization Less Than 20%, Selected Markets, De-
cember 1975. ' 
Percen? of Handlers' 
Receipts Used in 
Other Than Class I 





Total handlers in market 
Handlers in 81-1 00 % group: 
Percent of total handlers in market 
Percent of total market non-Class I 

















No. of Handlers in Market 
Puget Sound St. Louis-Ozarks Southern Illinois 
6 12 5 
4 5 8 
3 3 
1 3 
4 2 7 
16 23 26 
Percent 
25 9 27 
70 11 17 
Other Factors Affecting Costs of Handling 
Reserve Milk Among Markets. Substantial varia-
tion in costs of processing in nonregulated manufac-
turing dairy plants is illustrated in most cost studies of 
the dairy industry. In the 1965 Minnesota-Wisconsin 
study, operating costs were collected for 52 dairy 
plants. That analysis showed per hundredweight 
costs of butter plants to vary from 88 to 111 % of the 
average cost for all butter plants. Butter-powder 
plant costs varied from 85 to 118% of average costs. 
Cheese plant costs varied from 84 to 103% of aver-
age costs.9 
Under Federal orders, regulated manufacturing 
milk plants must all pay the same prices for manu-
facturing use milk, regardless of the cost situation 
they face. Yet there are a number of reasons why 
regulated manufacturing milk plants in many order 
markets probably have lower levels of efficiency than 
non-regulated plants and, therefore, higher process-
ing costs. First, the M-W price is the pay price for 
plants in an intensive milk producing area where 
there are large numbers of plants, and where sup-
posedly it is relatively easy for plants to obtain vol-
umes of milk to achieve efficient sized operations. 
The volumes of surplus milk in some Federal order 
milk markets are so small that there are no manu-
facturing facilities within the market. In Georgia, 
for example, there are no plants for making butter, 
nonfat dry milk, or hard cheese. When milk surplus 
in excess of fluid and soft manufactured dairy prod-
ucts develops, it is transported to Tennessee for pro-
cessing. The cooperative handler of the milk reports 
that it netted an average of 37.6 cents per cwt less 
than the .Georgia surplus price because of the extra 
hauling associated with the milk.10 However, the 
same cooperative realized an average return in 1971 
of 9. 7 cents per cwt over the Nash ville Class II price 
on surplus milk that it moved to non-pool plants for 
manufacturing.11 
Even where the Federal order markets have lo-
cally regulated manufacturing milk plants to handle 
surplus, it is argued that they are likely to be less effi-
cient than non-regulated manufacturing milk plants 
in Minnesota and Wisconsin. The major argument 
is that they have greater variation in milk volumes 
than nonregulated plants. Most, if not all, of the 
seasonal variation in milk supplies in regulated mar-
kets is borne by the surplus plants. Two cooperative 
surplus plants in Tennessee and Louisiana reported 
volumes of less than 500,000 lb in September 1970-
the low production month. In April, volumes 
reached .23.9 million lb in the Tennessee plant and 
91bid, p. 18. 
10 lbid, March 6, 1974, 39:8717. 
11fbido 
5.8 million lb in the Louisiana plant.12 The volume 
in the one case was almost 50 times as great in 1 
month as another. In Minnesota, on the other hand, 
each manufacturing plant probably faces annual sup-
ply variations similar to the state average for all milk 
production. For 1975, the production in the high 
month was 58 % greater than in the low month. Re-
serve milk seasonal variation in Federal order markets 
reaches 250% of the low month's receipts in the St. 
Louis-Ozarks and Georgia markets and 350% in the 
Georgia market (see Table 5). 
Federal order manufacturing milk plants also 
have substantially greater day-to-day variations in 
milk supplies. Fluid bottling plants normally bottle 
milk for fluid distribution 5 days a week, Monday 
through Friday. Some plants occasionally bottle 
milk on Saturday. Packaged milk sales, furthermore, 
peak on Thursday and Friday. Thus, to meet these 
needs plus weekend sales when no bottling is carried 
out requires larger quantities of milk in fluid plants 
on Thursdays than any other day of the week. 
Data in Table 6 for the Chicago market show 
how daily reserve milk supplies fluctuate at the sup-
ply plant level on a seasonal basis. 
The volumes ·of milk shown in the table repre-
sent the extra milk on that particular day that the co-
operatives had to use for manufacturing. It is evi-
dent that during the flush season there were substan-
tial volumes of reserve milk available for manufac-
turing on each day of the week. However, in No-
vember volumes of reserve milk were down in total 
and substantial fluctuations occurred on a daily 
basis. Both seasonal and daily fluctuations in re-
serve milk volume aggravate the cost problem in 
handling reserve milk. It is generally accepted that 
a stable volume of reserve milk at capacity would 
be associated with minimization of handling costs. 
The Chicago market pools a large volume of 
milk annually and reflects a relatively low Class I 
utilization. Both of these factors tend to maintain 
volumes of reserve milk supplies at levels that can 
be handled economically. Many other fluid milk 
markets have smaller pools and higher Class .I utili-
zations. As a result, costs of handling reserve milk, 
particularly with respect to the problem of; daily 
fluctuations in the flush season, would be high as 
compared to the . Chicago situation: In some in-
stances, costs would be high enough to preclude the 
construction of any local manufacturing facilities. 
As a result, other means of handling the reserve milk, 
such as diversion to more distant manufacturing 
plants, have to be implemented. Such alternatives 




































































in N ""'1' LO'° LO t-.... °' ro ro N f'., LO ~ j 00 s.~ ~ s :::!: s 00 ....- ....- !'-. ~ 
a . 





r- ....- - r- ..... 
M...OM.-CQOOJ'-.,.LOON--Or-
t-.... 0- NM M LO ..-,cot-.... ..0 LO 0-





{; ~ ~g~~!~~;t~R~o: ~ 
~ ..0 N N LO ...- -.0 N LO N LO ""'1" ....- D .. 
°' O"'Or-ON.-Oocor--..o-o- ·rn 
0 







TABLE 6.-Daily Average Receipts Minus Ship-
ments to Distributing Plants by Five Operating Co-
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transportation involved. The question is whether 
or not some recognition of cost differences should be 
considered in establishing reserve class milk prices. 
One of the difficulties in allowing reserve milk 
pay prices in Federal orders to reflect different costs 
is objectively determining what the differences are 
and which one should be allowed for in reserve class 
pncmg. Any allowance will undoubtedly continue 
to result in inequities-inequities between regulated 
plants within a market, between regulated plants in 
different markets, and between regulated and non-
regulated manufacturing milk plants. The USDA 
has taken the position that the additional costs, be-
cause of efficiency differences, are costs of servicing 
the fluid market-costs of balancing fluid milk sup-
plies with fluid milk needs. It is maintained that 
these costs should therefore be reflected in service 
charges to buyers of milk for fluid purposes. 
The question of adjusting the reserve milk price 
to reflect costs clearly is a complicated one. How-
ever, in measuring the question against the several 
objectives of reserve milk pricing, the inference is 
that reserve milk pricing policy can be better served 
by avoiding adjustments in the reserve milk price 
that would reflect reserve handling costs. Market 
service charges in the fluid market, whether effected 
bv· cooperatives or authorized by order provisions, 
would be the preferred means of recovering the costs 
of handling reserve milk. 
Differences Among Markets in Terms 
of Cooperatives' Role in Handling Reserve Milk 
A primary service that dairy marketing co-
operatives provide milk producers is that of guaran-
teeing a market. In the process of guaranteeing a 
market, cooperatives move into a major responsi-
bility in the handling of reserve milk supplies. Con-
siderable variation exists among regions and among 
markets with respect to the proportion of milk pro-
duers who are members of cooperatives,· and with 
respect to the proportion of reserve milk handled by 
cooperatives. In all Federal order markets, as of 
December 1975, 86.4% of producers shipping to 
market were members of a cooperative- association. 
Among the nine regions of Federal order markets, -
the Middle Atlantic region had the ·1owest percent-
age of producers· in cooperatives, and the Mountain 
region had the highest percentage of cooperative 
members. 
A measure of the strength of individual co-
operatives within markets may be observed by re-
viewing data on the percent of producers in a mar-
ket belonging to the largest cooperative in the mar-
ket. Data reflecting this measure are reported in 
Table 7. 
In 7 of the 56 markets, all producers on the 
market belonged to the largest (and therefore only) 
cooperative in. the market. At the other extreme, 
seven markets reported fewer than 30% of the mar-
ket producers belonging to the largest cooperative 
in the market. The differential role of cooperatives 
in handling reserve milk supplies is substantiated in 
Table 8. In this table, differences in the propor-
tions of non-Class I usage by cooperatives as of De-
cember 1974 are indicated. While cooperatives 
processed, transferred, and/ or diverted about 65 % 
of the non-Class I milk priced under Federal orders 
in December 1974, the proportions in individual 
markets ranged from less than 10% (five markets) 
to more than 90% (eight markets). 
The differences between cooperatives and pro-
prietary firms in handling reserve milk appear to be 
very closely related to the products being manufac-
tured. 
Cooperatives are usually the most important 
organizations in handling reserve milk supplies in 
markets where most of the reserve milk is utilized for 
butter and nonfat dry milk production. 
· Since cooperatives are an important institution 
in handling reserve milk, and since the handling of 
reserve milk can be a costly process, it has been ob-
served that concessions should be made in the re-
serve price in order that cooperatives, and thus 
member producers, not be penalized in performing 
this essential market function. However, since all 
reserve milk in a market must finally be handled by 
some interest, the case for price concessions cannot 
be restricted to the cooperative's role in handling re-
serve milk. If there is to be a cost basis for adjust-
ing the reserve milk price, all interests handling re-
serve milk, proprietary firms and cooperatives, 
should benefit equally from the price policy. Ad-
justments in reserve milk prices on this basis would 
not be predicated on whether the reserve milk wa'l 
handled by choice or necessity. 
13 
TABLE 7.-Distribution of Federal Order Markets 
.by· Percent of Producers Belonging to Largest Coopera-
tive in Market, December 1975. 
Percenl of Total 
Members o·f · Largest· No. of Federal Federal Order Milk 
Cooperatives (Percent) Order Markets Represented 
100.0 7 
90-99.9 7 6 
80-89.9 5 3 
70-79.9 8 6 
60-69.9 9 20 
50-59.9 6 9 
40-49.9 5 20 
30-39.9 2 8 
Less than 30 7 27 
TABLE 8.-Proportions of Non-Class I Usage 
Handled by Cooperatives, by Volume of Milk and 
Number of Markets, December 1974. 
Percent of Other Than 
Class I Milk Manufactured, 
Transferred, or Diverted Volume of No. of 
by Cooperatives Milk Markets 
(mil. lb) 
More than 90 216.5 8 
70-89.9 337.6 11 
50-69.9 469.0 17 
30-49.9 84.2 8 
10-29.9 18.7 8 
Less than 10 0.6 5 
Total 1,126.8 57 
The equity aspects of handling reserve milk may 
be more severe within a market than among mar-
kets. Within a market, one organization such as an 
operating ·cooperative may carry most of the re-
sponsibility for handling reserve milk. Meanwhile, 
other interests including bargaining associations, 
non-members, and proprietary firms may effectively 
incur neither responsibility nor cost in the reserve 
milk handling function. This issue does not get to 
the question of whether or not the same reserve milk 
price should be used in all markets. However, this 
equity problem in reserve milk pricing in the future 
will likely become more serious within markets than 
among markets because market consolidation will 
tend to create markets that have more similar char-
acteristics, even while greater variation is generated 
within the organization of any particular market. 
Multiple Reserve Milk Price Classes 
The question of whether or not manufacturing 
use milk should be assigned to and priced in more 
than one price class according to use is often raised 
with respect to reserve milk pricing. Currently, in 
most Federal order markets, three price classes are 
applied to all milk. Reserve milk is normally 
equated with Class III milk. Products usually de-
fined in Class III include "hard" cheese, butter, dry 
milk products, and evaporated and condensed milk. 
The large proportion of Class III milk used in the 
manufacture of butter, nonfat dry milk, and cheese 
limits most analysis of the surplus question to these 
three products. In this section, some of the issues 
involved in establishing a single reserve class price 
or separate reserve classes are examined. 
During the early period of the Federal milk 
order program, there were variations among mar-
kets in: a) the number of use classes, b) the prod-
ucts in each class, and c) the prices for each use 
class. Over time, there was a gradual reduction in 
the number of use classes. By the end of 1957, less 
than one-fifth of the order markets had more than 
two use classes. In those markets w'ith two classes, 
ice cream and cottage cheese as well as butter, non-
fat dry milk, and cheese were in the lowest use class. 
During the early 1960's, the need developed for clo-
ser coordination and more uniformity of order pro-
visions as the increased mobility of milk supplies 
caused local markets to gradually lose their identity. 
The merging of orders and the adoption of a uni-
form formula for moving Class I prices in all mar-
kets were two results of this development. It also 
impacted on the classification provisions in orders. 
The 39-market decision (March 6, 1974) est2b-
lishing three classes for pricing (Class I for fluid 
products, Class II for the soft products regularly 
supplied from local milk supplies, and Class III for 
the remaining manufactured dairy products) re-
flects an apparent policy of USDA toward: a) a 
uniform number of use classes among markets, b) 
making the products in each class uniform among 
markets, c) making the price for each class uniform 
among markets, and d) a single use class for milk 
used to make butter, nonfat dry milk, and cheese. 
Two objectives have been advanced for estab-
lishment of multiple manufacturing use classes for 
milk: 
l. Total producer returns may be increased 
in situations where values of milk for dif-
ferent uses vary substantially from time to 
time; also, when all milk is Grade A and 
pooled, returns may be increased by more 
extended price classification. 
2. Multiple classes for pricing of manufactur-
ing use milk would avoid or reduce some 
of the pressures on regulated processors 
which are caused by fixing a single price 
for manufacturing use milk regardless of 
the net returns forthcoming in each use. 
14 
The extensive literature available on milk pric-
ing does not focus on the question of defining more 
than one reserve class. In the 1962 Nourse Com-
mittee Report on the Federal order programs, the 
issue of the number of surplus classes was sum-
marized as follows: 
"In considering the problem of the appropriate 
number of surplus classes to be used in the price 
structure for a local fluid milkshed, therefore, 
two questions must be answered. The first of 
these is, What is the nature of the demand for 
the alternative products for which the total 
milkshed supplied may be used? The second 
question becomes, Are these demands signifi-
cantly different from each other ?"13 
There are no simple answers to questions raised 
about the number of reserve classes. In fact, 
USDA's Milk Pricing and Advisory Committee, 
which was established primarily to analyze alterna-
tive means for priCing Class I milk, observed that 
this issue was sufficiently complex to require a sepa-
rate study.14 
A 1969 study of the Minnesota-Wisconsin price 
series discussed some of the issues and problems of a 
single reserve vs. multiple reserve class prices in Fed-
eral order markets, but made no recommendation as 
to which would be preferred.15 
Increasing Producer Returns 
with Multiple Reserve Classes 
In order for multiple reserve classes to increase 
producer revenue, two conditions that must be met 
have been noted. "First, the reaction to changes 
in price must be different for the buyers of milk for 
one product than for buyers who use it for another 
product. Second, buyers of (milk for manufactur-
ing uses) must not have available alternative sources 
of milk or the ingredients of milk. " 16 Whether or not 
there are different reactions to price changes in the 
different uses is denoted by the elasticity of demand. 
If the demand elasticities for milk in each manufac-
turing use are different, then total revenue can be 
increased by setting prices at different levels for each 
use. 
The impact of charging different prices for all 
milk used for cheese and for milk used for butter and 
"Nourse, E. G., et al. April 1962. Report to the Secretary ot 
Agriculture by the Federal Milk Order Study Committee. U. S. Dept. 
of Agr., Part II, Sec. 'I. 
'"Knutson, Ronald D., et al. March 1973. Milk Pricing Policy 
and Procedures. U. S. Dept. of Agr., Part II, pp. 12, 59. 
"'Hammond, J. W. and T. F. Graf. May 1969. Study of Prices 
for Milk in Manufacturing Uses. Univ. of Minn., Agri. Exp Sta., Bull 
497, pp. 23-24. 
16Clarke, D. A., Jr. and Louis F. Herrmann. March 1961. Class 
Ill Milk in the New York Milkshed: VI-Economic Analysis of Class 
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nonfat dry milk is illustrated in Table 9. The first 
row of the table presents actual average 1974 prices 
paid for milk used in both enterprises, $7.15 per cwt. 
The estimated farm level demand for elasticities 
were -.209 for milk used in cheese and -.827 for 
milk used for butter and nonfat dry milk.17 TheEe 
coefficients indicate that charging different prices 
for milk in each use will increase total producer re-
venue. The succeeding rows in Table 9 show the 
impacts of successive increases in prices for milk in 
cheese and the corresponding price decline for milk 
used in the two enterprises in 1974. According to 
these calculations, the total producer returns could 
have been increased by $330 million by fixing the 
cheese milk price at $9.00 per cwt and the butter-
powder milk price at $6.52 per cwt. In terms of 
blend price for milk in the two uses, the two prices 
would have yielded an average return of $7.87 per 
cwt for milk in manufacturing uses. 
For the above price discrimination procedure 
to be workable, some kind of national pool would be 
needed for payment to producers. A national pool-
ing mechanism would permit equitable distribution 
of the increased returns among producers regardless 
of the use made of their milk . 
The preceding is an indication of how increased 
classification and price discrimination could increase 
producer returns for milk. Such a procedure re-
sults in a decrease in total consumer welfare and 
would certainly be opposed by consumers and their 
representatives. As a price support mechanism, 
however, it does have some appeal because average 
producer prices can be increased without govern-
ment payments for subsidies or product purchases . 
Differences in Net Returns 
Between Manufactured Dairy Products . 
The second argument for permitting multiple 
reserve class prices is that net returns, i.e., the resid-
ual after substracting estimated costs of processing 
manufactured milk products, differ from plant to 
plant. Net returns may differ because the transport 
costs for finished products from processing plants to 
consuming markets differ according to location of the 
plants. However, the argument for multiple price 
classes is usually based on another characteristic of 
the manufacturing milk industry: Product prices 
for the different manufactured dairy products vary 
over time relative to one another and change the 
gross returns yielded from each hundredweight of 
milk. For given levels of · processing costs, this 
"'Calculated from retail demand elasticities in Thraen, C. S., 
J. W. Hammond, and B. M. Buxton, I 976, An Analysis of Household 
Consumption of Dairy Products, Univ. of Minn., Agr. Exp. Sta., Bull • 
515. 
means that net returns per hundredweight of milk 
will differ according to whether a plant is producing 
cheese, or butter and powder, or other manufac-
tured dairy products. 
In a nonregulated market, competition in the 
long run forces all plants producing manufactured 
dairy products to pay similar prices for milk. How-
ever, in a short run situation where net returns to 
one product (e.g., butter) increase relative to net re-
turns to cheese, cheese plant operators are faced with 
a dilemma. Should they pay the same price as the 
butter-powder plants and hope that the situation 
quickly corrects itself, or should they pay what they 
can afford to pay and hope that producerloyalty will 
maintain business until the situation adjusts? If 
price imbalance persists, cheese plants would have 
to reduce their pay price, and receipts of producer 
milk likely would decrease. As producers shift their 
milk to butter-powder plants, product prices should 
eventually adjust so that net returns again become 
equal. The point is that plants in an unregulated 
market are not required to pay precisely the same 
price for milk as are plants subject to Federal order 
regulation. 
In contrast to the assumptions of equilibrium 
models, processing plants do not always pay the 
same prices for milk in the absence of governmental 
controls. Several factors affect prices and are con-
sidered by the firm in establishing prices that are paid. 
First, not all plants are operating at the same level of 
efficiency, and therefore at the same level of proces-
sing costs. Transportation costs for the products to 
the consuming markets increase with distance from 
consuming markets. A recent study indicated that 
this results in generally declining milk prices in Min-
nesota and Wisconsin from the southeast regions to 
the northwest.18 Pay prices of an individual plant 
are also affected by competition. A competing plant 
may be paying more because it is producing a product 
that currently yields a greater net return, or it may be 
a much more efficient plant. To obtain milk for op-
eration, a given plant may therefore pay niore than 
justified by its own processing costs. 
The several factors affecting pay prices in non-
regulated markets result in substantial variations in 
pay prices. For example, in June 1965, nonregu-
lated dairy plant pay prices in Minnesota and Wis-
consin ranged from $2.94 to $3.57 per cwt at 3.5% 
butterfat test. November prices for that year ranged 
from $2.95 to $3.65 per cwt.19 In 1976, they ranged 
.between $7.80 and $8.90 in June and $8.30 to $9.20 
in August. 
18Hammond, J. W. and T. F. Graf, op. cit., p. 17. 
191bid, p. 20. 
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With a single manufacturing milk price under 
Federal orders, all plants are required to pay the same 
price for manufacturing use milk regardless of the net 
return in each use. This means that plants may be 
paying more or less than the milk is worth. The 
amounts that the actual pay price for manufacturing 
use milk exceeded or fell short of estimated net re-
turns in two uses are illustrated in the section on pro-
duct price formulas (Tables 43 and 44 using the de-
rived margins approach). During the 84-month 
period January 1971 to December 1977, the Mi:qne-
sota-Wisconsin price (the manufacturing use price 
in all Federal orders) exceeded the estimated net re-
turns to cheese production in 19 months and was less 
than the net return in 65 months. The maximum 
amount by which the net returns were exceeded by 
the M-W price was 30 cents per cwt. The maximum 
that net returns to cheese exceeded the M-W price 
was 50 cents per cwt. 
The net returns to butter and powder produc-
tion were exceeded by the M-W price in 38 of the 84 
months, were greater in 44 of the months, and the 
same in 2 months. In 2 of the months, the M-vV 
price exceeded the estimated net returns to butter-
powder by more than $1.00 per cwt. 
Obviously the requirement to pay a single price 
can impose a substantial cost on some plants. The 
fixing of separate prices that are more closely tied to 
the average returns for the use made of the milk is 
one way to deal with the problem. The problem is 
more serious with increased product specialization of 
handling of Federal order reserve milk. If facilities 
exist only to process one product, adjustments in use 
as relative product prices change are impossible. The 
degree of product specialization for selected Federal 
order markets was shown in Table 2. In those mar-
kets where there is substantial product specialization 
in the handling of reserve- milk supplies, processors 
may find difficulty in reallocating reserve milk to 
different uses. 
Multiple class pricing of reserve milk is complex 
in application. Arguments for multiple class pricing 
are strong. Yet there are a number of reasons for 
maintaining a single manufacturing use price. First, 
separate manufacturing use prices will not assure that 
all plants can afford the prices established by the 
regulation. The differences in ability to pay among 
plants making the same product may be as great as 
the differences associated with different products. 
Second, when or if net returns do differ among 
products, it is desirable to encourage utilization of 
milk in those uses that result in the highest return to 
producers rather than providing a means to permit 
use in lower valued products. A single price pro-
vides this encouragement. 
Shipping dock for reserve milk products at balancing plant. 
Third, being forced to pay more for milk than 
it is worth is not unique to a regulated price system. 
When butter-powder and cheese prices are out of 
line, nonregulated plants making one of the products 
have to pay more than they can afford to compete for 
milk. "Over time, price disparities for various prod-
ucts either balance out due to interaction of supply 
and demand, or plants shift to alternative higher price 
products." 20 Thus, a single Federal order manufac-
turing milk price may not be placing plants under 
any undue hardships. 
Based on the information developed in this re-
port, it is not possible to advance a specific recom-
mendation as to the number of reserve classes. That 
decision has to be formulated in the context of the 
several objectives of reserve milk pricing. As tho~e 
objectives are reviewed, it is evident that a single re-
serve class can serve some of the purposes advanta-
geously, while multiple reserve classes provide a bet-
ter fit for other objectives . The performance afforded 
by a single reserve class in recent years generally has 
been positive. There have been short run stresses in 
periods when product prices were not in their normal 
relationship. However, a single reserve class has 
brought some self-correction to this problem over time 
as milk usage shifted to the higher value product. 
Resolving the Multi-Market, Multi-Class 
Issues in Reserve Milk Pricing 
The complex issues that emerge in reserve milk 
pricing relate to matters of: 1) whether different re-
serve milk prices might be established in different 
'°Similar points were presented in Hammond, J . W. and T. F. 
Graf, Ibid, pp. 23-24. 
markets, 2) the number of reserve usage classes that 
might be defined, and 3) the level of reserve milk 
handling efficiency that should be reflected in the 
reserve class price. These issues cannot effectively 
be resolved by optimization procedures. A rigorous 
matching of each issue to the several objectives of re-
serve milk pricing is required to make the regulation 
decision that will result in the type of performance de-
sired in reserve milk marketing. 
The substantial rationale for adopting the same 
reserve price in all markets was noted previously. It 
should also be recognized that the U. S. Department 
of Agriculture has steadily moved in the direction of 
using the same reserve class price in all regulated mar-
kets. This movement was climaxed in early 1974 
when the so-called "39 market classification" deci-
sion was issued. This decision basically adopted a 
three-price class program and established a uniform 
reserve class price for all affected markets. A re-
view of that decision indicates the key factors that 
argued for the same reserve class price in all markets.21 
1. Differences in reserve milk prices among in-
terrelated markets cause inequities or com-
petitive disparities among competing hand-
lers of reserve milk. 
2. Class III price adjustments that would at-
tempt to reflect balancing costs in different 
markets would lead to a proliferation of dif-
ferent Class III prices that would aggravate 
the matter of establishing equal raw product 
costs. 
3. Regulated handlers of reserve class milk 
should not be given an arbitrary advantage 
"Federal Register, March 7, 1964. 39,9016-9020. 
over unregulated handlers of manufacturing 
grade milk, nor should they be put at a com-
petitive disadvantage. 
4. Implementation of lower reserve milk prices 
in some markets would mean that producers 
serving those markets would not be receiv-
ing a price for reserve milk equal to com-
petitive prices paid for manufacturing grade 
milk. 
The four factors are a direct application of most 
of the previously noted objectives of reserve milk pric-
ing. However; at least for some markets, it is ap-
parent that the objectives of: 1) maintaining ade-
quate manufacturing outlets, and 2) pricing reserve 
milk at a market clearing level were de-emphasized 
relative to the other objectives. 
Given the rationale for using the same reserve 
price in all markets and the tentative considerations 
relating to the number of reserve classes, the question 
remains as to what level of efficiency should be re-
flected in the reserve class price. Specifically, should 
the price permit a return to only the most efficiently 
regulated manufactured dairy product plants, to 
plants of average efficiency, or to the least efficient 
plants? Again, the answer can only be inferred from 
the several purposes of reserve milk pricing. 
Among the pricing objectives cited early in this 
report, the maintenance of adequate manufacturing 
outlets, the availability of milk for the fluid market, 
the relationship to unregulated manufacturing milk 
prices, the resource allocation factor, and the equity 
objective all bear directly on the efficiency question. 
These several objectives taken together suggest that 
some "average level of efficiency" be recognized in 
defining the reserve milk price. Since the intensive 
production and processing area for manufactured 
dairy products is in the upper Midwest, and since the 
handling of reserve milk in other regions of the United 
States generally may be subject to more market 
stresses, the average level of efficiency in the upper 
Midwest is the appropriate reference point. As noted 
earlier, the market stresses or reserve handling costs 
in regulated markets are better handled on a fluid 
market service charge basis and not by arbitrary ad-
justments in the reserve milk price. In addition, a 
reserve price based on the average efficiency in the 
upper Midwest should offer some incentive for plants 
in other markets to attain greater efficiencies. 
In summary, the combination of the same reserve 
class price in all markets, a single reserve usage class, 
and a recognized "average" efficiency level for es-
tablishing reserve milk prices have met the work-
ability criterion on a longer run basis. Most of the 
objectives of reserve milk pricing have been served 
effectively in recent years by implementing policy 
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along these lines. The basis for using the same re-
serve price in all markets is logical. The rationale 
for choosing a single reserve class and an average effi-
ciency level is less precise, but the process has met 
most of the purposes of reserve pricing in most mar-
kets most of the time. 
ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS FOR 
RESERVE MILK PRICING 
Given the eventual elimination of the Minnesota-
Wisconsin competitive pay price series, what alterna-
tives are available for pricing reserve milk in regu-
lated markets? In this section, four possible alter-
natives and the pros and cons of each are considered. 
These alternatives are: 1) development of an alter-
native competitive pay price series for the situation 
when all milk is Grade A and pooled, 2) formulation 
of an approximate product price formula ( s), 3) use 
of the public hearing process for direct establishment 
of reserve milk prices, and 4) adoption of an eco-
nomic index procedure for moving reserve milk prices. 
COMPETITIVE PAY PRICE 
Over the history of public administration of pro-
ducer milk pricing, some type of a competitive pay 
price series generally has been used to price reserve 
class milk. In recent years, in the Federal milk order 
program, the Minnesota-Wisconsin manufacturing 
grade milk price has become almost the exclusive 
basis for establishing monthly minimum prices for re-
serve (Class III) milk. With the projected disap-
pearance of a competitive pay price as the volume of 
manufacturing grade milk diminishes, the question is 
raised as to how essential a competitive pay price 
series is to the future determination of milk prices. 
If a competitive pay price does indeed appear essen-
tial, then it is logical to analyze alternative means that 
might be implemented to retain a competitive pay 
price series. 
A matter that requires emphasis in weighing the 
competitive pay price question concerns the relevance 
or necessity of a competitive pay price when substan-
tial quantities of manufacturing grade milk continue 
to be marketed vs. the situation when conversion vir-
tually has been completed and only Grade A milk is 
marketed. Part of the justification for using a com-
petitive pay price series to price reserve class milk in 
the past relates to the necessity for price coordination 
of reserve supplies of Grade A milk with manufactur-
ing grade milk. Another justification has been the 
difficulty and problem involved in developing realis-
tic product price formulas. 
The reasons for coordinating reserve class prices 
with manufacturing grade milk prices when signifi-
cant volumes of manufacturing grade milk continue 
to be marketed are fairly obvious. In the situation 
where reserve Grade A prices are established lower 
than prices paid for manufacturing grade milk, un-
regulated manufacturing plants are placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage relative to manufacturing 
plants in the pool. 
The Federal milk order program has been sensi-
tive to the matters of over-pricing and/ or under-pric-
ing reserve milk relative to unregulated manufactur-
ing grade milk. Essentially, reserve milk pricing 
policy has been geared to providing for orderly dis-
position of excess supplies in the short run as well as 
for longer time periods. The immediate target has 
been to establish reserve milk prices at levels which 
will provide for the economic utilization of reserve 
milk in manufacturing outlets, i.e., which will clear the 
market. In the longer run, the effort is made to es-
tablish prices at a level consistent with maintaining 
adequate manufacturing facilities for the handling of 
surplus milk in regulated markets. Up to this time, 
such a policy has required that excess Grade A milk 
be priced in close relationship to prices paid for 
manufacturing grade milk. On this basis, the use 
of a competitive pay price series to price reserve milk 
has been at least desirable and probably necessary. 
The fact that 19% of the milk marketed in the U. S. 
is still manufacturing grade milk indicates that these 
factors must be given serious consideration. 
Much of. the rationale for using a competitive 
pay price series to price reserve milk is that milk uti-
lized in similar products, whether Grade A or Grade 
B, must be priced at essentially the same level. As 
long as manufacturing grade milk constitutes a sig-
nificant portion of the market for milk used for manu-
factured dairy products, the "equal" price require-
ment should be recognized. However, the continu-
ing conversion to Grade A milk production and mar-
l~eting indicates that at some future point neither 
manufacturing grade milk nor the prices for it will 
be available, and the pricing of excess Grade A milk 
will not be constrained by manufacturing grade milk 
prices. Assuming that classified pricing plans will 
continue to be in effect in fluid milk markets, a new 
policy for pricing reserve milk must be defined and 
procedures for pricing reserve .milk must be devel-
oped. · 
The primary alternative to pricing reserve milk 
by a competitive pay price series has been the use of 
product price formulas. Secondary alternatives, 
which have not been directly utilized but which need 
to be evaluated, include the public hearing process 
and the use of an economic index formula. Most of 
the pro and con arguments relative to the use of a com-
petitive pay price· series generally are_ set forth in 
terms of a partial comparison with product price for-
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mulas. In their 1969 milk price study,22 Hammond 
and Graf offered the following supportive observa-
tions on competitive pay price formulas: 
1. The average prices paid for manufacturing 
grade milk (unregulated plants) in areas of 
substantial competition for that milk provide 
a good measure of average value. Such 
prices reflect competitive values and are an 
average of prices actually reported paid. 
2. Changes in plant processing costs, product 
values, and yields are directly and automa-
tically reflected in the competitive prices 
paid by plants and therefore reflect the full 
value of milk used for manufactured dairy 
products. 
.3. A competitive pay price such as the Minne-
sota-Wisconsin price or the U. S. manufac-
turing grade price reflects the return for all 
products manufactured from mi:Ik, includ-
ing minor by-products. 
4. Since processing margins are automatically 
reflected in competitive pay prices, problems 
associated with maintaining ·accurate and 
up-to-date make allowance provisions as in 
product price formulas· are. avoided: · 
5. A competitive pay price series reflects over-
all manufacturing milk values. · Therefore, 
in markets· where facilities permit, inilk is 
allocated to manufactured dairy products 
that have the highest value use (assuming 
that a single reserve price class is used in the 
market). In effect, the competitive pay 
price series provides a continuing incentive 
for needed resource adjustment .. 
On the negative side, six factors were noted: 
1. Reported prices may differ from prices actu-
ally paid for various reasons, including er-
rors in butterfat testing and milk weighing, 
incidence of hauling subsidies or various un-
reported premiums, and payment practices 
of cooperative plants being affected by divi-
dends or patronage refunds. 
2. Calculation of a ~ompetitive pay price series 
is somewhat more costly than the use of for-
mula type prices. 
3. Competitive pay pric.e series are normally 
based upon prices reported paid at a -sample 
of plants and may not be accurate if the 
sample_ is not ~epresentative. _ The weigh,ing 
of the sample in terms of products may pose 
a particula~ proble~ if pay prices at one 
"Hammond, J. W. and T. F. Graf, ·op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
type of plant differ substantially from pay 
prices at different product plants. 
4. The level of efficiency of operations to which 
a competitive pay price series is geared may 
create p~oblems. The M-\V price, for ex-
ample, is drawn from an area where milk 
production and processing of manufactured 
dairy products are probably conducted on a 
more efficient basis than is typical across the 
entire industry. Direct application of the 
price series outside of the manufacturing 
milk area implicity assumes a higher level 
of efficiency than prevails in the outside 
markets. 
5. Because the competitive pay price for a giv-
en month is needed very early in the follow-
ing month for price announcement purposes, 
the ·competitive pay price may have to be 
based in part on estimates and therefore may 
deviate from the actual average. 
6. A competitive pay price series is not well 
suited to precisely reflect values of milk for 
different uses. 
It is evident that factors arguing for retention of 
a competitive pay price series as long as substantial 
quantities of manufacturing grade milk continue to 
be marketed are fundamental. The question remains 
as to whether a competitive pay price series has such 
superior qualities that efforts should be made to con-
tinue providing such a price even as manufacturing 
grade milk disappears. An evaluation of the com-
petitive pay price series indicates that the plus factors 
are quite formidable. At the same time, the minus 
factors reflect criticisms that point more to the me-
chanics of calculating the price and are less signifi-
cant in their potential impac_ts. A reasonable conclu-
sion is ·that the merits of a competitive pay price series 
are considerable and that, as a minimum, analysis 
should be directed to identifying alternative means of 
retaining competitive pay prices and to evaluating 
the potential performance of such prices. 
To analyze the competitive pay price issue, an 
evaluation of the adequacy of the Minnesota-Wiscon-
sin manufacturing grade milk price series is initially 
developed. It is anticipated that a viable M-W price 
series will continue to be available for several years. 
For the longer run, and assuming that manufacturing 
grade milk and unregulated Grade A milk will not be 
available, alternative means of retaining a competi-
tive pay price series are analyzed. 
Adequacy of the Minnesota-Wisconsin Price Series 
The Minnesota-Wisconsin price series reflects 
free market pay prices for milk for manufacturing 
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uses, as determined by compet1t1ve bidding among 
unregulated processors in Minnesota and Wisconsin 
-the two major manufacturing_ dairy product states. 
In theory, the M-W price represents national supply-
demand conditions for manufactured dairy products, 
and indirectly for fluid products, since milk not used 
in fluid products "backs" into manufactured prod-
ucts. Manufacturing grade milk prices are measured 
from a base of 120 plants in Minnesota and 200 plants 
in Wisconsin. These plants purchased approximate-
ly 60% of all manufacturing grade milk sold in the 
two states. Monthly changes in prices from the base 
by 40 Minnesota plants and 70 Wisconsin plants de-
termine monthly M-W series prices. 
Close surveillance of the series is maintained by 
the USDA Statistical Reporting Service and the 
Dairy Division to assure continued reliability of the 
Minnesota-Wisconsin series. During the most recent · 
36-month period for which data are available ( 1974-
7 6), estimated (announced) monthly Minnesota-
Wisconsin prices averaged only 1.2 cents per cwt be-
low final enumerated prices (Table 10). 
A study directed at answering the criticism that 
the reported Minnesota-Wisconsin price overstated 
prices paid because of butterfat testing practices at 
dairy plants was made at the request of the USDA.23 
This study found some discrepancies between re-
ported and actual milk prices of dairy plants. Over-
statements of milk prices occurred because of under-
stating butterfat tests by an average of 4.1 cents per 
cwt for 52 representative Minnesota and Wisconsin 
plants in 1967. Butterfat actually purchased by 
plants from the farmers exceeded butterfat reported 
to farmers for 50 of the 52 plants. 
Hauling subsidies and cooperative refunds re-
sulted in understatements of 1.4 cents and 2.1 cents 
per cwt, respectively, in reported cash prices for the 
two states combined. 
On the average, reported prices paid by these 52 
plants exceeded actual prices paid by only 0.6 cent 
per cwt. The M-W price series, therefore, closely 
approximates actual prices paid for manufacturing 
grade milk in the two states. Errors in butterfat test-
ing reflected in the M-W series are largely offset by 
hauling subsidies and patronage refunds. 
A question has been raised by some critics of the 
M-W series whether or not the M-W series can be in-
fluenced by individual dairies or organizations. The 
USDA review procedure makes this possibility highly 
unlikely. Prices reported by sample plants which are 
questionable are excluded if they cannot be verified. 
Also, sample plant price changes are evaluated m 
23Hammond, J. W. and T. F. Graf, op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
TABLE 10.-Comparison of Minnesota-Wisconsin Manufacturing Grade Milk 
Price with Final Two-State Estimated Price for Milk of 3.5 % Milkfat Content by 
Months, 1974-76.* 
t>iffere111ce Between 
Minnesota-Wisconsin Final Two- Final Two-State 
Year and Month Series State Estimate and M-W Series 
1974 
January $8.10 $8.08 $-0.02 
February 8.14 8.13 -0.01 
March 8.15 8.13 -0.02 
April 7.73 7.68 -0.05 
May 6.93 6.78 -0.15 
June 6.31 6.34 +o.o3 
July 6.29 6.27 -0.02 
August 6.39 6.41 +0.02 
September 6.69 6.70 +0.01 
October 6.82 6.86 +0.04 
November 6.76 6.76 0 
December 6.41 6.46 +0.05 
Simple Average 
-
1974 7.060 7.050 -0.010 
1975 
January 6.80 6.75 -0.05 
Febr~ary 6.85 6.84 -0.01 
March 6.86 6.87 +0.01 
April 6.94 6.96 +0.02 
May 7.02 7.05 +0.03 
June 7.11 7.12 +0.01 
July 7.35 7.37 +0.02 
August 7.70 7.77 +0.07 
September 8.27 8.34 +o.o7 
October 8.60 8.73 +0.13 
November 8.84 8.91 +0.07 
December 9.08 9.17 +0.09 
Simple Average - 1975 7.618 7.657 +0.039 
1976 
January 8.90 8.91 +0.01 
February 8.25 8.26 +0.01 
March 8.60 8.42 -0.18 
April 8.44 8.42 -0.02 
May 8.30 8.33 +o.o3 
June 8.32 8.39 +o.o7 
July 8.71 8.76 +0.05 
August 8.99 9.00 +0.01 
September 8.46 8.56 +0.10 
October 8.26 8.31 +0.05 
November 8.26 8.25 -0.01 
December 8.25 8.22 -0.03 
Simple Average - 1976 8.478 8.486 +0.008 
36 Months $7.719 $7.731 $+0.012 
*Prices have been converted from the average milkfat test to 3.5 % using the milkfat differential 
SPE1Cified in Federal orders (Chicago Grade A butter x 0.120). 
terms of changes from the bas.e month in wholesale 
prices of manufactured dairy produds and historical 
price and fat test relationships. Thus, no one firm 
or organization can hope to have much of an impact 
on the price. , 
A second factor .relevant to possible rigging of 
the price by a group of plants in the series relates to 
the fact that the M-W price is used for both Class I 
and Class III pricing. For Class I purposes, coopera-
tives prefer to see the price as high as possible; on the 
other hand, they normally favor a Class III obligation 
as low as possible. Therefore, incentives for rigging 
conflict and create a situation where rigging is less 
likely to occur. 
Another factor which could reduce the adequacy 
of the M-W series is Grade A subsidization of Grade 
B operations in dual intake plants. Factors other 
than the value of milk for manufacture would then be 
influencing the manufacturing grade milk price. A 
comparison of manufacturing grade milk prices paid 
at dual intake plants (Grade A and Grade B) and 
straight Grade B plants (Table 11) indicates "sub-
sidization" does not occur. Minnesota . Grade B 
plants paid as high or higher prices than dual intake 
plants in 11of12 months in both 1970_and 1973. 
Wisconsin Grade B plants outpaid dual intake plants 
all 12 months in 1970, and paid as high or higher in 
7 out of 12 months in 1973. 
One other feature of the M-W price, as well as 
any other competitive pay price series, that needs to 
be recognized is that it is an average price and that a 
substantial range in actual pay prices exists among 
reporting plants. For example, in June, July, and 
August 1976, the M-W price adjusted to a 3.5% but-
terfat basis was announced as follows: 
June 197 6 $8.32 per cwt 
July 1976 8.71 per cwt 
August 1976 8.99 per cwt 
For the 3-month period, the range in prices paid 
by manufacturing grade milk plants in Minnesota 
and Wisconsin was more than $1.10 in June and Aug-
ust, and more than $0.90 in July. 
For the month of June ($8.32 M-W price),.ap-
proximately 24% of the cheese plants had pay prices 
in the $8.20 to $8.40 range. Similar proportions of 
cheese plants had pay prices of + 10 cents from the 
average in July and August. Obviously, about 
three-fourths of the cheese plants were more than 10 
cents higher or lower than the reported M-W price. 
Approximately 30% of the butter plants and 
slightly more than 50% of the varied plants had pay 
prices in a plus/minus 10 cent range from the M-W 
price for the 3-month period. Again, substantial 
numbers of plants had pay prices that were more than 
10 cents per cwt different from the announced M-W 
price. For the mid-1976 period, the data show that 
most of the cheese plants paid above the average for 
all plants, and most of the butter plants paid below 
the average for all plants. 
The range in plant pay prices in a competitive 
pay price series such as the M-W price needs to be 
recognized and monitored. Among the factors that 
TABLE 11.-Milk Sold to Plants, Manufacturing Grade (Price), Minnesota and Wisconsin Average Price Re-
ceived by Farmers per 100 Lb (Adjusted to 3.5% B. F. Basis) by Kind of Plant, Monthly, 1970 and 1973.*t 
Minnesota Wisconsin 
1970 1973 1970 1973 
Dual Dual Dual Dual 
Grade B Intake Grade B Intake Grade B Intake Grade B Intake 
Plants Plants Plants Plants Plants Plants Plants Plants 
Dollars per cwt 
January 4.49 4.47 5.34 5.35 4.70 4.62 5.59 5.57 
February 4.48 4.44 5.40 5.40 4.62 4.60 5.6_0 5.60 
March 4.43 4.39 5.45 5.44. . 4.61 4.57 5.72 5.72 
April 4.52 4.49 5.50 5.45 4.61 4.55 5.76 5.77 
May 4.54 4.53 5.56 5.54 4.60 4.54 5.79 5.80 
June 4.58 4.57 5.60 5.52 4.61 4.53 5.81 5.82 
July 4.61 4.59 5.77 5.75 4.64 4.58 5.94 5.94 
August 4.60 4.59 6.50 6.47 4.66 4.55 6.46 6.48 
September 4.58 4.56 7.05 7.05 4.63 4.55 7.06 7.07 
October 4.59 4.56 7.40 7.40 4.70 4.68 7.53 7.51 
November 4.63 4.62 7.61 7.54 4.73 4.72 7.86 7.82 
December 4.68 4.69 7.79 7.78 4.77 4.75 8.10 8.01 
*Prices at average test have been converted to a 3.5 % basis using a butterfat differential per point (0.1 % J that is calculated by multiply-
ing the average price of Grade A (92 score) butter at Chicago by 0.120. This is the method specified in Federal milk orders. 
tFor 1970, the tabulations include all plants receiving any Grade B milk in both states. For 1973, the tabulations for Minnesota in-
clude ail plants receiving any Grade B milk; for Wisconsin the tabulations include only those plants reporting receipts on a monthly basis. 
but those plants accounted for about 75 % of the manufacturing grade milk produced in the state. 
explain the range are product and location. In re-
serve milk pricing, particularly with respect to the 
issues of what level of efficiency to gear the price level 
and whether or not separate reserve product classes 
should be defined, an evaluation of the factors asso-
ciated with the lower prices and the higher prices in 
the monthly range of competitive pay prices becomes 
necessary when reserve milk pricing procedures are 
analyzed relative to the objectives of reserve milk 
pricing. 
Although the M-W series has served as an ap-
propriate and adequate price base in the past, it has 
not been free of problems. Some of the more impor-
tant ones are described in the following paragraphs. 
Pay Price Differences Between 
Creameries and Cheese Pactories 
The Minnesota-Wisconsin price series can be 
analyzed to differentiate between the value of milk 
for butter-powder and the value of milk for cheese. 
For example, from 1969 through 1973, M-W series 
prices consistently exceeded M-W creamery pay 
prices and consistently were less than M-W cheese 
pay prices. Price variations reached + 10 cents per 
cwt in the M-W creamery spread and -10 cents in 
the M-W cheese spread (Tables 12 and 13). The 
differences have been less since 1973. 
The Minnesota-Wisconsin series reflects average 
net values of various products, which may differ sub-
stantially from net values of individual products. Fur-
thermore, the net value of individual products rela-
tive to the pay series may change over time-some-
times exceeding and other times lagging the competi-
tive pay price series. 
The Minnesota-Wisconsin price series reflects 
the value of milk utilized in the mix of dairy products 
produced in the area for which the pay prices are 
gathered. This product mix for the M-W pay price 
series (or for other series which might be constructed) 
may differ materially from the mix of products pro-
duced from reserve milk in a particular order mar-
ket. If this occurs, serious financial problems may 
result for plants having class price obligations based, 
on product mixes that differ substantially from their 
own. For example, the M-W price is heavily 
weighted by cheese values, with 86% of the 1976 
product weight in the major state, Wisconsin, as-
signed to cheese and only 3% to butter (Table 14). 
For the two states, Minnesota and Wisconsin com-
bined, cheese had a weight of close to 70% in the 
M-W series. Also, in 1976 less than 45% of U. S. 
milk used for manufactured dairy products was used 
for cheese. In 1976, Federal order markets also were 
using slightly more reserve milk in cheese than in but-
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TABLE 14.-Product Weights in the Minnesota-
Wisconsin Price Series, 1976. 
Average for 
Minnesota 1:1nd 
Wisconsin Minnesota Wisconsin 
Butter 3 30 15 
Cheese 86 50 70 
Varied Products 11 20 15 
fourths or more of reserve milk was used in produc-
ing butter. Thus, cheese had a far heavier weight 
in the M-W series than the proportionate use of milk 
for cheese in either Federal order markets or in the 
United States as a whole. 
Since cheese returned a higher farm pay price 
than butter-powder in all 8 years, 1969-76 (Tables 12 
and 13), regulated butter-powder plants were obvi-
ously disadvantaged relative to cheese plants with the 
M~ W series price in effect. 
Selection of Competitive Pay Price 
A number of different competitive price series 
could be developed for Federal order reserve milk 
pricing including the Minnesota price, the Wisconsin 
price, the Minnesota-Wisconsin price combined, or 
the U.S. average price. Each would yield somewhat 
different prices. For many years the M-W series 
prices have exceeded U.S. manufacturing pay prices, 
with price variations reaching + 20 cents per cwt in 
the M-W-U. S. spread (Table 15). Substantial 
variation also exists between the M-W series and Wis-
consin and Minnesota manufacturing milk prices, 
with the M-W price averaging as much as 10 cents 
per cwt annually less than Wisconsin and 14 cents per 
cwt more than Minnesota since 1970 (Tables 16 and 
17). The Wisconsin manufacturing price averaged 
19 cents per cwt more than the Minnesota manufac-
turing price during 1970-75, and the differential has 
been widening rather than narrowing (Table 18). 
-. These differences between U. S., Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin manufacturing milk pay prices raise ques-
tions about using composite M-W prices for reserve 
milk in either Wisconsin or Minnesota, much less in 
the entire country. However, there are plausible 
reasons for the price differences among the several 
series. The U. S. manufacturing milk price ~eries 
reflects prices from a larger area and from areas 
where price-making is less competitive; the differences 
between the Minnesota and Wisconsin manufacturing 
milk 'prices are explained partly by the product dif-
ferences between the two states. 
In utilizing a competitive pay price series for re-
serve milk pricing in regulated markets, two criteria 
are important: 1) the price should be generated from 
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market prevail; and 2) since reserve milk is utilized 
for a wide range of manufactured dairy products, the 
competitive pay price series should be influenced by 
the product volumes among the several uses. The 
Minnesota-Wisconsin series meets these criteria more 
than other competitive pay price series. Even so, 
no single price series can provide a panacea to the sev-
eral problems associated with reserve milk pricing. 
Influence of Graide A Blend 
Prices on Competitive Pay Prices 
If a competitive pay price is to accurately reflect 
the value of milk for manufacturing, it must reflect 
the value of produds made from the reserve milk, 
rather than the influence of outside price enhance-
ment or price diminishing factors. In this context, 
the question of influence, or lack of influence, of 
Grade A fluid prices on manufacturing milk prices 
naturally arises. Although there are some exceptions, 
evidence indicates that areas with high fluid prices 
generally have higher manufacturing prices than 
areas with low fluid prices, and vice versa. For ex-
ample, in 1976 both Minnesota and Wisconsin manu-
facturing milk prices tended to be highest in areas 
where fluid prices were highest, and lowest in areas 
where order blend prices were lowest (Table 19). 
_ · Wisconsin's highest Grade A fluid prices were 
in the Southern districts, and manufacturing milk 
prices in that area were also highest in the state. 
Wisconsin's lowest fluid prices were in the Northwest 
and West Central districts, which also had the lowest 
manufacturing milk prices. 
Similarly, Minnesota's highest fluid price was in 
the Southeast district, which had a higher manufac-
. turing milk price than all but one district. Minne-
sota's lowest fluid price district was the North Cen,-
tral district, which also had the lowest manufacturing 
milk price. 
When fluid prices are high relative to manufac-
turing milk prices, pressures build on manufacturing 
plants to increase their pay prices. When fluid prices 
are low relative to ~anufacturing milk prices, there 
is less pressure for increases in manufacturing prices. 
Low differentials between fluid and manufacturing 
prices also discourage Grade A conversion. 
Differing Values of Butterfat 
in Butter and Cheese 
In pricing reserve milk, the M-W price at 3.5% 
butterfat is adjusted up or down by a differential 
based on the Chicago Grade A butter price times 
12%. The adjustment on milk used to make butter 
is the same as that used to make cheese. This proce-
dure fails to adequately reflect the value of higher 
testing milk used for cheese. 
TABLE 18.-Manufacturing Grade Milk P.ay Prices, per cwt, 1966-1977, 3.5 % Butterfat Test. 
Wisconsin Manufacturing Grade 
Wisconsin Manufacturing Minnes·ola Manufacturing Milk Prices Exceed Minnesota 
Grade Milk Prices Grade Milk Prices Manufacturing Grade Milk Prices 
Cheese Chees·e Cheese 
Yeat All Creameries Plants All Creameries Plants All Creameries Plants 
Dollars per cwt, 3.5 % milk 
1966 $4.00 $3.90 $4.02 $3.85 .$3.83 $3.96 +$0.15 +$0.07 +$0.06 
1967 3.98 3.98 3.94 4.01 4.00 4.07 0.03 - 0.02 - 0.13 
1968 4.17 4.19 4.14 4.19 4.17 4.26 0.02 + 0.02 0.12 
1969 4.48 4.42 4.50 4.36 4.33 4.49 + 0.12 + 0.09 + 0.01 
1970 4.75 4.68 4.75 4.58 4.53 4.68 + 0.17 + 0.15 + 0.07 
1971 4.87 4.84 4.87 4.75 4.73 4.80 + 0.12 + 0.11 + 0.07 
1972 5.18 5.08 5.19 4.94 4.90 4.99 + 0.24 + 0.18 + 0.20 
1973 6.40 6.27 6.42 6.17 6.14 6.24 + 0.23 + 0.13 + 0.18 
1974 7.15 7.18 7.13 6.96 6.96 7.00 + 0.19 + 0.22 + 0.13 
1975 7.70 7.72 7:7o 7.51 7.51 7.53 + 0.19 + 0.21 + 0.17 
1976 8.61 8.61 8.61 8.35 8.32 8.38 + 0.26 + 0.29 + 0.23 
1977 8.67 8.63 8.67 8.48 8.46 8.49 + 0.19 + 0.17 + 0.18 
Average 
1966-70 4.27 4.23 4.27 4.20 4.17 4.29 + 0.07 - 0.06 0.02 
1971-77 6.94 6.90 6.94 6.74 6.72 6.78 + 0.20 + 0.18 + 0.16 
1966-77 5.83 5.79 5.83 5.68 5.66 5.74 + 0.15 + 0.13 + 0.09 
TABLE 19 .-Comparison of Average Grade A Fluid and Manufacturing Grade Milk Prices per cwt, 3.5% 
But.terfat Test, Minnesota and Wisconsin, 1976.* 
Wisconsin Minnesotat 
Crop Reporting Fluid Manufacturing Fluid Manufacturing 
District Price Grade Price Difference Price Grade Price DifferenGe 
S.E. $9.16 $8.65 $0.51 $9.10 $8.36 $0.74 
N.E. 9.08 8.61 0.47 :j: :j: 
s.c. 9.13 8.73 0.40 8.97 8.35 0.62 
N.C. 9.02 8.64 0.38 8.74 8.06 0.68 
s.w. 9.14 8.56 0.58 8.88 8.42 0.46 
E.C. 9.07 8.72 0.35 8.99 8.27 0.72 
c. 9.07 8.55 0.52 8.83 8.36 0.43 
w.c. 8.99 8.52 q.47 8.83 8.34 0.42 
N.W. 8.95 8.50 0.45 8.77 8.07 0.70 
*Butterfat differentials used for Wisconsin and Minnesota fluid milk and Wisconsin manufacturing milk price conversions to 3.5 % butter-
fat test were 1 0.6¢ per point (the average annual 197 6 Chicago Order 30 differential), and 10.2¢ per point for Minnesota manufacturing milk. 
tJuly 1976 - June 1977 prices (after Federal milk order merger). 
:j:Too few to report. 
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As a general relationship, milk testing higher in 
protein (specifically casein) means higher cheese 
yields. Since there is a positive average relationship 
between the fat test and the protein test in producer 
milk, higher fat levels in milk are associated with 
higher protein tests and higher cheese yields. 
It is useful to use an example to illustrate the 
higher implicit value that accrues to butterfat in 
cheese as compared to butterfat in butter through the 
price standardization procedure. The assumption is 
made that wholesale butter and cheese prices are 
$1.01 and 98 cents per lb, respectively (approximate 
CCC purchase prices for the 1977-78 marketing 
year). Further, a fat test of 3.7% butterfat is used 
in this example. Finally, the standard Van Slyke 
cheese yield table indicates that 3.5% milk normally 
yields 9. 7 4 lb ( 3 9 % moisture) , while 3. 7 % milk 
yields 10.21 lb of cheese. 
Wholesale butter at $1.01 per lb generates a 12.1 
cent butterfat differential. Therefore, if the Minne-
-sota-Wisconsin price at 3.5% test is $8.80 per cwt,. 
the 3.7% price is $9.04. The additional 2 points of 
fat, or 24 cents per cwt higher price, is associated with 
an additional 0.47 lb of cheese (10.21 lb minus 9.74 
. lb) . With the price of cheese at 98 cents a lb, the 
higher yield from 3.7% milk adds 46 cents (98 cents 
x 0.47) to the gross return. Therefore, the appar-
ent margin from the higher _testing milk is 22 cents 
per cwt greater ( 46 cents minus 24 cents) than the 
apparent margin associated with ·milk testing 3 .5 % 
butterfat. A comparable situation occurs to a much 
lesser degree in milk used for butter-powder because 
of· the normally higher powder yield in higher testing 
milk. 
Essentially, as the butterfat test of milk increases, 
.. ~ handler's gross return from making cheese increases 
'more than does the price paid for the milk, and the· 
apparent margin widens. The mechanical proce-
dure of adjusting pay prices from announced 3.5% 
prices to the higher average test of milk used to make 
cheese fails to recognize the additional value provided 
cheese processors from higher value milk. This is 
because the principal milk solid that butter contains 
is butterfat, and the entire price standardization pro-
cedure is geared to the value of butterfat as mea-
sured by butter. With single component pricing, 
i.e., butterfat, the value of milk used in products such 
as cheese in which yields are influenced by the solids-
not-fat content of milk as well as the milkfat is not 
fully reflected through a butterfat differential alone. 
As long as milk prices are established on a cwt-butter-
fat basis and the price is standardized only on the 
basis of butterfat, any pricing formula will be subject 
to the apparent inconsistency of different butterfat 
values in different products. Some type of a mul-
28 
tiple component pricing plan would be required to 
help correct this situation. 
Converting the Minnesota-Wisconsin Price 
at Average Butterfat Test to 3.5% 
In appraising the M-W price series as a mover 
of manufacturing values, the question emerges as to 
whether the procedure prescribed in Federal orders 
for converting the M-W price at average test to 3.5% 
provides a butterfat differential which is representa-
tive of the average of butterfat differentials at manu-
facturing grade milk plants in the two states. 
The Economics, Statistics, and Cooperative Ser-
vice provides a monthly estimate of the M-W price at 
the average butterfat test. This price is convert~d 
to 3.5% using the butterfat differential specified in 
Federal milk orders (Chicago Grade A butter x 
0.120). If the butterfat differential calculated ac-
cording to this procedure corresponds closely with the 
average differential in the two states, it is reasonable 
to conclude that it is appropriate to use this differen-
tial for converting prices at test to a 3.5% butterfat 
basis. 
Prior to 1975, differentials specified in Federal 
orders for converting the M-W to 3.5% and the aver-
age two-state differentials appeared to be in close re-
lationship. Data reported in Table 20 indicate that 
in 197 4 differentials used to convert the M-W price 
and average two-state differentials both averaged 7 .9 
cents per point. Beginning in August 1974, how-
ever, the order differential used for converting the 
M-W price has been above the average two-state clif-
f erential and the spread between the two has been 
widening;_ - In 1975, the differential used in convert-
ing the M-W price averaged 9.3 cents per point, 0.8 
cent per point more than the average two-state differ-
ential of 8.5 cents. In.1976, the differential used in 
converting the M-W pri~e averaged 1.2 cents per point 
higher, and for the period April-August 1977, the dif. 
ferential was 1. 7 cents per point higher· each month. 
Since most Federal orders use a factor of 0.115 
in adjusting producer prices, the 0.115 factor might 
be considered as a possible alternative that would 
bring the differential used to convert the M-W to 
3.5% in line with the average two-state differential. 
Using a factor of 0.115 instead of 0.120 in calculating 
the differential would have narrowed the difference 
from 0.8 to 0.4 cent per point in 1975, from 1.2 cents 
to 0.7 cent in 1976, and from 1.7 to 1.2 cents per 
point in April through August 1977 (Table 20). 
The widening of the difference between the clif-
f erential used to convert the price to 3 .5 % and the 
average two-state butterfat differential indicates that 
no single factor could be relied on to provide a repre-
sentative order differential for more than a short per-
iod of time. 
TABLE 20.-Comparison of the Average Butterfat Differential for Manufacturing Grade Milk in Minnesota 
and Wisconsin with Differentials Calculated Using the Chicago Grade A Butter Price Times 0.120 and 0.115. 
Calculated Differentiall 
Chicago Grade A Butter Chicago Grade A Butter 
Price Times 0.120 Price Times 0.11 5 
Exceeds Exceeds 
Average Butterfat Average Average 
Differential in Differential Differential 
Minnesota and in Minn. in Minn. 
Year Wisconsin Differential and Wis. Differential and Wis. 
Cents per Point 
1974 
Jonuary 8.4 8.2 -0.2 7.9 -0.5 
February 8.2 7.7 -0.5 7.4 -0.8 
March 8.2 8.2 0 7.8 -0.4 
April 8.0 8.2 0.2 t.8 -0.2 
May 7.8 7.3 -0.5 7.0 -0.8 
June 7.7 7.3 -0.4 7.0 -0.7 
July 7.6 7.3 -0.3 7.0 -b.6 
August 7.8 8.0 0.2 7.7 -0.l 
September 7.8 8.2 0.4 7.8 0 
October 7.9 8.3 0.4 7.9 0 
November 7.9 8.3 0.4 7.9 0 
December 7.8 7.8 0 7.5 -0.3 
Average 7.9 7.9 0 7.6 -0.3 
1975 
January 7.8 8.0 0.2 7.7 -0.l 
February 7.8 8.2 0.4 7.8 0.0 
March 7.9 8.2 0.3 7.8 -0.l 
April 7.9 8.3 0.4 8.0 0.1 
May 7.8 8.3 0.5 8.0 0.2 
June 7.8 8.3 0.5 8.0 0.2 
July 8.1 9.2 0.3 8.8 0.7 
August 8.7 10.0 0.3 9.6 0.9 
September 9.2 10.5 1.3 10.l 0.9 
October 9.5 11.2 1.7 l 0.7 1.2 
November l 0.7 11.7 1.0 11.2 0.5 
December 10.3 12.4 2.1 11.9 1.6 
Average 8.5 9.3 0.8 8.9 0.4 
1976 
January 9.5 10.3 0.8 9.9 0.4 
February 9.2 9.7 0.5 9.3 0.1 
March 9.4 10.3 0.9 9.9 0.5 
April 9.7 l 0.7 1.0 10.3 0.6 
May 9.7 10.8 1.1 10.3 0.6 
June 10.0 11.4 . 1.4 10.9 0.9 
July 10.6 12.7 2.1 12.2 1.6 
August l 0.7 12.7 2.0 12.2 1.5 
September 10.2 11. l 0.9 10.6 0.4 
October 9.9 10.9 1.0 l 0.4 0.5 
November 9.8 10.9 1.1 l 0.4 0.6 
December 9.7 10.9 1.2 10.4 0.7 
Average 9.8 11.0 1.2 10.5 0.7 
1977 
January 9.8 10.9 1.1 l 0.4 0.6 
February 9.8 10.9 1.1 l 0.4 0.6 
March l0.0 11. l 1.1 10.7 0.7 
April 10.3 12.0 1.7 11.5 1.2 
May l 0.4 12.l 1.7 , 1.6 1.2 
June l p.4 12.l 1.7 11.6 1.2 
July l 0.4 12.l 1.7 11.6 1.2 
August 10.4 12.l 1.7 11.6 1.2 
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TABLE 21.-Comparison of the Minnesota-Wisconsin Price Adjusted to 3.5% 
!oy the Ave~age Butterfat Differential for Manufacturing Grade Milk in Minnesota 
and Wisconsin with the M-W Adjusted to 3.5 % Using the Butterfat Differential 
Specified in Federal Orders. 
Minnesota-Wisconsin Price Amount M-W Adjusted to 3.5 % Using Adjusted by 
Average Average Differential 
Butterfat Butterfat in Minn. and Wis. 
Differential Differential Exceeds M-W 
in Minnesota Specified in as Adjusted in 
Year and Wisconsin Federal Orders* Federal Orders 
Dollars per cwt 
1974 
January 8.10 8.10 0 
February 8.13 8.14 -0.01 
March 8.15 8.15 0 
April 7.73 7.73 0 
May 6.93 6.93 0 
June 6.31 6.31 0 
July 6.29 6.29 0 
August 6.40 6.39 0.01 
September 6.70 6.69 0.01 
October 6.83 . 6.82 0.01 
November 6.77 6.76 0.01 
December 6.41 6.41 0 
Average 7.06 7.06 0 
1975 
January 6.80 6.80 0 
February 6.86 6.85 0.01 
March 6.87 6.86 0.01 
April 6.95 6.94 0.01 
May 7.03 7.02 0.01 
June 7.12 7.11 0.01 
July 7.36 7.35 0.01 
August 7.71 7.70 0.01 
September 8.30 8.27 0.03 
October 8.66 8.60 0.06 
November 8.87 8.84 0.03 
December 9.13 9.08 0.05 
Average 7.64 7.62 0.02 
1976 
January 8.92 8.90 0.02 
February 8.25 8.25 0 
March 8.61 8.60 0.01 
April 8.45 8.44 0.01 
May 8.31 8.30 0.01 
June 8.33 8.32 0.01 
July 8.72 8.71 0.01 
August 9.01 8.99 0.02 
September 8.48 8.46 0.02 
October 8.28 8.26 0.02 
November 8.30 8.26 0.04 
December 8.29 8.25 0.04 
Average 8.50 8.48 0.02 
1977 
January 8.22 8.19 0.03 
February 8.18 8.16 0.02 
March 8.33 8.31 0.02 
April 8.63 8.60 0.03 
May 8.65 8.62 0.03 
June 8.61 8.qQ 0.01 
July 8.66 8.65 0.01 
August 8.66 8.64 0.02 
*Chicago Grade A butter price x 0.120. 
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Converting the M-W price at average test to 
3.5% using a butterfat differential which is higher 
than the manufacturing grade butterfat differential 
in the two states results in a 3.5% price lower than it 
would be if the average two-state differential was 
used. In order to observe how much the 3.5% price 
is lowered by a higher fat differential, the M-W price 
at average test was converted to 3.5% using the aver-
age of the Minnesota and Wisconsin manufacturing 
grade milk butterfat differentials. The resulting 
prices were then compared to the announced prices 
converted to 3.5% by a differential calculated by 
' multiplying the monthly Chicago Grade A butter 
price by 0.120 (Table 21). A comparison of the two 
sets of prices reveals the following: 
• In 1974 the two sets of prices averaged the 
same. In 1975, 1976, and during the first 8 
months of 1977, 3.5% prices adjusted by the 
present method understated 3.5% prices ad-
justed by the average two-state differential by 
an average of 2 cents per cwt. 
e During the 44-month period January 1974-
August 1977, prices adjusted by the present 
method understated prices adjusted by the 
average two-state differential by 1 cent per 
cwt in 18 months and by 2 cents in 7 months. 
The two prices were the same in 9 months. 
The largest difference was 6 cents and this 
only occurred during 1 month, October 1975. 
8 The largest understatement from using the pre-
sent method can be expected in the fall months 
when the average butterfat tests are at their 
peak. 
While using the present method for converting 
the M-W price has not and may not result in a sig-
nificant understatement of the price at 3 .5 %, the fact 
remains that a butterfat differential obtained by mul-
tiplying the monthly Chicago Grade A butter price 
by 0.120 no longer is representative of the average 
two-state differential. It may be appropriate, there-
fore, to consider the procedure for converting the M-W 
_price to 3 .5 % as an item on the agenda to be consid-
ered the next time a general hearing on milk pricing 
is held. 
RETAINING A COMPETITIVE PAY PRICE SERIES 
WITH A MANUFACTURING MILK ORDER 
While reserve milk pricing in regulated markets 
historically has been related to competitive pay prices 
through a formula mechanism, the concept of letting 
reserve milk prices directly find their own competitive 
level (within a regulated market) has at least been 
recognized. In a 1961 study of Class III pricing in 
the New Yo,rk milkshed, Clarke and Herrman com-
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mented as follows: "With certain assumptions about 
the effectiveness of competition, by far the simplest 
solution would be to permit Class III prices to find 
their own level . . . Prices for milk considered to be 
in the pool but in excess of Class I and Class II re-
quirements would be negotiated between iiidividual 
buyers and sellers ... these negotiations might tend 
to establish a uniform price consistent with the com-
petitive price for all pool milk used for manufactur-
ing in the market ... "24 
Since that 1961 study, the steady conversion 
trend toward an all Grade A supply has drawn some 
attention to possibilities for retaining competitive pay 
prices in the absence of manufacturing grade milk. 
The usual assumption has been that as conversion to 
one grade of milk becomes an accomplished fact, and 
that as the converted milk becomes pooled in the Fed-
eral market order program, competitive pay pricing 
for manufacturing use milk will no longer be possible. 
There will not be any Grade B manufacturing grade 
milk available for competitive pricing. Nevertheless, 
large volumes of butter, cheese, nonfat dry milk, and 
other manufactured dairy products will continue to 
be processed, but from Grade A milk which is in mar-
ket order pools. The upper Midwest will continue 
to be the dominant production-processing area for 
manufactured dairy products. Manufactured dairy 
products will continue to be produced in many spe-
cialized manufacturing plants and by many compet-
ing firms in the upper Midwest. Given these obser-
vations, the question is whether a competitive pay 
price series can continue to exist when all milk con-
verts to Grade A with pooling of the converted milk 
in market orders. In this ·section, an alternative 
which could retain a competitive pay price series in 
the upper Midwest is examined. 
One means of retaining a competitive pay price 
is to simply exempt some manufacturing use milk 
(Class III) from minimum pricing provisions. This 
suspension of the minimum price requirement on 
Class III milk could be limited to plants engaged ex-
clusively in making Class III products. No perform-
ance requirement in terms of pool plant qualifications 
would be required .of these plants. In effect, an ad-
ditional designation of a pool plant beyond that of a 
distributing plant, supply plant, or cooperative hand-
ler would be established. Exempt plants under this 
plan would be pooled under what is defined as the 
Midwest Manufacturing Milk Order. In all likeli-
hood, pool plant qualifications in this order, as well as 
others, would not be needed as all milk becomes 
pooled, except as a means of identifying the pool to 
which milk is assigned. Some call provisions may be 
24Clarke, D. A., Jr. and Louis F. Herrmann, op. cit., pp.' 46-47. 
necessary m order to assure availability of milk for 
Class I uses. 
As a result of the exemption of Class III milk 
minimum pricing, processors of manufactured dairy 
products in this order would make decisions as to 
what to pay for milk for manufacturing in the same 
way that pay price decisions on manufacturing grade 
milk are currently made. A pay price series based 
on the prices paid at these plants could be computed 
for use in Class III pricing in all other Federal order 
markets. It could also lead to a manufacturing milk 
price that clears the market of all milk forthcoming 
at that price. 
In order to evaluate the key elements of such a 
proposal, an example is useful. Initially, assume that 
all the milk in the Midwest is pooled under two or-
ders, the Upper Midwest Fluid Milk Order and the 
Midwest Manufacturing Milk Order. For ana-
lytical. purposes, it is assumed that the two orders pool 
all of the milk in Minnesota and Wisconsin and milk 
from surrounding states that is currently pooled in 
the Chicago and Upper Midwest Federal Orders. 
An approximation of such volumes on the two mar-
kets can be made by combining the milk in the pre-
sent Chicago Regional and Upper Midwest Federal 
Order Markets according to their 1976 producer re-
ceipts, plus the non-regulated 1976 marketings of 
Grade B milk in Minnesota and Wisconsin. For 
1976, the volumes and use were as follows: 
with the Class I and II milk of the current Chicago 
Regional and Upper Midwest orders in the combined 
Upper Midwest Fluid Milk Order. 
The manufacturing milk order without mini-
mum Class III pricing permits the development of 
competitive price series for a much larger volume of 
milk than is currently included in the Minnesota-
Wisconsin price series. As a result, a legitimate pay 
price series would be available for various uses, in-
cluding direct adoption as the Class III price in all 
other Federal order markets. 
One complex question relates to how the manu-
facturing milk order would be administered to fulfill 
the objectives of the Federal milk order program if 
the milk in the pool is not subject to minimum pric-
ing. To make such a system operative, some adjust-
ment in usual Federal order procedures would be re-
quired. A paramount con_cern is the payment of 
producers shipping milk to plants in the regulated 
manufacturing order-those plants not subject to 
mm1mum pncmg. If these producers receive only 
the competitive manufacturing use price, there would 
be no incentive to ship milk to these plants. Obvious-
ly some kind of equalization payment to producers in 
addition to plant pay price under the manufacturing 
order would be required to bring their prices in line 
with producer prices in the fluid markets. Thus, 
gross return per hundredweight of milk for each pro-
ducer would be composed of two payments. First 
Producer Deliveries Class II 
in Thousands Class I Sales 
Market of Pounds Sales (Soft Products) 
Chicago Regional Order 9,779,003 3,115,330 1, 120,408 
Upper Midwest Order 5,336,370 1,507,625 254,905 
Wisconsin Grade B 6,909,000 
Minnesota Grade B 4,865,400 
Total Upper Midwest Markets 26,889,773* 4,622,955 1,375,313 
*Undoubtedly some additional manufacturing milk from North and South Dakota would be included. 
As the data indicate, the Upper Midwest mar-
ket as defined would have about 17% Class I utiliza-
tion. Assuming three pr.ice classes in the markets, 
the total annual assignment of milk to Class III would 
'account for about 78% of total use, or about 20.9 
billion lb of milk for Class III products. The 20.9 
billion lb of Class III is substantially greater than the 
current marketing of Grade B manufacturing milk 
in Minnesota and Wisconsin. 
It is also assumed that about three-fourths of the 
20.9 billion lb of Class III milk is received at plants 
exclusively or primarily engaged in manufacturing 
Class III products. Thus, about 15.7 billion lb 
would be under the ·Midwest Manufacturing Milk 
Order. The remaining 5.2 billion lb would be pooled 
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would be the pay price of the plant to which each 
producer sold his milk. This price would be deter-
mined as usual by product pay prices, processing 
costs, and the competition facing each plant. Un-
doubtedly different plant pay prices would prevail. 
This is similar to the current situation for manufac-
turing plants in the upper Midwest. Second, the pro-
ducers shipping to exempt Class III plants would re-
ceive an equalization payment from the market ad-
ministrator of the market manufacturing order which 
has been assessed against fluid milk markets. As a 
result, these producers would receive a blended share 
of Class I sales in the same way that all producers.in 
fluid milk orders are compensated. However, the 
producers of the so-called exempt plants in the manu-
facturing order need not receive the minimum blend 
price as defined in existing fluid milk orders. 
Equalization rates could be calculated as the 
difference between an equalization price for the mar-
ket order and blend price in the Upper Midwest Fluid 
Milk Order. The equalization payment would need 
to be a fixed amount, regardless of the plant to which 
c>, producer shipped his milk or the price paid by that 
plant. If equalization payments depended on the 
plant's pay price, plants that would pay low prices 
for milk used in Class III purposes would draw more 
heavily from the pool and would have a direct incen-
tive to pay low prices. 
It would be necessary to assure that large num-
bers of producers in the Midwest Manufacturing 
Milk Order do not receive a higher total return per 
hundredweight than the blend price of producers 
shipping to plants in the Upp er Midwest Fluid Milk 
Order. This could be accomplished by making the 
Class III equalization price higher than the average 
competitive pay price at exempt plants. The aver-
age competitive pay price would be used for estab-, 
lishing the Class III prices for all other Federal order 
markets. This average price would be directly com-
parable to the present Minnesota-Wisconsin price. 
The Class III equalization price would be used onlv 
for administering the pool of the Midwest Manufa~­
turing Milk Order. It could be based on prices at or 
near the top of each month's range of competitive pay 
prices. For example, assume that in a given month 
the calculated average price paid by the exempt 
plants of the manufacturing order is $9.00 per cwt. 
It may be calculated from a distribution of plant 
prices for 320 plants as the current Minnesota-Wis-
consin price. The range could be as follows: 









Average: $9.00 320 
In order to determine an equalization price from 
this type of a price distribution, it could be provided, 
for example, that the equalization price would be the 
average price paid by the high 5% of plants in the 
series. From the example, the high 5 % or 16 plants 
in the series averaged $9.45 in the pay price. There-
fore, $9.45 would be the equalization price. If the 
blend price for the Upper Midwest Fluid Milk Order 
for the month happened to be $9.75, an equalization 
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payment of 30 cents per cwt would be paid by the 
Manufacturing Order Market Administrator to all 
producers selling milk to the "exempt" plants. 
Specification of the equalization price at or near 
the high end of the range of competitive pay prices 
would accomplish two things. First, it would avoid 
major price misalignment between the fluid and 
manufacturing prices that would cause difficulty in 
retaining producers in the fluid orders and obtaining 
milk for fluid uses. If the equalization price was at 
the midpoint of prices reported in the competitive pay 
series, for example, the equalization payment would 
be higher; about half the producers under the manu-
facturing order would be receiving a higher price 
than producers in the Midwest Fluid Milk Order. 
Use of an equalization price at the high end of the 
range of competitive pay prices would limit this prob-
lem. In the example, producers at the four plants 
paying $9.60 per cwt would be getting a price 15 
cents more than the fluid market blend ($9.90 as op-
posed to $9. 7 5), but the incidence and the magnitude 
of this difference is limited and would avoid any sig-
nificant problems. 
Second, specification of the equalization price 
at or near the high end of the range of competitive 
pay prices would not interfere nor influence the deci-
sion making on prices by the exempt plants. Market 
forces and plant operations would continue to be the 
key factors in making monthly price decisions. The 
fixed equalization payment out of the market ad-
ministrator's office would not affect price differences. 
Plants reporting pay prices at the high end of the 
range would continue to see their producers enjoying 
a slight price advantage. Similarly, plants reporting 
pay prices at the low end of the range would continue 
to see their producers having a price disadvantage. 
Knowledge that an equalization price would come 
out of the competitive pay price series for a given 
month should not alter factors relevant to decision 
making on price at any plant if a number of plants 
are competing for milk supplies. 
A second important question about the proposed 
manufacturing milk order concerns the source of the 
equalization fund. At first glance, one might argue 
that the source of funds should be the Upper Midwest 
Fluid Milk Order. The basis of the argument is that 
the current Chicago or Upper Midwest orders which 
would make up that market are those on which con-
verted Grade B manufacturing milk is currently 
pooled. However, there are at least three reasons 
why some broader base of assessment is necessary: 
1. Classified prices that raise fluid prices in any , 
market of the U.S. above those which would 
prevail without the regulation have a de-
pressing effect on manufacturing milk prices, 
although total revenue to the dairy indus-
try is increased. Thus, producers who sell 
in markets with only manufacturing use 
milk should participate in the increased re-
turns generated from classified pricing. 
2. The funds required for the equalization pay-
ment are substantial and could not be borne 
by one Federal order fluid market, even a 
very large one. 
3. Since plants in the manufacturing order 
could provide potential reserves for all fluid 
markets, it is reasonable to observe that a 
standby assessment from most or all regu-
lated markets be made for the availability 
of standby reserves. 
To illustrate the assessments on a narrow and 
broad basis, the milk volumes indicated previously 
for Upper Midwest Fluid Milk Order and the Mid-
west Manufacturing Milk Order are noted. The 
class uses are based on the 1976 utilization of milk in 
the Chicago and Upper Midwest orders. Assume the 
$9.00 per cwt average price in the manufacturing 
order. 
For the Midwest Manufacturing Milk Order: 
Producer receipts are 15.7 billion lb 
Utilization of producer milk is: 
Class Ill 15.7 billion lb 
Equalization price $9.45 per cwt 
For the Upper Midwest Fluid Milk Order: 
Producers receipts are 11.2 billion lb 
Utilization of producer milk is: 
Class I 4.6 billion lb 
Class II 1.4 billion lb 
Class Ill 5.2 billion lb 




$10.80 per cwt 
9.10 per cwt 
9.00 per cwt 
Blend price is $9.75 per cwt 
The equalization payment to producers in the 
Midwest Manufacturing Order as calculated earlier 
is 30 cents per cwt-the difference between the equa-
lization price of the manufacturing order and the 
blend price of the Upper Midwest Fluid Milk Order. 
In order to provide the amount of funds from the 
Upper Midwest Fluid Milk Order, 42 cents per cwt 
would need to be deducted from the blend price in 
that order. The net price to producers in that order 
would fall from $9.75 to $9.33 per cwt. This is now 
lower than the average return to producers in the 
manufacturing order. If, however, funds for equali-
zation were collected from all fluid milk orders, the 
deduction would be 6.8 cents per cwt based on 1976 
Federal order deliveries. The net return to produ-
cers in the Upper Midwest Fluid Milk Order would 
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fall to $9.68 per cwt. It appears that the broader 
basis of assessment is necessary. 
Collection of funds from all other Federal order 
markets for distribution in the manufacturing order 
market bears some similarity to the current reserve 
(standby) pool that is privately administered outside 
the Federal order program. That program collects 
monies in several fluid milk orders and then distrib-
utes the funds to manufacturing plants in the upper 
Midwest which receive Grade A milk. The standby 
plants agree to ship fluid grade milk into the order 
markets only upon call by the standby pool. The 
above proposal differs from the standby pool in that 
a much larger volume of milk would be contributing 
funds and a much larger number of producers would 
be receiving payments. 
The proposed manufacturing milk order is also 
different than past proposals for manufacturing grade 
milk orders. In such earlier proposals, the focus of 
the regulatory process concerned such matters as 
check weighing, testing, and market information. 
Establishment of minimum prices for milk was usual-
ly not included in discussions of a manufacturing milk 
order. Under this plan, price reporting to the 
manufacturing milk order administrator by each 
plant is a primary function. 
The grade or quality of milk is not a particular 
issue in this proposal. In the long run, complete con-
version to Grade A is assumed; therefore, the manu-
facturing pool would relate only to Grade A milk. 
In the more immediate time period or transition per-
riod, the milk eligible for inclusion in the reserve pool 
would likely include manufacturing grade milk as 
well as such Grade A milk currently being identified 
in the voluntary standby pool. The main argument 
for including both Grade B and Grade A milk in the 
manufacturing pool during the transition period 
would be to broaden the base on which the competi-
tive price series is generated. 
The order would also be defined in terms of pro-
duction area-not market area-and production 
would overlap some of the market areas of the existing 
fluid milk markets. At the onset the manufacturing 
pool would include (or regulate) plants in three dif-
ferent categories. These would be: 
1. All Grade B plants in Minnesota and Wis-
consin. 
2. Any unregulated Grade A plants in Minne-
sota and Wisconsin that are engaged only in 
manufactured dairy products. 
3. Surplus plants (supply plants) currently 
regulated in Federal orders in Minnesota 
and Wisconsin (possibly some ·firms in 
North and South Dakota) which would opt 
to participate in the manufacturing order 
rather than the fluid milk order. 
Different possibilities exist with respect to such 
plants. Plant performance requirements could be 
tightened somewhat in the Upper Midwest Fluid 
Milk Order so that the manufacturing order would 
be the preferred choice for some of the plants. 
Obviously, with an estimated 15.7 billion lb of 
milk participating in the manufacturing order, sev-
eral hundred plants may be subject to its regulation 
(both the number of plants and the volume of milk 
might be different depending on what criteria are 
finally adopted for defining participation in the 
manufacturing order). It is likely that the plants 
would operate in a manner similar to that of plants 
currently buying manufacturing grade milk in Min-
nesota and Wisconsin. A necessary requirement of 
plants is tha t their pay prices be reported monthly to 
the manufacturing milk order administrator and that 
the procedures finally adopted for estimating a com-
petitive price series receive the full cooperation of the 
plant personnel. 
The entire proposal for Class III suspension is 
conceptual and has been advanced for further evalu-
ation. A number of basic institutional, legal, and 
operational questions can be directed at the concept. 
For example, in the initial stage, should there be a 
differential equalization rate for Grade B and Grade 
A producers? For multi-plant firms that have plants 
under both the manufacturing order and fluid order, 
will the pricing policies or decisions for manufactur-
ing milk be significantly affected by the equalization 
payment to producers? Is there any inherent char-
acteristic of the proposal that forces the pay prices in 
the manufacturing order to depart from a market 
clearing price for milk used in manufacturing dairy 
products? Some of the questions may be answered 
by additional economic analysis; others may only be 
answered through actual application of the proposed 
program. 
Pump, pasteurizing unit, and part of vacuum pan used to condense reserve milk for spray drying. 
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PRODUCT PRICE FORMULAS 
FOR RESERVE MILK PRICING 
Product-price formulas were used in a number 
of Federal order markets in the 1940's and 1950's to 
price reserve milk. Reserve milk prices were deter-
mined by multiplying product prices for either cheese, 
or butter and nonfat dry milk, by yield estimates and 
subtracting allowances for processing costs. Product 
price formulas permit developing estimates of the 
average value of milk in specific. uses, particularly 
butter-powder and cheese. They may more closely 
approximate what plant operators can afford to pay 
in the short run for specific uses-as contrasted to 
competitive pay prices, which are indicative of what 
plants have paid. Butter-powder and cheese for-
mulas can be used separately, or combined by assign-
ing weights to the butter-powder and cheese formulas, 
to get a combined butter-powder cheese formula. 
Product price formulas require representative 
measures for product prices, yields, and make allow-
ances. It also is necessary to have the various mea-
sures internally consistent. For example, if the price 
for 40-lb blocks of standard moisture cheese is used 
' the yield factor and the cost factor must also relate 
to 40-lb blocks of standard moisture cheese. 
Obtaining representative information as to prod-
uct yields is difficult because of variation of fat and 
nonfat solids content of milk received. Only rarely 
do plant receipts average 3.5% butterfat. Although 
plants generally have records on overrun for butter-
fat and powder yields per hundredweight of skim milk 
or buttermilk gried, the data generally are not re-
ported. 
Similarly "clean" data on product prices and 
costs. are difficult to come by. 
These difficulties are frequently cited as reasons 
why it is hard to develop realistic product price for-
mulas. In spite of these difficulties, product price 
formulas can be developed which reflect average 
prices paid for manufacturing milk in Minnesota and 
Wisconsin. This is possible because: 
a. The M-W price itself is a reflection of a wide 
spectrum of products manufactured, prices 
received for products, yields, costs, etc. 
b. Wholesale prices used for butter and cheese 
reflect changes in prices received for these 
products. 
c. Yield information can be derived through a 
combination of plant information and theo-
retical yields, and can be converted to 3.5% 
butterfat basis so as to be representative of 
standard yields. 
A close relationship has existed between changes 
in product prices and changes in manufacturing milk 
prices. Analysis of monthly data for the period Jan-
uary 1971 through January 1975 indicates that 
99.4% of the changes in the M-W price during the 
412 years were associated with variations in the price 
of butter, nonfat dry milk and cheese, 99.3% with 
variations in cheese prices, and 86.1 % with varia-
tions in butter and nonfat dry milk prices. These re-
sults indicate that a product price formula, properly 
constructed, would not drastically change the under-
lying current basis for pricing reserve milk in Federal 
orders. 
DATA NEEDS FOR PRODUCT PRICE FORMULAS 
Data needs for each of the three essential ingre-
dients in product price formulas-product prices, 
processing costs, and product yields-are discussed in 
following sections. 
Product Prices 
Product prices used in product price formulas 
should reflect as accurately as possible what plants 
are actually receiving for manufactured dairy prod-
ucts. At present the trade sells cheese largely on the 
basis of the Green Bay National Cheese Exchange 
price, butter on the basis of Chicago or New York 
Mercantile Exchange prices, and nonfat dry milk on 
the basis of various measures including USDA Mar-
ket News quotations. 
Butter and Cheese Exchange Quotations. 
Trading on the National Cheese Exchange and the 
Mercantile Exchanges is limited to a few minutes on 
Friday mornings. These prices, adjusted with pre-
miums and discounts for product characteristics, are 
the basis on which most cheese and butter is sold by 
manufacturing plants and assemblers during the fol-
lowing week. 
Questions have been raised as to whether these 
exchange prices are accurate and whether the ex-
changes any longer perform a useful function. There 
is special concern over the small volume of trading. 
Trading on the National Cheese Exchange and on the 
Mercantile Exchanges has always been thin. For 
example, in 1975 sales on the butter exchange were 
less than 0.1 % of production, and sales on the cheese 
exchange were less than 0.5 % of production. How-
ever, trades are not normally made for merchandis-
ing, but instead are made primarily when product 
traders feel price adjustments are needed to reflect 
supply-demand conditions. The trade generally in-
dicates that prices resulting from exchange trading 
are reflective of market conditions. There is con-
firmation of this opinion in that exchange prices are 
used extensively as the basis for buying and selling 
butter and cheese. 
Market News Quotations. The Dairy Market 
News Service of the USDA assembles and reports 
various dairy product price series. These include: 
1) Chicago and New York area wholesale butter 
prices, 2) Central States production area nonfat dry 
milk prices, and 3) Wisconsin assembly point cheddar 
cheese prices. 
The wholesale butter price is based on reports of 
wholesale seIIing prices for bulk butter at Chicago 
and New York. The level of open market trading 
in bulk butter in these markets has been very low in 
recent years, since large volumes of bulk butter are 
no longer moved into the city for printing and trad-
ing, but instead go directly from country processing 
points to retailers or other users. Prices reported on 
the wholesale market are based on limited trading, 
and much of the trading represents sales to users such 
as candy manufacturers, bakeries, and food proces-
sors. On numerous occasions, market news report-
ers, because of the lack of trading, have reported a 
nominal price based on the normal differential which 
has prevailed between the spot market and the whole-
sale selling price, or have used CCC purchase prices 
when CCC is buying butter. 
The low level of trading of bulk butter on the 
Chicago wholesale market is of concern since this 
price is used in computing butterfat differentials in 
aII Federal order markets. A monthly average butter 
price which is incorrect by just 1 cent could result in 
an increase or decrease in aggregate values of milk to 
producers by more than $500,000. IdeaIIy, a more 
broadly based, weighted average f.o.b. plant price for 
bulk butter obtained on a monthly basis, similar to 
the information presently obtained by the USDA for 
nonfat dry milk, would generate more confidence in 
the reported price. 
The volume of transactions involved in the Wis-
consin assembly point cheese price is substantial as 
compared to the ver.y thin market in which wholesale 
seIIing prices for butter are based. Information re-
ported covers open market transactions for 20 to 25 
of the major assemblers of cheese in Wisconsin. Wis-
consin represents nearly 50% of the U. S. production 
of cheddar cheese. A large portion of the•open mar-
ket transactions in barrel and 40-lb block cheese is 
covered by the Wisconsin assembly point cheese price 
reports. Here again, however, the volume of open 
market transactions represents only a limited portion 
of total cheese marketed in Wisconsin. A range of 
prices is reported, but no information is reported as 
to relative volumes sold at different prices. 
The price measure for nonfat dry milk which is 
used in Federal milk orders is a weighted average seII-
ing price reported to the Economics; Statistics, and 
Cooperative Service of USDA for spray process non-
fat dry milk, f.o.b. plants located in the Chicago area, 
i.e., in Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. 
Although there is ·some variation irr the number of" 
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plants reporting from month to month, prices in this 
series represent about 25% of the total U. S. produc-
tion of spray process nonfat dry milk. 
Trade Reaction to Price Quotations. Seven 
major Wisconsin processors and wholesalers of manu-
factured dairy products were interviewed to deter-
mine use of the different price series. The seven 
dairy firms handled more than one-half of Wisconsin's 
butter, nonfat dry milk, and cheese. 
Every firm interviewed used the Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange and National Cheese Exchange for 
"base" butter and cheese price quotations. Every 
firm also paid or received premiums (on the average) 
over exchange prices. None used the USDA Chicago 
wholesale butter price quotation or Wisconsin assem-
bling point cheese price. For nonfat dry milk, some 
firms used "Chicago area" f.o.b. plant prices, and 
some used "country point" prices reported by USDA 
as a basis for pricing nonfat dry milk. Others relied 
on their "feel of the market" or their plant costs in · 
determining nonfat dry milk prices. 
With the exception of relatively smaII quantities 
of nonfat dry milk, no USDA Market News prices are 
used in pricing manufactured dairy products in Wis-
consin. Exchange prices (which are used) do not 
reflect premiums and discounts, and are "central 
market" prices, not f.o.b. plant prices actuaIIy re-
ceived for the product. Also, the Cheese Exchange 
price does not include carload assembly costs. As-
sembly charges are currently credited to seilers <;tt 2)'4 
cents per pound· over exchange prices. Assembly 
charges account for part of the premium structure. 
Responses of interviewed firms to the price quo-
tation issue were as foIIows: ·Firm A had a verbal con-
tract for a cheese premium of 2 )t4 cents per pound 
over the National Cheese Exchange price on high 
quality 40-lb blocks. Premiums remain constant 
over long periods of time ( 1 year or longer), but are 
reduced on lower quality cheese. The firm also re-
cei,.ves approximately 1h cent per pound transporta-
tion ailowance for delivering cheese to the buyer'~ 
warehouse. 
Firm A was satisfied with using the National 
Cheese Exchange price as a base, and the firm doubts 
whether USDA f.o.b. plant reported prices would be 
given much credence by either buyers or seIIers. Firm 
A questions the accuracy and . usefulness of prices 
plants or buyers would report because of premium, 
quality, style, and size variations reflected. in the re-
ported prices. 
Firm B has a "written" cheese sales contract for 
3 cents per pound premium over the National 
Cheese Exchange price on 40-lb blocks, plus )t4 ·cent 
per pound for cheese more than 1 year old. The 
buyer pays storage costs. The firm gets larger pre-
miums on "in and out" or spot sales than on long-
term contracts, and also receives a moisture premium 
based on the Exchange moisture adjustment chart. 
The butter prices used by Firm B are based on 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange price plus a small 
premium which is almost constant over time. 
The firm's nonfat dry milk price is based on the 
USDA Market News country point price, plus their 
"feel of the market." They believe that quoted price 
ranges pose a problem and that more precise prices 
would be beneficial. 
Firm B also believes that a USDA Market News 
country point cheese price would be inappropriate 
since it would also report price ranges rather than a 
precise price. They prefer Chicago Mercantile and 
National Cheese Exchange prices since they are pre-
cise and are not reported as a range. Firm B does 
not believe USDA Market News f.o.b. plant prices 
could be reliably used in product price formulas be-
cause of the many premiums, grades, and varieties of 
products involved. For example, seven different non-
fat dry milk prices are recognized by Firm B. 
Firm C bases their cheese sales price on the Na-
tional Cheese Exchange price, plus a fixed contractual 
premium extending 1 year or longer, with a 6-month 
prior notice escape clause for both parties. Cheese 
prices and premiums are based on Wisconsin State 
brand (grade) prices, with a 90-day holding time re-
quirement. If the cheese does not hold its quality 
for 90 days, the premium and price are reduced. 
Firm C butter prices are based on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange price less a location adjustment, 
and nonfat dry milk prices are based on USDA Mar-
ket News country point prices. 
Firm C indicates that current pricing procedures 
are satisfactory because everyone uses the same prices 
or bases. However, management states that the pre-
miums received are so secret that no plant would 
divulge them to USDA Market News and therefore 
f.o .b. country point cheese prices would be difficult 
to obtain. Firm C, therefore, indicates that the Na-
tional Cheese Exchange price is the best operational 
price. 
The firm also notes that large quantities of bulk 
butter are being sold at country points, so a country 
point butter price quotation would be possible if pur-
sued by USDA Market News. 
Firm D gets a 4-5 cents a pound premium over 
the National Cheese Exchange on 40 lb bloc:k cheese. 
The firm is not unhappy with current premium pric-
ing procedures, but admits they are "dealing in the 
dark" on the premium structure. 
The firm gets a Y2 cent to 1 cent premium over 
the Chicago Merchantile Exchange price on butter 
sales. Butter premiums are more stable than those 
on cheese and generally much lower. 
Farm assembly bulk tank trucks await unloading at supply-equalization plant. 
38 
All nonfat dry milk is sold f.o.b. country plant 
at negotiated prices with no premium, since its price 
is not based on exchange prices. 
The firm has a problem with premiums on long-
term contracts because they must be agreed to ahead 
of time and specified in the contracts, whereas pre-
miums are negotiated on each uncommitted "in and 
out" transaction. Thus, long-term premiums can be 
out of line in either rising or falling cheese markets. 
They indicate such problems would not arise if a 
price base could be developed which reflected ex-
change prices plus premiums. 
Firm D suggests that current pricing procedures 
are very imprecise, and this could create problems in 
the use of product formula pricing. 
Firm E receives a 5% cents per pound premium 
over the Chicago Mercantile Exchange price for 
packaged butter, 1 Y4 cents per pound over the Ex-
change price for bulk butter on long-term contracts, 
and 11;3 cents to 1 % cents per pound premium for 
bulk butter on "in and out" sales. The firm is satis-
fied with the Mercantile Exchange price as a base 
price because everyone uses it. 
This firm receives a l Yz cents per pound cheese 
premium over the National Cheese Exchange price, 
but shares in other premiums, thus increasing its ef-
fective premium to at least 2Y4 cents per pound. 
Nonfat dry milk powder prices are based on the 
M-W milk price plus their plant costs in manufactur-
ing butter-powder ( 73 cents per cwt of milk in late 
1975). 
Firm E does not use the USDA Market News 
butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk price quotations 
because they do not believe price ranges are mean-
ingful, and they feel that price quotes represent 
guesses rather than what the product actually sells 
for. 
Firm F pays Y4, cent per pound premium over the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange price for 93-score hard 
bulk butter on long-term contracts ( 1 Yz years or 
more). The seller pays transportation costs-about 
Yz cent per pound on Wisconsin sales. The firm pays 
the 90-score Mercantile Exchange price for 90-score 
butter. They pay premiums of Yz to % cent per 
pound on "in and out" butter purchases when butter 
is short, but the higher premiums are an exception. 
They also pay Y4 cent per pound premiums plus pack-
aging costs of about 2Yz cents per pound for pack-
aged butter. 
The firm generally stays with the Y4 cent pre-
mium on long-term contracts, which enables it to 
gross about 0.5% gross profit on bulk butter opera-
tions (between 0.4 cent and 0.5 cent per pound). 
On nonfat dry milk; Firm F pays what the 
"trade calls for" and their "feel for the market" with-
out regard to USDA Market News quotations. 
Firm F favors use of the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change for pricing bulk butter, but opposes packaged 
butter quotations because efficiency and packaging 
costs vary so much from plant to plant. They do not 
· feel the USDA Market News bulk butter price has 
much validity. Firm F mistrusts telephone collection 
of prices as too imprecise, reflecting judgment and 
consensus rather than actual prices. They indicate 
that USDA Market News price range quotations are 
largely useless to the trade in establishing transaction 
prices. 
39· 
The firm does not see the need for f.o.b. plant 
prices for butter, because f.o.b. Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange prices minus transportation costs are f.o.b. 
plant prices. However, the firm would like to see 
daily, rather than weekly, Mercantile Exchange prices 
because buyers are "stuck" for a whole week at one 
price in a falling market. 
The firm also feels an "exchange" for nonfat dry 
milk powder would be valuable, and distrusts USDA 
Market News prices for powder for the same reasons 
as for butter. · 
Firm G bases their cheese pay prices on the Na-
tional Cheese Exchange plus premiums of 4Yz cents 
per pound on 40-lb blocks and 1 Yz cents on barrel 
cheese. These premiums vary over time and between 
varieties and types of cheeses as supply-demand con-
ditions change. Barrel cheese occasionally has nega-
tive premiums and 40-lb blocks zero premiums. 
This firm would like to see premiums built into 
the National Cheese Exchange price rather than nego-
tiated as at present, thereby making the price more 
accurate and representative. The firm bases their 
sales prices on current · Exchange prices plus pre-
miums, and if premiums go up, they have a difficult 
time reflecting premiums in their sales price. Firm 
G observes that premiums develop because some firms 
need cheese and_ "bid" for it among suppliers-there-
by driving up premiums all over the market. In-
creased premiums are not bid into the exchange price 
because that would not help price-setters get the 
cheese they need, since the price to all other firms 
would also go up immediately. 
Firm G does not pay much attention to "assem-
bly point" cheese prices. Their margin of error is 
only Yz cent per pound if they are to make a profit, 
and USDA Market News price "ranges" don't help 
them much. Instead, Firm G accepts the idea that 
the exchange price is a true indicator of supply-de-
mand in the cheese market. 
Suitability of Price Quotations for Product 
Price Formulas. Manufactured dairy product price 
quotations currently used by the trade have the fol-
lowing shortcomings as basis for product price formu-
TABLE 22.-Average Cheese Premiums per Pound Over National Cheese Exchange, Grade A, 40-Lb Block, 
and Barrel American Cheese Prices, Paid to Wisconsin-Midwest Cheese Manufacturers, F.O.B. Plant, Monthly, Jan-




































































































































































































































































































































































































































las: a) they are generally central market rather than 
f.o.b. country point prices; and b) they do not include 
premiums (which are frequently substantial and vary 
greatly over time), discounts, and carload assembly 
costs for cheese. For product price formula pur-
poses, in which the best measure of average prices 
actually received by plants is essential, the country 
point f.o.b. quotes and the premium-discount adjust-
ments have to be recognized. 
USDA Market News now collects prices assem-
blers receive for cheese, but not prices assemblers pay 
plants for cheese. USDA Market News indicates it 
could collect f.o.b. country plant prices for Swiss, 
Italian, and American cheese, and also butter if in-
dustry cooperation could be obtained. Bulk butter 
prices, f.o.b. country point, were collected until the 
early 1960's and their reporting could be resumed. 
However, most butter is now printed in the country, 
so validity of f.o.b. country point bulk butter prices 
is lessened. Nonfat dry milk prices, f.o.b. country 
plant, are already being collected by the U. S. De-
partment of Agriculture. Federal milk order audi-
tors could check accuracy of reported prices, or milk 
orders could be amended to require the reporting of 
prices received for butter, cheese, and nonfat dry 
milk, f.o.b. plant, to the market administrator. 
For product price formula purposes, it is desir-
able that monthly weighted average _prices, f.o.b. 
plant, be obtained for the products. Federal order 
market administrators would be in a better position 
than the USDA Market News to• collect' weighted 
average f.o.b. plant prices. It probably- would be 
necessary to obtain such information on a· mandatory 
basis rather than voluntarily. Market News has no 
authority to require p:rice reporting"._ Federal milk 
orders could be amended to require product price in-
formation essential to administration of the order pro-
gram. 
The obtaining of f.o.b. plant' price information 
is complicated by variations in packaging~ product 
composition, quality, size of transaction, and other 
conditions of sale. Efforts would have to be 'made. 
to obtain information which related to specified types 
of transactions. · 
Premium Structure 
Product price formulas require accurate product 
price data-prices plants actually receive for prod-
ucts. As previously indicated, exchange prices used 
by the cheese and butter trade are only base prices to 
which premiums are added in setting actual prices 
plants get for their products. (Premiums do not 
necessarily represent additional net income to plants; 
instead they may offset costs including assembly and 
grading incurred in selling to specific buyers.) Varia-
41' 
tions in these· premiums for major Wisconsin and 
Midwest cheese, butter, and nonfat dry milk plants 
and wholesalers are indicated in Tables 22-25. These 
data indicate the magnitude and variation_s in adjust-
ments which would have to be made to exchange and 
evep. USDA Market News price quotations to reflect 
actual prices plants received for manufactured dairy 
products. 
Cheese premiums varied widely between firms 
and over time-:-from ~ cent to more than 10 cents 
per pound for the years 1972-1977 (Tables 22 and 
23). Obviously, exchange priCe quotations are con-
siderably understating actual chee~e pay prices. . The 
differences would have to be taken.into consideration 
in developing equitable product price formulas. 
TABLE 23.-Average Annual Cheese Premiums 
per Pound Over National Cheese Exchange, Grade. A, 
40-Lb Block American Cheese Prices, Paid by Four Ma-
jor Buyers to Wisconsin-Midwest Cheese Manufactur-
ing Firm No. 6, F.O.B. Plant Carload Lots, 1972 to 1975. 
Buy.er 1972 1973 1974 1975'. 
A $0.0325 $0.0350 $0.0475 $0.0375 
B 0.0350 . 0.0525 . 0.0425 0.0425 
c 0.035d .. 0.0400 . 0.0550 0.0525 
D 0.0375 0.0365 0.0365 0.0515 
TABLE 24.-Comparison of.Gra'de A Butter Prices 
per Pound Paid Wisconsin-Midwest Manufacturers, 
F.O:B. Plant, and Chicago Mercantile Exchange 92-
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Note, + .sign indicates manufacturer's price is higher than Ex-
change price; - sign indicates lower. 
TABLE 25.-Comparison of Nonfat Dry Milk Extra 
Grade Spray High Heat F.O.B. Plant Prices per Pound 
Paid Wisconsi111-Midwest Manufacturers and USDA 
Market News, Chicago Area Prices for the Same Type 
and Quality Product, Monthly, January 1974 to July 
1975. 
Butter premiums (or discounts) are less, and 
vary less than cheese premiums (Table 22). Few 
country point butter prices varied more than 2 cents 
per pound from Chicago Mercantile Exchange prices 
in 1974-75, and most variation was less than 1 cent 
per pound. Nonfat dry milk premiums or discounts 
ranged from plus 5.7 cents to minus 4.4 cents per 
pound above and below USDA Market News quota-
tions in 1974-75 (Table 25). Thus, smaller adjust-
ments would be needed in exchange prices for butter 
than for cheese or nonfat dry milk in developing prod-

























































Product price formulas require estimates of pro-
cessing costs, i.e., the cost of transforming raw milk into 
manufactured dairy products. Procedures used for 
estimating these costs include: a) analyzing records of 
plant operations, b) the synthetic firm approach, c) 
indexing base period processing costs, or cl) "deriving" 
operating margins. 
Note: + sign indicates manufacturer's price is higher than aver-
Costs from Plant Records. Computation of 
average dairy processing costs directly from plant 
records initially appears to be an appropriate method 
for fixing margins because it involves real plants. For 
the administrative agency, cost analysis eliminates 
much of the subjectivity in fixing margins .. To gain age price reported for Chicago area; - sign indicates lower. 
TABLE 26.-Annual Milk Receipts in Surveyed Minnesota-Wisconsin Dairy 
Plants, 1974. 
Type of Plant Total Milk Received Range in Receipts Average Receipts 
(mil. lb] 
Butter (5] 198.2 19.4 - 49.8 39.6 
Nonfat Dry Milk (5] 639.7 19.9 - 240.8 127.9 
Butter-Powder (5] 521.2 21.8 - 170.7 104.2 
Cheese (10) 1,363.4 8.1 - 438.3 136.3 
TABLE 27.-Ratio of Summary Products Sales Revenue to Total Dairy Reve-
nues in Surveyed Minnesota-Wisconsin Dairy Plants, 1974. 
Butter Plants* 
Nonfat Dry Milk 
Powder Plantst 
Butter-Nonfat Dry 









*For butter plants: 1) butter 
2) skim milk (fluid) 
3) buttermilk (fluid] 
tFor nonfat dry milk 
powder plants: 1) NFDM powder 
:j:For butter-nonfat 1] butter 5) buttermilk powder 
dry milk powder 2) butter sold locally 6) buttermilk (fluid) 
plants: 3) NFDM powder 7) condensed skim 
4) NFDM animal feed 8) aJI dairy blend 
**For cheese plants: 1) cheese 4) dry whey 
2) butter from whey cream 5) liquid whey 





insight into the feasibility and problems of using plant 
records, cost data were collected from representative 
Minnesota-Wisconsin plants manufacturing cheese, 
butter, nonfat dry milk, and butter-nonfat dry milk. 
Surveyed plants were selected by stratifying manufac-
turing dairy plants in Minnesota-Wisconsin into the 
four product groups. Twenty plants were selected 
randomly in each state, with the number in each 
group proportionate to the group's share of all dairy 
plants. Twenty plants participated in Minnesota and 
five plants participated in Wisconsin. 
Average annual receipts of plants manufacturing 
nonfat dry milk, butter-powder, and cheese each ex-
ceeded 100 million lb of milk. Average annual re-
ceipts of butter plants were 40 million lb of milk 
(Table 26). Size ranges were considerable (for ex-
ample, from 8 million to 438 million lb of milk an-
nually in cheese plants). 
Plants manufactured considerable quantities of 
dairy products other than their primary- manufac-
tured dairy products. "Specialization" fell as low as 
32% for cheese plants, 37% for butter plants, and 
51 % for nonfat dry milk powder plants (Table 27), 
necessitating cost ·allocation among various enter-
prises. Joint costs were also allocated for processing 
plants that were units of large multi-plant firms, and/ 
or where the dairy operation was part of a firm that 
included nondairy activities such as feeds, farm sup-
plies, and locker plants. In all cases, a standard pro-
cedure for allocating joint costs was used. 
Butter-powder processing costs were calculated 
in two ways: 1) processing skim milk and cream in 
specialized powder and specialized butter plants, and 
2) processing skim milk and cream in combination 
butter-powder plants. The average costs of proces-
sing milk in combined butter-powder plants, $0.307 
per cwt, were less than the cost of processing powder 
alone in specialized drying plants-$0.504 per cwt 
(with butter processing costs an additional $0.236 per 
cwt of milk). Average costs of processing milk into 
cheese were $0.792 per cwt (Table 28). 
Individual plants had wide variations in proces-
sing costs-from $0.239 to $0.678 per cwt for butter-
powder plants and $0.678 to $1.576 per cwt for cheese 
plants. There were also wide ranges in processing 
costs in "butter only" and "nonfat dry milk powder 
only" plants. 
On the average, fixed costs were a rather con-
stant proportion of all costs-12 to 14% for the four 
types of plants (Table 29). Labor was the major 
cost item for all operations, accounting for 30 to 40% 
of average total costs. The range of costs was sub-
stantial for ea~h of the individual cost components. 
Factors accounting for cost differences among 
plants include: 1) level of utilization of plant capa-
city, 2) depreciation procedures, 3) original construc-
tion costs which have continued to inflate over time, 
and 4) allocation of costs when a number of enter-
prise activities are involved. 
These data indicate that use of average plant 
costs in product formula pricing would require some 
plants to pay considerably more than they could af-
ford to pay, while low cost plants would l:;ienefit from 
wide margins. The data also indicate the problems 
of attempting to get information on average cost data 
from plant records. 
Synthetic-Firm Costs. The synthetic-firm ap-
proach uses technical production relationships and 
costs from measurement of actual plant operations, 
from equipment manufacturers, and from engineer-
ing firms to determine resource and labor require-
ments for different sized plants. Market prices for 
wages and all inputs (fixed and variable) are applied 
to each component. Assuming maximum use of ca-
pacity, costs can be generated. If different tech-
niques of production are available, lowest cost plants 
for any given volume can be selected from among the 
options. This procedure was followed in a study of 
cheddar cheese manufacturing costs by Lilwall and 
Hammond.25 
25Lilwall, Nicholas and Jerome Hammond. 1970. Cheddar 
Cheese Manufacturing Costs. Univ. of Minn., Agri. Exp. Sta. Bull 
501'. . ' 
TABLE 28.-Costs o~ Processing Milk into Various Manufactured Dairy Products in Surveyed Minnesota-Wis-
consin Dairy Plants, 1974. 
Weighted Average Costs 
Range 
Nonfat Dry 
Butter Milk Powder 
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*The differences in average total costs per cwt between Tables 28 and 29 are explained by the fact that the cost data in Table 28 have been adjusted for the amount of whole milk re· 
ceived at the plant but subsequently transshipped to another plant for processing. 
An advantage of the synthetic-firm approach is 
that it standardizes all plants to a given point in time. 
Thus, prices for all factors of production are the same. 
On the other hand, the dairy industry is not organized 
in this manner. Plants were constructed at different 
.times and they operate at different utilization levels. 
The extent. of capacity in the industry is difficult to 
determine. As this varies for any given plant, costs 
per hundredweight of milk will vary. 
The synthetic-firm approach is useful for analy-
sis of plant efficiency and for planning of new facili-
ties or plant expansion. However, it may yield rather 
misleading results regarding actual costs of manufac-
turing operations, and therefore may be inappro-
priate for use in constructing product price formulas. 
Indexing Base Period Costs. "Indexing" in-
volves adjusting base period manufacturing costs by 
an index over time of costs of processing inputs such 
as wages, packaging supplies, fuel and power, and 
construction costs, weighted according to their impor-
tance. The indexing procedure was used in compu-
ting margins presented in Table 30, with 1970 mar-
gins adjusted annually by annual changes in the in-
dex of hourly wage rates in food processing industries. 
Data in Tables 31 through 33 indicate that use 
of indexed base period costs in computing margins 
for product price formulas generally resulted in cheese 
and butter-powder-cheese formula prices quite close 
to the M-W price series in the 8-year period 1970-77. 
Formula prices using indexed costs averaged within 
8 cents of the M-W price in 3 of 8 years for butter-
powder, 5 of 8 years for cheese, and 6 of 8 years for 
butter-powder-cheese. However, the differences 
widened in 1976 and 1977: : ' 
A major advantage of using the indexing proce-
dure is that the data for construction of the index are 
readily available from government publications. The 
Survey of Current Business, published monthly by 
the Department of Commerce, reports prices and in-
dexes for all the factors indicated above. The base 
year used will strongly influence the level of "indexed 
costs," so use of a representative base period is essen-
tial. A problem with this approach is that it does 
not adequately reflect efficiencies resulting from 
changes in factors such as plant size and new tech-
nology. 
Costs' from Derived Margins. Derived mar-
gins can be used to estimate processing costs for prod-
uct-price formulas as long as there are some non-regu-
lated plants manufacturing cheese, butter, and -pow-
der (but not handling fluid milk for packaging). 
Derived margins are the difference between the gross 
value of manufactured dairy products and average 
prices paid farmers for the milk used for the manu-
factured dairy products. This procedure, like index-
ing, is relatively simple and inexpensive. Product 
prices and pay prices for milk are both assembled by 
the Economics, Statistics, and Cooperative Service for 
other uses. No additional data are needed. 
The derived margin approach to processing costs 
breaks down when all milk becomes Grade A. As 
long as competitive.manufacturing grade milk prices 
are available, the derived margin approach has the 
advantage of providing a means of deriving product 
. formulas for butter-powder and cheese that will close-
. ly approximate over .time any particular measure of_ 
competitive pay. price chosen. Derived margins, in 
turn, can provide a means of establishing separate 
prices for_ milk for butter-powder and for milk for 
cheese. To·the extent that separate prices are· desir-
able,· derived margins provide an advantage over the 
M-W price, whic~ is a measu~e of the average value 
TABLE 30.-Calculation of Butter-Powder and Cheese Plant Processing Margins, 1969-1977. 
Dairy P~oduct Processing Index of Proje~t~ Buitel'-· Projected Cheese 
Labor Force Earnings* Earnings Powder. Marginst Margins:f: 
Year (dollars per hour) (:1969 = 1 00) (1970 = 0.59) (1970 = 0.67) 
1969 .$3.03 100.0 
1970 
.. 
3.26 107.6 ;p>:._!W~ ·:.) 0.67 
" 
~ 
1971 . -3.45 113.9 . - -0.63 0.72 
1972 3.65 120.5 0.67 0.76 
1973 3.87 127.7 
' -
0.71 0.81 
1974 4.18 138.0 . 0.75-- '· 0.86 
..• ·4.56 - -:-1975 150.5 
- 0 .• 81 0.92 
1976 4.95 162.4 0.89 1.01 
1977 0.96 1.09 
*Statistical Abstract of the United States, U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
tThe average margin for 1970, based on the difference between the 1970 M-W creamery pay price and the value of butter and nonfat dry 
milk produced from milk in 1970, adjusted by an index of labor earnings for the preceding year. (See Table 33 footnote for formula used 
to determine butter-powder value.) 
:j:The average margin for 1970, based on the difference between the 1970 M-W cheese plant pay price and the value of cheddar cheese, 
butter, and dry whey produced from milk in 1970, adjusted by an index of labor earnings for the preceding year. [See Table 32 footnote for 
formula used to determine cheese-butter-whey value.) 
A5 
TABLE 31.-Amount Minnesota-Wisconsin Manufacturing Grade Price Exceeds Cheese Formula Price When Make Allowance Is Adjusted by Index 
Factors.* 
Absolute 
Year Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average Averaget 
Dollars per cwt 
1970 -0.21 -0.18 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.14 -0.12 -0.10 -0.08 0.08 
1971 +0.01 +0.09 -0.13 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0 0 +0.06 +0.05 +0.06 -0.06 0 0.04 
1972 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 +0.04 +0.04 +0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 0.04 
1973 +0.01 +o.D3 +0.01 +0.04 +0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.26 -0.07 -0.18 -0.15 -0.03 0.08 
1974 -0.12 -0.14 -0.07 -0.07 +0.20 +0.22 +0.18 +0.03 +0.33 -0.27 -0.16 +0.09 -0.02 0.16 
1975 +0.41 +o.34 +0.31 +0.25 +0.15 +0.08 +0.06 -0.11 +o.o4 -0.13 +0.05 +0.12 +0.15 0.17 
1976 +0.20 · +o.52 +o.44 +0.09 +0.15 +0.12 +o.D3 -0.20 +0.08 +0.26 +o.36 +o.36 +0.21 0.23 
1977 +o.53 +o.46 +o.34 +0.18 +0.24 +o.39 +0.21 +0.12 -0.09 -0.13 -0.13 -0.21 +0.21 0,26 
*Both prices at 3.5 % butterfat. Cheese formula price: {weighted average of Wisconsin primary market, barrel and 40-lb. block, cheddar cheese prices times 9 .66] plus {Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange Grade A butter price times 0.3] plus {Central States edible dry whey powder-$0.08 ($0. l 0 in 1977] times 5.5] minus manufacturing allowance based on the previous year's 
wage increases among dairy manufacturers calculated in Table 30. Cheddar cheese prices weighted by the total annual production in Wisconsin for the previous year. 
Weights: 














TABLE 32.-Amount Minnesota-Wisconsin Manufacturing Grade Price Exceeds Butter-Powder Formula Price When Make Allowance Is Adjusted by 
Index Factors.* 
Absolute 
Year Jan, Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average Averaget 
Dollars per cwt 
1970 +o.38 +o.35 +0.24 -0.01 -0.12 -0.09 -0.10 ·-0.07 -0.04 +0.08 +0.14 +0.13 +0.01 0.15 
1971 +0.17 +0.21 +0.19 -0.07 -0.16 -0.14 -0.14 -0.12 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 +0.02 -0.02 0.12 
1972 +0.10 +0.10 +0.18 +0.10 +0.09 +0.10 +0.14 +0.13 +0.10 +0.01 -0.02 -0.14 +0.08 0.10 
1973 +o.o3 +0.05 +0.06 +0.01 +o.o4 +0.11 +0.01 -0.29 --0.15 +o.79 +o.87 +1.25 +0.23 0.30 
1974 +i.53 +1.40 +0.77 +0.08 +o.o4 -0.23 -0.23 -0.39 -0.14 -0.07 -0.13 -0.26 +0.20 0.44 
1975 -0.06 -0.11 -0.10 -0.07 -0.02 0 -0.14 -0.16 -0.25 -0.41 -0.52 -0.47 -0.19 0.19 
1976 +0.12 +o.34 +o.43 +0.26 +0.13 -0.07 -0.09 +0.21 +0.14 +o.o9 +0.15 +0.15 +0.21 0.23 
1977 +0.16 +0.13 -0.06 -0.30 -0.30 -0.33 -0.28 -0.29 -0.25 -0.25 ~0.22 -0.13 -0.17 0.22 
*Both prices at 3.5 % butterfat. Butter-powder formula: (Chicago Mercantile Exchange Grade AA butter price times 4.27) plus (Central States area nonfat dry milk (spray) price times 8.3] 
minus manufacturing allowance based on the prevlous year's wage increase among dairy manu1'acturero calculated in Table 30. 
tAverage ignoring signs. 
, TABLE 33.-Amount Minnesota-Wisconsin Manufacturing Grade Milk Price Exceeds Butter-Powder-Cheese Formula Price When Make Allowance ls 
Adjusted by Index Factors.* 
Absolute 
Year Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average Aver.;get 
Dollars per cwt 
1970 +0.14 +0.13 +0.11 -0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 +0.03 +0.04 +0.01 0.06 
1971 +0.10 +0.15 +0.04 -0.06 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 
1972 +0.05 +0.04 +0.07 +0.07 +0.07 +0.07 +0.05 +0.04 +0.04 -0.01 -$.05 -0.10 +o.o3 0.06 
1973 +0.02 +0.04 +0.03 +o.03 +0.02 +0.04 -0.01 -0.18 -0.21 +o.3o +0.27 +o.45 +0.08 0.13 
1974 +o.49 +o.43 +0.24 -0.01 +0.14 +0.05 +0.03 -0.13 +0.16 -0.20 -0.15 -0.04 +0.06 0.17 
1975 +0.24 +0.17 +0.16 +0.13 +0.09 +0.05 -0.01 -0.13 -0.05 -0.23 -0.16 -0.10 +o.02 0.13 
1976 +o.39 +o.46 +o.44 +0.15 +0.14 +0.05 -0.01 -0.05 +0.10 +0.20 +0.28 +0.28 +0.21 0.21 
;.f:>.. 1977 +o.44 +o.38 +0.24 +0.06 +0.10 +0.21 
','I +0.13 +0.02 -0.13 -0.16 -0.15 -0.19 +0.12 0.18 
*Both prices at 3.5 % butterfat. Butter-powder and cheese formulas in Tables 31 and 32 were weighted annually in proportion to the relative quantities of milk used to produce nonfat 
dry milk and cheddar cheese in Minnesota and Wisconsin during the preceding year. 
Butter• 
Powder % Cheese % 
Weights 1970 59 41 
J • 
. ... 
·1971 54 46 





'.) - ~ 43 57 
.. ~ ~ -~ 1974 37 63 
..) 
··- . ,, 
.1975 . 37 63 
J . 
". ·' ·. 1976 3q 64 
1977 25 75 
tAverage ignoring signs. 
c ·~ 
. ' 
of milk in various uses. Margins reflected by the 
M-W price have shown considerable variation within 
a year. The derived margins approach tends to 
eliminate such short run variations. 
Choosing the Make Allowance Procedure. 
Of the four methods specified for calculating proces-
sing costs, the "derived margin" procedure is simplest, 
most inexpensive, and most accurate-as long as un-
regulated competitive manufacturing milk pay prices 
are available. Make allowances (margins) can be 
calculated monthly by simple arithmetic procedures 
(see subsequent section entitled, Construction of 
Product Price Formulas). 
After conversion to Grade A (and with the 
elimination of a competitive Grade B farm milk pay 
price), the indexing method of estimating processing 
costs has merits in terms of simplicity of procedure, 
cost of calculation, and reflection of changes in actual 
processing costs. Indexing can still be used for cal-
culating processing costs when all milk becomes 
Grade A or regulated. Such is not the case for de-
rived margins unless a method for retaining competi-
tive pay prices is developed. 
However, any administered price procedure will, 
at times, result in processing allowances that are too 
high for some plants and too low for others. If it is 
found that margin allowances are too low to permit a 
plant of reasonable operating efficiency to cover costs 
plus a competitive return on investment, adjustments 
in the base or index factors may have to be made. 
Product Yields 
Manufactured dairy product yields per hundred-
weight of milk are needed in computing product price 
TABLE 34.-0verrun in Four Surveyed Butter Pro" 










TABLE 35.-Nonfat Dry Milk Yields per Hundred-
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formulas. Product yields vary for three reasons: I) 
solids content of raw milk, 2) product specification, 
and 3) recovery of solids in processing operations. 
Even when the first two are known with a high degree 
of accuracy, the latter can still cause considerable 
yield variability. Nevertheless, yield factors must be 
selected if a product price formula is to be used. The 
following discussion deals with product yields for 
various manufactured dairy products, and factors ac-
counting for -variations in yields. 
Butter Yields. The legal definition of butter 
specifies a minimum of 80% butterfat. Thus, for 
milk of a given butterfat content, maximum butter 
yields should be 125% of the amount of butterfat in 
the whole milk ( 100 __,__ 80). In trade terminology, 
the 125% factor is referred to as 25% overrun. How-
-ever, losses of fat in milk separation, buttermilk, and 
other losses limit the yield to somewhat less than 25% 
overrun. 
_Four plants reported their yield (overrun) for 
this study (Table 34). 
The widest variation in yields occurred between 
pl~nt two and plant three, with the butter yield of 
plant three exceeding that of plant two by more than 
~ lb per cwt of milk. At current butter prices, this 
would have meant approximately another 5 cents in 
gross value per cwt of milk for the high yield plant. 
Nonfat Dry Milk Yields. Nonfat dry milk 
yield is related to the nonfat solids content of the raw 
milk. . However, the relationship is not precise. For 
example, yields of nonfat dry milk per hundredweight 
of whole milk reported by six Minnesota plants for 
this study show a 0.215 lb difference in yield between 
the high and low plants (Table 35). At current 
prices of powder, the yield differences amount to 
_about 15 cents per cwt of milk. 
There is some relationship between nonfat dry 
milk yields and the fat content of the whole milk. 
But again the relationship is not very precise. In a 
1956 USDA study, 67% of nonfat dry milk yields 
varied withiri plus or minus 0.207 lb of the average 
for milk of a specified fat content (Fig. 1). 
Cheese Yields. Yields of cheese per hundred-
- - -wel.ght of milk are influenced by moisture content-
the higher the moisture, the greater the yield~and 
by fat and casein content of raw milk. The wide 
. .. variations in cheese yidds associated with variations 
in fat content of milk and moisture content of cheese 
are indicated in Table 36. 
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Cheese prices are adjusted according to moisture 
content, so value differences due to yields are some-
what offset by product price adjustments. Never-
theless, cheese yields would have to be taken into con-
sideration in product price formulas. 





















Yield= .4863(% fat in whole milk)+7.065 
(Standard error of estimate = ± . 207) 
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FIG. 1.-Nonfat dry milk solids yield in relation to fat conte~t of whol~ milk. 
TABLE 36.-Theoretical Yields of Cheddar Cheese Calculated by the Formula: Yield= CF+ C) N.* 
(Moisture Content of Cheese) 
Milk 
Fat 34% 35% 36% 37% 38% 39% . 40% 41 % 
% lb lb lb lb . !b lb lb lb 
3.0 7.905 8.058 8.186 8.313 8.441 8.568 8.721 8.874 
3.1 8.148 8.279 8.410 8.541 8.672 8.803 8.960 9.118 
3.2 8.366 8.500 8.635 8.769 8.907 9.038 9.200 9.361 
3.3 8.583 8.722 8.860 8.998 9.136 9.274 9.439 9.605 
3.4 8.801 8.943 9.084 9.226 9.367 9.50_9 9.679 9.848 
.. 
3.5 9.019 9.164 9.309 9.454 9.599 9.744 9.918 10.092 
3.6 9.237 9.385 9.534 9.682 9.831 9.979 10.157 10.336 
3.7 9.454 9.606 9.758 9.910 10.062 . 10.214 i0.397 10.579 
3.8 9.672 . 9.828 9.983 10.139 10.294 10.450 10.636 10.823 
3.9 9.880 10.049 10.208 10.367 10.526 10.665 10.876 11.066 
4.0 10.l 08 10.270 10.433 10.595 10.758 10.920 11.115 11.310 
4.1 10.325 10.491 10.657 10.823 10.989 11.155 11.354 11.554 
4.2 10.542 10.712 10.882 11.051 11.221 ·11.390 11.594 11.797 
4.3 10.761 10.934 11.107 11.280 11.453 11.626 11.833 12.041 
4.4 10.978 11.155 11.311 11.508 11.684 11.861 12.073 12.284 
4.5 11.196 11.376 11.556 11.736 11.916 12.096 12.312 12.528 
*Yield= pounds of cheese per 100 lb of milk. 
F = pounds of fat in 100 lb of milk. 
C =pounds of casein in 100 lb of milk. 
N =moisture factor. 
Source: Van Slyke, L. L. and W. V. Price. 1949. Cheese. Orange Judd Publishing Co., Inc., New York, p. 67. 
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CONSTRUCTION OF PRODUCT PRICE 
FORMULAS WHEN COMPETITIVE FARM 
MILK PAY PRICES ARE AVAILABLE 
Class I utilization in Federal order markets aver-
aged only 55% in 1976. Of the 45% of Federal or-
der milk processed in manufactured dairy products, 
butter, nonfat dry milk, and cheese accounted for 
63.4% of all Class II and Class III usage (butterfat 
basis). Therefore, product price formulas must be 
concerned primarily with three products-butter, 
nonfat dry milk, and cheese. 
Product price formulas have not been more 
widely used because of the difficulty of obtaining re-
presentative plant cost information to determine make 
allowances. However, as long as competitive pay 
prices are available, the "derived margin" procedure 
described earlier can be used. Derived margins can 
be used to generate a margin (make) allowance, and 
the margin in turn can be used to derive a manufac- · 
turing milk price. 
The following procedure illustrates the use of a 
butter-powder formula to calculate a price or to de-
rive an apparent margin. Assume the following for 
a given month: 
is: 
Grade AA butter price= $0.91 per lb 
Nonfat dry milk price =·$0.62 per lb 
Yield of butter per cwt 3.5 '1~ B. F. milk-4.27 lb 
Yield of powder per cwt 3.5 % B. F. milk-8.3 lb 
Minnesota-Wisconsin series price = $8.05 per 
cwt 3.5 % B. F. milk 
The gross return on butter-powder manufacture 
(butter price x yield factor) + (powder price x 
yield factor) 
($0.91 x 4.27) + ($0.62 x 8.3) = $9.03 per cwt 
gross return per cwt of 3.5 % milk used in but-
ter-powder. 
The derived margin on butter-p~wder manufa?-
ture is: 
(gross return per cwt on butter-powder) - (M-
W price per cwt} 
($9.03 per cwt) - ($8.05 per cwt) = $0.98 per 
cwt derived margin-on milk testing 3.5 % B. F. 
used for butter-powder. 
If the margin of $0.98 per cwt remains relative-
ly stable from month to month, it is possible to get a~ 
estimate of the Minnesota-Wisconsin price by sub-
tracting the apparent margin from the gross return. 
($0.91 x 4.27) + ($0.62 x 8.3) - $0.98 = $8.05 
per cwt 3.5 % B. F. milk. 
The sal!le procedure c;;tn be used in calculating 
derived margins for cheese manufacture. 
Washing Out Errors in Product Prices or Yields Used 
An interesting aspect of the derived margins ap-
proach is that small errors in yield-factors, or product 
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prices, are "washed out" as long as the errors are rela-
tively constant from month to month. This is be-
cause variations in yields or product prices will be 
offset by equal variations in derived margins. 
For example, if the measure of product price is 
too high relative to what plants actually receive, the 
calculated gross return will be "too high." But the 
derived margin will also be "high" by the same 
amount. Therefore, the formula can still approxi-
mate the M-W or any other target level which is 
sought, ·as long as actual margins taken remain rela-
tively constant. In the same way, yield factors which 
are overstated or understated will be offset by an off-
setting overstatement or understatement of the "true" 
margin. 
The error cancellation effect can be illustrated 
by use of a product price formula to calculate the 
gross value per cwt of 3.5% butterfat milk for cheese: 
(Wisconsin assembly point cheddar cheese price 
per pound x 9.45 lb yield per cwt of milk test-
ing 3.5 % butterfat) 
+ (Chicago Grade A butter price x 0.3 lb yield fat 
in whey cream per cwt of milk) 
+ (Dry edible whey price per pound - $0.08 x 
5.5 lb yield dry whey per cwt of milk} 
Using average prices for these products for No-
vember 1975, calculations are as follows: 
$0.9931 x 9.45 $9.385 
+ $0.9728 x 0.3 0.290 
+ ($0.0845 - $0.08) x 5.5 = 0.027 
Average gross value per cwt of 3.5 % 
B. F. milk for cheese in Minnesota-
Wisconsin in November 1975 $9.702 
Minnesota-Wisconsin cheese plant pay 
price per. cwt of 3.5 % B. F. milk in 
November 1975 $8.840 
Derived average margin per cwt of milk 
for cheese plonts i[t November 1975 $0.862 
However, if instead of using the Wisconsin as-
sembly point price for 40-lb blocks, the average No-
vember 1975 National Cheese Exchange price of 
$0.9,5,06 is substitP:ted for 40-lb blocks, the gross value 
and derived margin are reduced significantly: 
$0.9506 x 9.45 = $8.983 
+ $0.9728 x 0.3 0.290 
+ ($0.0845 - $0.08) x 5.5 = 0.027 
Average gross value per cwt of 3.5 % 
B. F. milk for cheese in Minnesota-
Wisconsin in November 1975 
Minnesota-Wisconsin cheese plant pay 




Derived average margin per .cwt of milk· 
for cheese p'lants in November 1975 ·$0.460 
Thus, the apparent margin for cheese plants is 
reduced $0.40 per cwt of milk (from $0.86 to $0.46) 
by using National Cheese Exchange prices rather than 
assembly point prices for cheese. However, calcu-
lated reserve milk prices from a product price for-
mula will be unaffected, since the lower exchange 
prices (than assembly point prices) exactly offset the 
lower apparent margins. 
Assembly Point Cheese Prices = ($0.702 gross value 
per cwt of 3.5 % B. F. milk) - ($0.862 per cwt 
margin) = $8.84 per cwt calculated reserve milk 
prices per cwt 
National Exchange Cheese Prices = ($9.300 gross 
value per cwt of 3.5 % B. F. milk) - ($0.460 per 
cwt margin) = $8.84 per cwt calculated reserve 
milk prices per cwt 
Different yield factors can also influence appar-
ent margins. The 9.45 lb yield factor used in the 
illustration is the yield of 37% moisture cheese from 
100 lb of milk containing 3.5% butterfat. However, 
cheese assemblers report prices on a standard mois-
ture basis. Therefore, if Wisconsin assembly point 
prices are used in a formula, it is appropriate to use 
a yield factor which relates to standard moisture 
cheese. The midpoint of the standard moisture range 
is about 38.4%. The midpoint translates into a yield 
factor of about 9.66 lb instead of the 9.45 lb yield 
applied to 37% moisture cheese. With the Novem-
ber 1975 assembly point price of $0.9931 per lb, the 
use of a cheese yield of 9.66 lb, instead of the 9.45 lb, 
increases gross returns by 21 cents per cwt of milk. 
Gross Cheese Returns per cwt of 3.5 % B. F. Milk 
(9.66 lb cheese yield per cwt milk) x 
($0.9931 per lb cheese)= $9.593 
(9.45 lb cheese yield per cwt milk) x 
($0.9931 per lb cheese)= $9.385 
·Increased gross cheese return = $0.208 
However, the higher yield also increases derived 
margins by the same amount as gross cheese returns 
increased, since the manufacturing milk price is sub-
tracted from a higher gross value of milk for cheese. 
Derived Margins per cwt of 3.5 % B. F. Milk 
($9.910 gross value with 9.66 lb 
cheese yield) - ($8.84 M-W) = $1.070 
($9.702 gross value with 9.45 lb 
cheese yield) - ($8.84 M-W) = 0.862 
Increased derived margin = $0.208 
Thus, calculated reserve prices from a product 
price formula with a yield of 9.66 lb of cheese per cwt 
milk would be the same as if a yield of 9.45 lb of 
cheese per cwt of milk was used. 
Calculated Reserve Milk Prices per cwt 
($9.910 gross value with 9.66 lb 
cheese yield) - ($1.070 margin) = $8.84 
($9.702 gross value with 9.45 lb 
cheese yield) - ($0.862 margin) = $8.84 . 
In summary, it is possible with a product price 
formula using varying product prices and yields to 
determine make allowances and to calculate a reserve 
milk price that closely represents the net value of 
milk. The product price used may be "too high" or 
"too low" relative to what plants actually receive, but 
this in turn results in returns being "too high" or "too 
low." In effect, "too high" or "too low" a product 
price is offset by "too high" or "too low" a derived 
margin. The same offsetting tendency exists with 
yield factors that are "too high" or "too low." 
Derived Product Price Formulas 
The derived margin approach to product price 
formulas represents a blend of the competitive pay 
price approach, and the product price formula ap-
proach. The concept can "force a price" at the M-
W level or any other level sought. Derived margins 
avoid the difficult problem of determining a repre-
sentative make allowance on the basis of frequently 
conflicting cost information obtained at public hear-
ings. The question remains, however, as to which 
particular competitive pay price the derived margin 
should be calculated. 
The following product price formulas are ex-
amples of the procedure for determining Class III 
price obligations. The sources of data for yield and 
price factors are described in subsequent sections. 
1. Butter-powder formula for milk testing 
3.5% butterfat: 
(Chicago Mercantile Exchange Grade AA 
butter price per pound x 4.27) + (Central 
States spray extra grade powder price per 
pound x 8.3) - 12-month moving average 
derived margin between gross return on but-
ter-powder and M-W creamery pay price 
per cwt (pay prices for individual states 
weighted by the two state production of non-
fat dry milk for the previous year). 
2. Cheddar cheese formula for milk testing 
3.5% butterfat: 
(Average of Wisconsin 40-lb block and bar-
rel assembly point price per pound x 9.66) 
+ (Chicago Mercantile Exchange Grade A 
butter price per pound x 0.3) + (dry edible 
whey Central States price per pound -
$0.0826 ) x 5.5 - 12-month moving average 
derived margin between gross return on 
cheese and M-W cheese plant pay price per 
cwt (pay prices for individual states weigh-
ted by the two state production of American 
cheese for the previous year) . 
3. Combined butter-powder-cheese formula for 
milk testing 3.5% butterfat: a combination 
of the above two formulas weighted annually 
in proportion to the relative quantities of 
26$0.10 in 1977. 
milk used in the production of nonfat dry 
milk and cheese in Minnesota and Wiscon-
sin. 
Suggested Product Price Measures 
for Use in Product Formulas 
If a product price formula is used for reserve 
milk pricing, the following price series for the product 
values are suggested: 
Butter. The butter price suggested for use is 
the average price for Grade AA butter for the month 
as reflected by "last significant transactions" on the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (reported by the 
USDA in weekly dairy market news reports). In 
calculating the monthly average, the price arrived at 
each Friday can be assigned to that day, and to each 
day Mond~y through Thursday of the following 
week. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange spot mar-
ket price for butter, plus or minus fairly fixed differ-
entials, is used as the basis for settlement on nearly 
all butter sold l;>y creameries, and by receivers to their 
wholesale customers.' 
The AA grade butter price is used for the butter-
powder formula since it is the predominant quality 
sold. However, the Grade A butter price is used in 
the cheese formula since whey cream butter generally 
is Grade A or Grade B, and more reliable price infor-
mation is available for Grade A butter. 
Nonfat Dry Milk. The price for spray process 
nonfat dry milk reported for the Central States area 
is suggested for use in the product price formula be-
cause it is based on information from processors who 
sell a large volume of nonfat dry milk. Also, it is 
calculated at the end of the month, whereas the f.o.b. 
plant price reported by the Economics, Statistics, .and 
Cooperative Service (which is currently used in a few 
Federal orders) is not available until the 5th of the 
following month. The Central States price is repre-
sentative of current values, whereas the USDA Chi-
cago area price includes long-term contract sales. 
It is recommended that midpoints of price ranges for 
high and low heat extra grade powder be averaged. 
In calculating monthly averages, weekly prices 
reported on Thursday are assigned to each day Mon-
day through Thursday of that week and to Friday of 
the preceding week. ' 
Cheese. The Wisconsin assembly point ched-
dar cheese price is suggested for use in calculating the 
cheese product price formula. This price closely re-
flects price changes which occur on the Wisconsin 
Cheese Exchange. Exchange prices reflect small 
sales volumes and do not reflect premiums (see Tables 
22 and 23). The assembly point price is· based on 
larger sales volumes and it reflects some premiums. 
Increasing quantities of cheese are sold in bar-
rels, and the question arises as to whether to us~ the 
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price for barrels, or 40-lb blocks, or some weighted 
average of the two. Normally there is a fairly stan-
dard differential between barrels and blocks, with 
barrels averaging about 3 cents lower over the past 
several years. This differential reflects labor and 
packaging cost differences. Generally, both prices 
move up and down together, and as long as this is the 
case, either price could be used. However, prices 
depart from their normal relationship often enough 
to make the use of an average of the two prices pre-
ferable. Currently, about one-half of the cheddar 
cheese produced is packed in barrels and 35 % in 40-
lb blocks. The remaining 15% is other styles of 
cheddar cheese. Most of these other styles are priced 
on the basis of changes in the 40-lb block price. 
At present a simple average of the two prices 
might be appropriate. However, weighting on the 
basis of relative quantities produced would reflect 
changes in the relative importance of barrel cheese 
as compared to other styles. In computing a month-
ly average, weekly prices reported on Wednesday are 
assigned to Monday through Thursday of that week 
and Friday of the preceding week. 
Whey. The price for edible dry whey in the 
Central States production area is an appropriate mea-
sure of whey values because of the large volume of 
sales in that area. · 
Since many c~eese plants do not have their own 
whey drying facilities, it is not reasonable to include 
the cost of drying whey in the make allowance. For 
purposes of the formula during the time period stud-
ied, whey was considered to have no value to cheese 
plants until the price of edible dry whey exceeded 8 
cents per lb-approximately the cost of assembling 
and drying of liquid whey. When edible dry whey 
prices were less than 8 cents per lb, whey did not con-
tribute to a plant's net income and therefore did not 
influence cheese plant farm milk pay prices. How-
ever, when edible dry whey prices are above their 
processing costs, whey adds to net income of cheese 
plants and therefore should be reflected in a cheese 
product price formula.27 
Suggested Yield Factors for Use in Product Formulas 
Dairy technologists have calculated theoretical 
yields for various dairy products from milk of vary-
ing composition. Blending information on theoreti-
cal yields, with information obtained on the basis of 
plant operations, permits derivation of yield factors 
which are reasonably reflective of average yields per 
cwt of 3 .5 % milk. 
270n the basis of 1977 cost data, whey does not contribute to 
a cheese plant's net proceeds until the price of dry edible whey ex-
ceeds l 0 cents per lb. Therefore, the factor of l 0 cents rather than 
8 cents would be appropriate in 1977. As whey drying costs in-
crease, further adjustment in this factor would be required. 
Butter. The yield factor used for butter is 4.27 
lb of butter per cwt of 3.5% milk. The 4.27 repre-
sents a 22% overrun on 3.5 lb of butterfat. This 
yield factor is based on Federal order hearing evi-
dence involving 11 plants handling 40% of the re-
serve milk in the Chicago Regional Federal Milk Or-
der marketing system. 
Powder. In a butter-powder operation, both 
nonfat dry milk and buttermilk powder are produced. 
The yield factor used is 8.3 lb of nonfat dry milk and 
buttermilk powder per 100 lb of milk testing 3.5% 
butterfat. Hearing record data from the 11 plants 
handling 40% of reserve milk in the Chicago market 
indicated a combined yield factor of 8.367 lb of non-
fat dry milk and dry buttermilk. The butter-pow-
der formula uses only the price of nonfat dry milk as 
the powder price factor. In order to recognize the 
fact that the price of dry buttermilk is often slightly 
lower than the price of nonfat dry milk, the yield fac-
tor has been scaled down to 8.3 lb. An alternative 
would be to use separate product prices and yields 
for nonfat dry milk and dry buttermilk. However, 
this refinement tends to complicate the formula, and 
is not considered necessary as long as the prices of 
nonfat dry milk and dry buttermilk remain about the 
same. 
Cheese. The yield of cheese of standard mois-
ture content used in the suggested cheese formula is 
9.66 lb of cheese per cwt of milk of 3.5% butterfat 
content. This yield is based on the table developed 
by Van Slyke and Price (Table 36). Plant operators 
generally indicate Van Slyke and Price provide as 
good an approximation as is available of cheese yields, 
based on butterfat content of the milk and moisture 
content of the cheese. Protein content of the milk 
is an important factor in determining cheese yields, 
but protein content cannot be reflected directly with-
in the framework of a pricing formula which consid-
ers only butterfat content of the milk. 
The yield factor of 9.66 applies to standard mois-
ture cheese. This is appropriate because . reported 
Wisconsin assembly point prices apply to standard 
moisture cheese. Standard moisture cheese is de-
fined as cheese with a moisture content between 
37.8% and 39.0%. The midpoint of this, 38.4%, 
and the 9 .66 yield are obtained by interpolation from 
the Van Slyke-Price tal?le. 
Butter from Whey Cream. The yield factor of 
0.3 lb of butter from the whey cream obtained from 
100 lb of 3.5% milk is used by several large plant 
operators in calculating what they can afford to pay 
producers for milk for cheese. This yield factor, 
therefore, is used in the suggested cheese formula. 
Whey. The dry whey yield factor of 5.5 lb of 
dry whey from 100 lb of 3.5% milk used to make 
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cheddar cheese is also based on data from several 
large whey processors. It is therefore used in the 
recommended cheese formula. 
Yield and price factors used in the proposed pro-
duct price formulas will not be realized by all plants. 
Some plants may have higher yields and/ or price fac-
tors and some may have lower. However, as indi-
cated earlier, the "derived margin" procedure will 
"wash out" the net effects of a "too high" or "too 
low" yield or price factor, and the Class III price ob-
ligation will therefore be unaffected. Therefore use 
of these yield and price factors in the proposed prod-
uct price formulas is recommended. 
Processing and Marketing Cost 
Estimates Suggested for Use 
Derived Margins and Class III Price Obliga-
tions. Derived monthly butter-powder and cheddar 
cheese margins, product formula prices, and monthly 
differences between the butter-powder-cheese formula 
prices and the M-W price during the period 1971-77 
are presented in Tables 37 through 45. Derived 
cheese margins ranged from $0.68 to $0.88 per cwt 
during the 7-year period, and derived butter-powder 
margins ranged from $0.56 to $1.16 per cwt. The 
cheese margin is influenced by the fact that the for-
mula uses the price of barrel cheese as well as the 40-
lb block- price. The margin therefore appears lower 
than the make allowance used for cheese in the price 
support program. If based only on 40-lb blocks, the 
margin would be 20 to 25 cents higher. Annual 
average derived butter-powder-cheese formula prices 
were within $0.04 per cwt of M-W prices during 5 of 
the 7 years, and cheese formula prices were within 
$0.04 per cwt of M-W prices during 3 of the 7 years. 
These product price formulas, therefore, yielded Class 
III price obligations quite close to M-W prices. 
On the average, butter-powder formula prices 
were at greater variance with M-W prices. Butter-
powder formula prices were within $0.10 per cwt of 
M-W prices during only 3 of the 7 years, were $0.25 
per cwt above M-W prices during 1 year, and were as 
much as $0.17 per cwt below M-W prices during an-
other year. 
Examination of Table 42 shows some interesting 
differences between product price formulas and com-
petitive pay prices. It shows it is possible to con-
struct a butter-powder-cheese formula which, over a 
period of time, will average close to the M-W price. 
However, substantial month-to-month variations oc-
cur. These are due in part to competitive pressures. 
For example, in the last 9 months of 1977, when milk 
supplies Were burdensome and competition for milk 
supplies less keen, the product price formula consis-
tently overstated by sizable amounts the M-W price. 










































































































* 12-month moving averages centered on 12th month of differences between a Minnesota-Wisconsin creamery pay price and the gross 
value from a butter-powder formula. Gross value butter-powder is [Chicago Mercantile Exchange Grade AA butter price times 4.27) plus Cen-
tral States area nonfat dry milk [spray) price times 8.3). Minnesota-Wisconsin creamery pay price is pay prices for the individual states weighted 
by the two-state production of nonfat dry milk for the previous year. Gross values and pay prices both at 3.5 % butterfat. 


















































































































*[Chicago Mercantile Exchange Grade AA butter price times 4.27) plus [Central States area nonfat dry milk [spray) price times 8.3) minus 










































































































*12-month moving averages centered on 12th month of differences between a Minnesota-Wisconsin cheese plant pay price and the gross 
value from a cheese milk formula. Gross value cheese is [weighted average of Wisconsin assembling points, barrel and 40-Jb. block cheddar 
cheese price times 9.66) plus [Chicago Mercantile Exchange Grade A butter price times 0.3) plus [Central States edible dry whey powder price 
minus $0.08 [$0.10 in 1977) times 5.5). Minnesota-Wisconsin cheese plant pay price is pay prices for the individual states weighted by the 
two-state production of American cheese for the previous year. Gross values and pay prices both at 3.5 % butterfat. Cheddar cheese 
















short in late 1973 and early 1974 and competition for 
milk supplies was strong, the M-W price was substan-
tially higher than the butter-powder-cheese formula. 
Table 45 shows the substantial differences that 
exist at times between the value of milk for cheese 
and for butter-powder. For example, in 1974 the 
cheese formula was $1.42 higher than the butter-pow-
der formula in January and by June the cheese for-
mula was 88 cents lower than butter-powder. This 
is an extreme example of the difficulty of developing 
a single price reflective of the value of milk for manu-
facture. It also shows why, at times, butter-powder 
plant operators are dissatisfied with a Class III price 
based on the M-W price which is weighted heavily 
by the value of milk for cheese. 
Indexing Base Period Costs. Calculating 
Class III (reserve milk) price obligations from de-
rived margins will no longer be possible when com-
plete conversion to Grade A occurs, and unregulated 
Grade B farm milk pay prices are no longer available. 
When this occurs, one procedure that could be used 
is the previously described "indexing base period 
costs" method of estimating processing costs (Table 
30). These "indexed make costs" can then be ap-
plied to the previously described product price for-
mulas and Class III pric~ obligations calculated in 
the same fashion as with "derived margins" (Tables 
31, 32, and 33). 
Data in Tabl~s 31, 32, and 33 indicate that use 
of indexed base p~rfod. costs in product price for-
mulas generally :r:esults''in formula prices· quite close 
to M-W series prices. Class III price obligations 
could therefore be cal~ulated o.ver a longer time per-
iod with considerable' p~ecisio11; even though unregu-
lated Grade B farm milk pay prices were not avail-
able. 
Margins and Yields from Plant Records. The 
information obtained in the survey into plant costs 
indicated wide cost variations. Such variations in 
cost are cou'sistent with, the experience of the U. S. 
Department of Agriculture in receiving cost informa-
tion at public hearings. Hearing evidence generally 
has reflected wide variations in costs and variations in 
accounting procedures used in calculating costs. The 
variations in reported costs were one reason that the 
U. S. Department of Agriculture shifted away from 
the use of product price formulas in Federal milk or-
ders. Variations in yield information and product 
TABLE 40.-Cheese Formula Price for Milk Testing 3.5% Butterfat Using Derived Margins for Make Allow-
ances.* 
Year Jan. . Feb. Mar . Apr. May June · July Aug. . Sept .. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average 
Dollars per cwt 
1971 4.83 4.80 4.99 4.92 4.83 4.81 4.81 4.81 4.80 4.81 4.82 5.03 4.86 
1972 5.06 5.06 5.17 5.00 4.98 5.00 5.13 5.21 5.19 5.29 5.45 5.52 5.17 
1973 5.52 5.52 5.64 5.69 5.75 5.83 5.90 6.56 7.23 7.61 7.86 8.12 6.44 
1974 8.28 8.32 8.25 7.82 6.75 6.12 6.15 6.40 6.90 7.12 6.93 6.34 7.12 
1975 6.56 6.65 6.71 6.87 7.05 7.20 7.45 7.95 8.38 8.88 8.95 9.12 7.64 
1976 8.93 7.98 8.41 8.58 8.37 8.42 8.89 9.39 8.59 8.23 8.16 8.16 8.51 
1977 8.03 8.05 8.32 8.76 8.72 8.56 8.73 8.89 9.17 9.1.7 9;18 9.29 8.74 
*(Weighted average of Wisconsin assembling points barrel and 40-lb block cheddar cheese price times 9.66) plus (Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change Grade A butter price times 0.3) plus (Central States edible dry whey powder price minus $d.08 ($0.10 in 1977) times 5.5) minus mar-
pins and barrel and block weights listed in Table 39. 
TABLE 41.-Combined Butter-Powder-Cheese Formula Price for Milk Testing· 3.5% Butterfat Using Derived 
Margins for Make Allowances.* ;.. 
Year Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average 
Dollars per cwt 
1971 4.73 4.72 4.80 4.91 4.88 4.86 4.86 4.85 4.84 '.4.84 4.8~' 4.93 4.84 
1972 4.94 4.93 4.98 4.91 4.90 4.91 4.99 5.07 5:J.o 5.23 ' 5.39 5.52 . 5.07 
1973 5.47 5.47 5.57 5.65 5.68 5.72 5.82 6.75 7.11 7.20 7.40 7.56 q.28 
1974 7.75 7.88 8.10 7.93 6.98 6.45 6.45 6.70 7.03 7.17 7.03 6.52 7.17 
1975 6.68 6.77 6.78 6.88 7.01 7.13 7.42 7.88 8.38 8.88 8.67 9.20 7.64 
1976 8.63 7.94 8.32 8.44 8.31. 8.42 8.87 9.19 8.52 8.25 8.20 8.21 8A4 
1977 8.08 8.09 8.37 8.82 8.78 8.65 8.77 8.88 9iJ_O 9.09 9.09 9.17 8.74 
*Butter-powder price from. Table 38 and cheese formula price from Table 40 weighted ny nonfat. dry milk: and cheese. Respective· 
weights listed in Table 42. 
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TABLE 42.-Amount Minnesota-Wisconsin Manufacturing Grade Milk Price Exceeds Butter-Powder-Cheese Formula Price Using Derived Margins f~r 
Make Allowances.* · 
Absolute 
Year Jan, Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average Averaget 
Dollars per cwt 
1971 +0.06 +0.11' +o.oi -0.08 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 +0.01 0 -0.02 0.06 
1972 +0.03 +0.04 +0.06 +0.05 +0.04 +o.o4 +0.02 0 0 -0.05 -0.07 -0.11 0 0.04 
1973 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 +0.01 -0.04 -0.19 -0.20 +0.29 +0.24 +o.38 +o.o3 0.12 
1974 +o.35 +0.26 +0.05 -0.20 -0.05 -0.14 -0.16 -0.31 -0.34 -0.35 -0.27 -0.12 -0.11 0.22 
1975 +0.12 +0.08 +0.08 +0.06 +0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.18 -0.11 -0.28 +0.17 -0.12 -0.02 0.11 
1976 +0.27 +o.31 +0.28 0 -0.01 -0.10 -0.16 -0.20 -0.06 +0.01 +0.06 +0.04 +0.04 0.12 
1977 +0.11 +0.07 -0.06 -0.22 -0.16 -0.05 -0.12 -0.24 -0.36 -0.35 -0.30 -0.30 -0.16 0.20 
*Both prices at 3.5 % butterfat. Butter-powder-cheese formula price base.cl on gross val.ues from butter-powder and cheese formulas quantified in footnotes of Tables 37 and 39, minus 
butter-powder and cheese margins· listed in Tables 37 and 39, weighted by relative annual quantities of milk used to produce nonfat dry milk and cheddar cheese in Minnesota and Wisconsin 
during the preceding year as follows: 
Butter 
Powder % Cheese % 
Weights 1971 54 46 
1972 51 49 
1973 43 57 
1974 37 63 
01 1975 37 63 
°' 1976 36 64 
1977 25 75 
tAverage ignoring signs. 
TABLE 43.-Amount Minnesota-Wisconsin Manufacturing Grade Milk Price Exceeds Butter-Powder Formula Price, Using Derived Margins for Make 
Allowances.* · 
Absolute 
Year Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average Averaget 
Dollars per cwt 
1971 +0.14 +0.18 +0.17 -0.08 -0.16 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.05 -0.04 0 +0.08 -0.01 0.11 
1972 +0.14 +0.16 +0.24 +0.14 +0.12 +0.12 +0.15 +0.13 +0.09 +0.01 -0.01 -0.11 +0.10 0.12 
1973 +0,02 . +0.05 +0.08 +o.94 +0.08 +0.16 +o.o7 -0.20 -0.05 +o.84 +o.84 +i.12 +0.25 0.30 
1974 +l.24 +1.oo +o.31 -0.40 -0.43 -0.69 -0.67 -0.82 -0.57 -0.44 -0.43 -0.45 -0.20 0.62 
1975 -0.19 -0.12 -0.03 +o.o3 +0.08 +0.10 -0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.27 -0.35 -0.26 -0.10 0.14 
1976 +0.79 +o.38 +o.44 +0.25 +0.10 -0.10 -0.12 +0.15 +0.06 -0.02 0 -0.04 +0.16 0.20 
1977 -0.05 -0.05 -0.20 -0.39 -0.34 -0.33 -0.25 -0.22 -0.14 -0.10 -0.04 +0.07 -0.17 0.18 
--·----
*Both prices at 3.5 % butterfat. Butter-powder prices quantified in Table 38. 
· tAverage ignoring signs. 
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TABLE 44.-Amount Minnesota-Wisconsin Manufacturing Grade Milk Price Exceeds Butter-Powder Formula Price, Using Derived Margins for Make 
Allowances.* 
Absolute 
Year Jan. Feb. March April May· June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average Averaget 
DoHars per cwt 
1971 -0.04 +o.o3 -0.18 -0.09 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04. -0.04 +0.03 +0.01 +0.02 -0.10 -0.04 0.06 
1972 -0.09 -0.09 -0.13 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.12 -0.14 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10 0.10 
1973 -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 .-0.12 -0.18 -0.32 -0.12 -0.22 -0.18 -0.14 0.14 
1974 -0.18 -0.18 -0.10 -0.09 +0.18 +0.19 -0.14 -0.01 -0.21 -0.30 -0.17 +o.o7 -0.08 0.15 
1975 +o.3o +0.20 +0.15 +0.07 -0.03 -0.09 -0.10 -0.25 -0.11 -0.28 -0.11 -0.04 -0.02 0.14 
1976 -0.03 +0.27 +0.19 -0.14 -0.07 -0.10 -0.18 -0.40 -0.13 +0.03 +0.10 +o.o9 -0.03 0.14 
1977 +0.16 +0.11 -0.01 -0.16 -0.10 +0.04 -0.08 -0.25 -0.43 -0.43 -0.39 -0.42 -0.16 0.22 
*Both prices at 3.5 % butterfat. Cheese formula prices quantified in Table 40. 
tAverage ignoring signs. 
TABLE 45.-Amount Cheese Formula Price Exceeds Butter-Powder Formula Price for Milk Testing 3.5% Butterfat Using Derived Margins for Make 
Allowances.* 
Year Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. 








+0.18 +0.15 +o.35 +0.01 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 
+0.23 +0.25 +o.37 +0.18 +0.16 +o.i7 +0.27 
+0.11 +0.12 +0.17 +0.10 +0.17 +0.26 +0.19 
+1.42 +1.18 +0.41 -0.31 -0.61 -0.88 -0.81 
-0.49 -0.32 -0.18 -0.04 +0.11 +0.19 +0.07 
+0.82 +0.11 +0.25 +o.39 +0.17 0 +0.06 
-0.18 -0.16 -0.19 -0.23 -0.24 -0.37 -0.17 
*Cheese formula prices and butter-powder formula prices listed in Tables 40 and 38, respectively. 









Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average Averaget 
-0.08 -0.05 -0.02 +0.18 +0.04 0.11 
+0.18 +0.02 +0.12 0 +0.19 0.19 
+0.27 +o.96 +1.07 +1.30 +0.40 0.40 
-0.36 -0.14 -0.26 -0.52 -0.14 0.64 
+0.01 +0.01 -0.24 -0.22 -0.08 0.17 
+0.19 -0.05 -0.10 -0.13 +0.19 0.24 
+0.29 +o.33 +o.35 +o.49 0 0.25 
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price information obtained from plants have also been 
a problem in product price formulas. However, it 
may be possible to resolve these problems if proce-
dures can be developed by which the market adminis-
trator regularly could collect product yield, product 
price, and cost data directly frotn .handlers. 
The product yield and cost data would only have 
to be collected from handlers regulated by the Chi-
cago Regional and Upper Midwe:st Federal Orders. 
The provision could require that all handlers regu-
lated by the Chicago and Upper Midwest Orders 
supply market administrators with yield, cost, and 
price data which would be used to establish a make 
allowance for milk going into -butter~powder and 
cheese. The information would be supplied on all 
Grade A milk and manufacturi:q.g_ grade milk in the 
handlers' plants, both pool and non-pool milk. The 
purpose for collection of the data would be to estab-
lish a Class III price for milk processed into hard pro-
ducts, and possibly a basic forµmla price for Class I 
pricing purposes. 
Sequentially, the process would involve deter-
mining the gross value of high quality hard dairy 
products (per cwt .of. milk)' sold in standardized 
packages on a volume basis, at actual transaction 
pnces. 
The next step woulc;l b~. to determine make al-
lowances for milk utilized in Class III. · The make 
allowance includes all cost elements associated with 
processing and marketing milk in dairy manufactur-
ing plants. These costs should cover labor, packag-
ing, fuel, power; selling, and_ transportation. It 
would be necessary to make :;t complete analysis of 
volume items (size~ quantity, type;of product, etc.). 
The procedure would provide data so that an average 
make allowance could be established. There are also 
many indirect costs associated _with manufacturing 
dairy products that would have to 'be evaluated and 
. allocated in determining the cost of processing 100 lb 
of milk. 
The analysis wol].ld ha ye to bi geared to a stan-
dard package at a specific point in the production 
process. The overall make allowance used to estab-
lish the Class III price .wo~lc;L tr:Xclude special pack-
ages and packaging, and speCial pr6duct formulation 
and premiums paid for special quality products. The 
procedure would establish a unified system of deter-
mining and allocating costs.< 'It may be' necessary to 
provide some technical assistance to handlers so that 
a coordinated system of accounts could be established. 
The major problem would be the allocation of ad-
ministrative, field service, and selling costs. The 
problems of allocation would be complicated for mul-
ti-plant companies with different operations and 
where a portion of the Grade. A milk was utilized as 
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Class I milk on the fluid market. 
The procedure would provide information on 
plant efficiency. New plants with high capital costs, 
established plants with efficient operations, and obso-
lete plants with high operating costs would mean sub-
stantial cost variations. Detail would be obtained 
on levels of overhead relative to degrees of integra-
tion into the marketing system. Costs of processing 
milk based on grade and quality programs could also 
be determin.ed. 
Upon establishment of the cost procedures, the 
system could use movers to adjust certain components 
of the make allowance. Volatile processing cost 
items could be adjusted without frequent or continu-
ous surveys of plants. Another method for updating 
the make allowance is the selection of a representa-
tive sample of plants which would supply current 
data, thereby serving as an indicator of industry 
trends. 
Reganiless of the system devised, the entire plant 
population might be evaluated on a regular basis to 
assure validity of the make allowance and to reflect 
all conditions in the m,arket affecting processing and 
ma~keting of Class III' milk. 
Price data collected for the product formula 
could be applied to establish a basic price. However, 
it must be recognized that gross value in many cases 
involves further processing, small packages, special 
moisture contents, and storage for a special market. 
Also, product composition often differs based on cus-
tomer requirements. The various cheese varieties 
require that compensating price adjustments be 
made._ Essentially, standardized products need to be 
specified for the price-· factor. 
Special problems to consider in establishing 
make allowances for manfactured milk from plant 
records are : 
1. Special· attention must be given to the En-
vironmental Protection Act. Dairy plants 
are faced with varying costs in this area, and 
the plants have limited control over pollu-
tion control rates. -
2. The whey disposal problem has a significant 
impact on cheese plants, since there is no 
-mar Ref for the whey solids in some periods. 
The disposal of whey is a substantial cost to 
the industry .. 
3. The Occup~tional Safety and Health Act 
adds to cost and therefore must be consid-
ered .. 
4. With fewer plants, hauling milk from farm 
to plant will raise costs -, for more distant 
farms. It may be necessar,y to allocate a 
part of farm hauling cpsts if hauling subsi-
dies occur: ' 
The make allowance, properly stuctured, would: 
1 ) reflect the technical advances made within the in-
dustry, 2) take into account significant cost shifts, 
3) generate farm milk prices that would push toward 
efficient resource allocation, and 4) be beneficial in 
directing plant management decisions. 
PROS AND CONS OF PRODUCT PRICE 
FORMULAS FOR PRICING RESERVE MILK 
The dairy industry has been concerned through-
out the history of Federal milk orders about the meth-
od employed in pricing pooled milk processed into 
butter-powder and cheese. Organizations and plants 
handling reserve supplies have felt settlement prices 
on Class III milk have been too high at some times 
and too low at others. Organizations primarily as-
sociated with supplying milk to processors have fel t 
that prices should be raised in order to improve re-
turns to farmers . Non-pool plants making cheese 
contend that low Class III prices have resulted in un-
fair competition in procuring manufacturing milk 
supplies. Realistically constructed product price for-
mulas could help solve some of these problems. 
There are several important advantages with 
product price formulas in pricing reserve milk. 
1. Product price formulas reflect what average 
processing firms can afford to pay for milk. Situa-
tions have developed in recent years where an in-
creasing demand for cheese and declining demand for 
butter and nonfat dry milk have forced butter-pow-
der plants regulated under Federal milk orders to pay 
more for milk than they can obtain from products 
produced from the milk. Processors under Federal 
orders are required to pay the M-W price even when 
it exceeds their gross return. Nonregulated firms 
are not . Product price formulas, as well as specified 
competitive pay prices, can reduce these types of in-
equities in that they would provide a means for es-
tablishing separate prices for milk for butter-powder 
and milk for cheese. 
2. The widespread availability of current prod-
uct price information would also permit calculating 
"final." reserve milk prices from product price formu-
las on the last day of any given month. Competitive 
pay prices such as the M-W price have not been avail-
able until the fifth day of the following month. 
3. Product prices adjust to clear the market of 
all products. If yield and processing factors in for-
mulas are representative, formulas based on product 
prices normally adjust to clear the market of milk. 
4. Product price formulas are reasonably easy 
to understand and use. 
5. Product price formulas are an equitable me-
thod of pricing milk, especially if separate class prices 
Tanker of cream moves from receiving room after separation. 
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are established for milk used for cheese and for but-
ter-powder. 
6. When product prices are above CCC pur·-
chase prices, then product price formulas tie reserve 
milk prices to "competitive markets" at levels that 
clear the market. If product prices are at CCC pur-
chase prices, product price formulas could still con-
tinue to operate, and generate prices targeted by the 
price support level. 
7. Product price formulas can be available in 
the absence of any competitive pay price series. 
8. The mechanics of product price formulas 
provide for specifying a make allowance. To the ex-
tent it is possible to develop reliable cost information 
for different types of reserve milk handling conditions, 
it is possible to reflect such cost differences in the 
make allowance. 
9. Product price formulas can be constructed 
using the derived margins approach. This approach 
approximates the level of competitive pay prices while 
retaining some of the other advantages of product 
price formulas. 
There are also disadvantages that need to be 
recognized in using product formulas to price reserve 
milk. 
1. It is difficult to get reliable information on 
plant costs. However, the derived margins approach 
can minimize this type of problem. 
2. Available product prices do not completely 
reflect average prices received f.o.b. plant. In par-
ticular, reported cheese prices probably do not reflect 
·premiums paid. 
3. Make allowances become obsolete fairly 
rapidly. Fuel costs and changes in the volume of 
milk handled per plant are two significant cost fac-
_tors· that are constantly changing. The hearing pro-
cess has proved too slow to adequately keep formula 
make allowances current. This problem can be alle-
viated through automatic means of adjusting make 
allowances such as indexing. 
4. The prices of butter and cheese are estab-
lished on the basis of limited trading by a limited 
number of firms. While there have been only iso-
lated indications of questionable activities in these 
markets, there is concern about using "thin" product 
markets as the basis for pricing billions of pounds of 
milk. 
5. Product price formulas reflect what a plant 
of average efficiency can afford to pay for milk over 
a period of time. Such formulas may not reflect com-
petitive pressures which at times cause plants to pay 
significantly more or less than they can afford to pay. 
6. Product price formulas with high marketing 
margins can make the handling of reserve milk ex-
cessively profitable. Handlers would then be reluc-
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tant to release milk for fluid uses when needed. As 
a result, fluid handlers would be apt to set retail fluid 
milk prices at levels consistent with the artificially 
high margins for manufacturing use milk. There-
fore, high margins for Class III milk may generate 
higher margins for Class I products. Further, fluid 
plants may have to pay higher than Class I minimum 
prices to attract milk to fluid use. 
In summary, product price formulas have ad-
vantages and disadvantages. They can perform posi-
tively in terms of meeting several of the primary ob-
jectives of reserve milk pricing. Product prices ad-
just on the basis of competitive market conditions. 
Reserve milk prices therefore will move accordingly. 
It is essential that reported prices, yields, and make 
allowances accurately reflect conditions in industry. 
These factors probably can be specified with appro-
priate precision if adequate resources are directed to 
developing the correct factors. If competitive pay 
prices are not available, product price formulas repre-
sent an effective alternative for pricing reserve milk. 
Product Price-Competitive Pay Price Formula 
A negative feature of product price formulas is 
that make allowances are difficult to keep current. 
A related criticism directed at competitive pay prices 
is that they are not available until some time after the 
time to which they apply. A possible alternative for 
calculating a pay price which overcomes these two 
problems is a combined product price-competitive 
pay price formula. 
An estimated pay price could be calculated by 
the last day of any month by adjusting the competi-
tive pay price for the previous month by the change 
in the gross value of milk which occurred since then, 
as determined by a product formula. For example, 
using a product formula, the gross value to manufac-
turing plants of 100 lb of milk made into manufac-
tured products for a month could be compared to the 
previous month. The change in the gross value 
would then be added to or subtracted from the pay 
price for the previous month to estimate a current 
monthly pay price. 
Since product prices are currently available, an 
estimate of a change in a pay price could be made on 
the last day of the month or on an earlier day during 
the month if available product prices were felt repre-
sentative of ·monthly average product prices. Thus, 
the pay price could be made more timely. The prod-
uct formula would not account for a plant margin or 
make allowance since such a cost would already be 
accounted for by the competitive pay price. This 
alternative assumes that the margin in the current 
month is the same as in the base month. Since a new 
base competitive pay price would be used each month, 
short-run changes in margins would be reflected with 
only a 1-month lag. 
A combined product price-competitive pay price 
formula could be developed to estimate an average 
price for milk in all manufacturing uses or the price 
for milk in any specific use for which there is a com-
petitive pay price series. 
ESTABLISHING RESERVE MILK PRICES 
THROUGH THE HEARING PROCESS 
Establishing the price for reserve milk solely on 
the basis of evidence presented at public hearings, 
and maintaining that price between hearings, is an 
alternative to automatic formula pricing or a com-
petitive pay price series. Periodic hearings could be 
scheduled on a regular basis to consider the need for 
price changes, or hearings could be held when speci-
fied changes in the economic situation occur that in-
dicate the need for price adjustment. This proce-
dure was used to price milk in fluid uses in the early 
years of the Federal order program. It was recently 
used in the California state milk control program but 
for Class I pricing only. There have been no in-
stances where the hearing process has been used to 
directly fix prices to be paid for milk used in manu-
factured dairy products. 
Before considering possible procedures and the 
advantages and disadvantages of the hearing pricing 
mechanism, it is useful to examine those situations 
where it has been used. Regulated Class I milk prices 
from 1933 until during World War II frequently were 
fixed directly by the hearing process. Prices were 
altered only by holding another hearing. Harris and 
Hedges stated that this procedure was reasonably 
satisfactory until 1937 because: 1) procedures for 
holding hearings for changing the level of price were 
rather simple and quick, and 2) it was a period of 
stable (although depressed) economic conditions that 
did not require frequent price changes.28 
The beginning of World War II introduced 
greater variability into the demands for dairy prod-
ucts. Wartime demands were expanding, but at a 
variable rate that was very difficult to predict. Dis-
satisfaction with the fixed prices under Federal orders 
increased as price adjustments failed to keep up with 
changing demands and supplies. In 1942, price ceil- -
ings were placed on milk prices and direct payments 
were made to farmers to stimulate milk production. 
For the time being, fixed fluid milk prices under or-
ders ceased to be a problem, but it was apparent that 
substantial price increases would be needed when 
price ceilings were removed after the war. By the 
end of 1946, all Federal order markets had adopted 
som~ type of formula to establish fluid milk prices. 
· • 
28Harris, Edmond S. and Irwin R. Hedges, op. cit., pp. 8-10. 
61 
Procedures 
The hearing process, as currently administered 
for Federal order promulgation and amendment, re-
quires a number of steps. They are: 1) petition for 
hearing, 2) the hearing at which evidence is received, 
3) period for filing of briefs, 4) preparation of recom-
mended decision by the USDA, 5) time for filing of 
exceptions to the recommended decision, 6) writing 
of the final decision, and 7) producer approval. The 
procedures can be long and unwieldy. A technique 
which was examined by the Milk Pricing Advisory 
Committee for Class I pricing specifies a required an-
nual hearing for the purpose of fixing the price.29 A 
similar procedure might be applied to reserve milk 
pricing with the option of holding emergency hearings 
during the year if there are strong indications of a 
need for price changes. 
The advantages and disadvantages of the hear-
ing process for direct pricing of reserve milk, as with 
other pricing mechanisms, are partially dependent on 
whether or not all milk in the U.S. is regulated under 
orders or whether some manufacturing use milk re-
mains unregulated. 
Advantages· of Fixed Prices 
Through the Hearing Process 
1. The hearing approach is understandable and 
it permits interested parties to participate in the pric-
ing procedures whenever a change in price is being 
considered. 
2. The hearing approach provides freedom to 
consider factors that influence milk prices. With 
formula pricing, the price movers are limited to those 
specified by the formula. 
3 .. When most or all milk has converted to 
Grade A, the observation has been advanced that the 
price set for reserve milk would be the basic force es-
tablishing product prices. For this reason, product 
formulas would be much less meaningful. 
Disadvantages of Fixed Prices 
Through the Hearing Process 
1. The hearing approach is a more costly pro-
cedure than formula pricing. Use of the hearing 
process requires expenditures for travel, meeting 
places, reports, hearing records, and preparation of 
personnel for participation in the hearing. The auto-
matic pricing mechanism avoids these costs. The ad-
ministrative costs of calculating and announcing a 
monthly formula price are small. Hearings regard-
ing formula pricing need to be called only when it 
appears that the existing formula is not reflecting the 
demand and supply situation in the market. 
2. The hearing approach is an unwieldy and 
time-consuming procedure for changing prices. The 
2
°Knutson, Rcnald D., et al., op. cit., pp. 78-79. 
TABLE 46.-Minnesota-Wisconsin Manufacturing 
Grade Milk Prices, 3.5 % Butterfat, by Months, 1975-
1977. 
1975 1976 1977 
January $6.80 per cwt $8.90 per cwt $8.19 per cwt 
February 6.85 8.25 8.16 
March 6.86 8.60 8.31 
April 6.94 8.44 8.60 
May 7.02 8.30 8.62 
June 7.11 8.32 8.60 
July 7.35 8.71 8.65 
August 7.70 8.99 8.64 
September 8.27 8.46 8.74 
October 8.60 8.26 8.74 
November 8.89 8.25 8.79 
December 9.08 8.25 8.87 
time required for changes, except for emergency con-
ditions, is a minimum of 2 to 3 months. 
The delays that are necessary with hearings may 
lead to a situation where economic conditions that 
warranted price changes may have passed before price 
changes are made. In recent years, several large 
and rapid changes in nonregulated manufacturing 
grade milk prices occurred within periods of a few 
weeks. The price changes were necessary to clear 
the market. The formula and competitive series 
used for order pricing brought about nearly simultan-
eous adjustments of Federal ·order reserve milk prices. 
The Minnesota-Wisconsin prices reported in Table 
46 demonstrate the difficulties that direct fixing of 
reserve milk prices by the hearing process would have 
in reflecting market conditions. A price range of 
$2.28 per cwt in 1975, 74 cents in 1976, and 71 cents 
in 1977, together with month-to-month changes that 
were as high as 65 cents (January to February 1976), 
indicate that the hearing process could not perform 
adequately in periods of volatile price change. 
3. Use of the hearing process for directly pric-
ing reserve milk while unregulated manufacturing 
milk is available can lead to different prices for manu-
facturing use milk in the two markets. The price 
difference would occur because hearings could not be 
called for every movement in nonregulated manufac-
turing milk prices. Different prices in regulated and 
unregulated markets are inconsistent with the objec-
tives of reserve milk pricing. 
It should be noted that the public hearing pro-
cess could effectively be used to adjust make allow-
ances in product price formulas at regular intervals. 
In this way, product price formulas would be used to 
establish the reserve class price, but public hearings 
would be essential for keeping the make allowance 
component .relevant. 
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In the situation where essentially all milk has 
converted to Grade A and is pooled in the regulatory 
program, reserve milk prices established by the public 
hearing process would continue to be subject to the 
market clearing criterion. 
Shortages or surpluses at the fixed price are like-
ly to be the rule. Even if the process yields a reserve 
milk price that clears the market when the price is 
fixed, continually changing supply and demand will 
soon make the price obsolete. Furthermore, there is 
no guarantee that the hearing process will even arrive 
at a price that will clear the market. 
In both the short run and long run, the reserve 
milk price must be a market clearing price and must 
reflect continually changing supply/ demand condi-
tions for milk used for manufactured dairy products. 
If returns from reserve milk products are below the 
equivalent reserve milk price, buyers would not ac-
cept the milk. If returns from reserve milk products 
are above the equivalent reserve milk price, Class I 
prices would have to reflect added premiums in order 
to assure adequate supplies. The more severe prob-
lem is associated with a reserve milk price higher than 
market conditions justify. It probably would be 
necessary to rely on dairy price support program pur-
chases in any situation that introduces the public 
hearing process for directly fixing reserve milk prices. 
The public hearing process has proved itself over 
the history of milk price regulation to be an excellent 
means for establishing and amending Federal milk 
orders. More specifically, the price provisions that 
have been adopted have proved to perform on a su-
perior basis when prices were established indirectly 
through formula rather than directly by the public 
hearing itself. In the future, with the likely demise 
of manufacturing grade milk price series, the public 
hearing process will continue to be vital, but direct 
pricing of reserve milk solely through public hearings 
would pose significant problems. The role of the 
public hearing relative to reserve milk pricing will 
be to adjust the procedures employed for establishing 
the reserve milk price as market conditions warrant, 
but direct fixing of reserve milk prices by public hear-
ing would not adequately serve the .objectives of re-
serve milk pricing. 
ECONOMIC INDEX FORMULA: 
PROS AND CONS 
Consideration of economic index formulas in 
milk pricing has been addressed almost exclusively to 
pricing Class I milk. For logical reasons, the direct 
use of economic index formulas to price reserve Grade 
A milk has never been advanced as a serious proposi-
tion. As a practical matter, the availability of com-
petitive :pay price series and product price formulas 
has precluded any demonstrated need for an eco-
nomic index formula. More basic has been the criti-
cal factor that reserve Grade A milk prices have had 
to be very closely related to manufacturing grade 
milk prices and to returns available from milk pro-
cessed into manufactured products. There is little 
room for error in pricing reserve Grade A milk. 
Where economic index formulas have been used 
to price Class I milk, they have been adjusted or 
modified periodically as changing market conditions 
over time tended to outmode the formula. Some er-
rors in pricing Class' I milk were permissible because 
reserve utilization of the milk provided a ready solu-
tion to pricing errors on the high side at least. There-
fore, economic index formulas for pricing Class I milk 
have been used and have received considerable accep .. 
tance in some markets. However, pricing of reserve 
milk cannot afford any significant distortions, and 
economic index formulas have not been considered as 
a possible means of establishing reserve milk prices. 
While res'erve milk prices have been related very 
closely to manufacturing grade milk prices, it should 
also, be recognized that manufacturing grade milk 
prices have been influenced for many years by the 
price support program. Support prices for milk are 
based upon the parity formula, which is one form of 
an economic index formula. The parity formula 
contains three factors, including: 1) the recent 10-
year average of the "all milk wholesale" price series, 
2) the recent 10-year average of the index of prices re-
ceived by farmers, and 3) the current index of prices 
paid by farmers. In periods when manufacturing 
grade milk prices are at or near the support level, 
which are usually the same as periods when milk is in 
excess supply relative to demand, the support price 
clearly is a major factor affecting the level of manu-
facturing grade milk prices. It is therefore fair to 
observe that during such periods an economic index 
formula is the dominant factor affecting manufactur-
ing grade milk prices and, in turn, reserve Grade A 
prices. However, there is a clear distinction between 
the application of the parity formula to establish a 
support price on manufacturing grade milk as com-
pared to the application of any proposed economic 
index formula for direct pricing of reserve supplies of 
Grade A milk. The parity formula affects reserve 
Grade A prices because of its direct impact upon 
manufacturing grade milk prices. It should not be 
concluded that since there is an economic index for-
mula influence in pricing reserve Grade A milk at 
the present time that it is then appropriate to consider 
economic index formulas for the current direct pric-
ing of reserve Grade A milk. 
The question of the applicability of an economic 
index formula to pricing of reserve class milk in the 
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long run, i.e., when the industry effectively has con-
verted to one grade of milk, is another matter. The 
presumed absence of a competitive pay price series at 
that time suggests that an economic index formula is 
one of the alternatives which should be evaluated. 
Further, the elimination of the basic constraint of 
having to relate the reserve class price to manufactur-
ing grade milk prices also argues for evaluation of an 
economic index formula. At the same time, the price 
generated by the economic index formula would still 
have to pursue a market clearing objective. 
With conversion to Grade A an accomplished 
fact, the pricing of reserve milk would have to be 
evaluated in two different contexts: 1) with a price 
support program, and 2) without a price support pro-
gram. Assuming that a product purchase type price 
support program continues to be operational, it is 
logical that the support price would be announced for 
reserve class (Class· III) milk. In fact, the support 
price would represent the minimum class price for 
reserve milk. Assuming a flexibility in the proced-
ures used to establish the support price, comparable 
to the 75 to 90% of parity range now available, price 
adjustments could be made as warranted. If the re-
serve price is too high as indicated by the supply-de-
mand conditions, the support price and reserve pr!ce 
could be adjusted downward at a subsequent price 
announcement. If the reserve price was too low, as 
indicated by supply-demand conditions across the 
milk industry, the flexibility in price support policy 
would permit an administrative adjustment upward 
in the reserve price-support price. In fact, some type 
of. supply-demand adjustment could be attached to 
the support price in order to provide automatic flexi-
bility. Actually, if market conditions were such that 
reserve milk was generating a higher value than the 
established support-reserve price, an alternative mea-
sure of the value· of reserve milk such as a product 
formula would probably be necessary to make pricing 
regulations operational. 
The implication in this discussion of a support 
price being maintained in the situation of no manu-
facturing grade milk is that the parity formula would 
be used to establish the "support-reserve" p~ice. This 
would be feasible even under current computational 
procedures because: 1) there will continue to be an 
"all milk wholesale" price; and 2) although the cur-
rent artificial adjustment to estimate a parity equiva-
lent for manufacturing grade milk would be elimina-
ted, a procedure for estimating the "normal" relation-
ship between the all milk wholesale price and the sup-
port-reserve price could be developed. 
Also, the support price could be implemented in 
terms of an "all milk" price. While the parity for-
mub, a~ one applicat!on of an economic index type 
formula, might be the appropriate alternative to 
adopt for establishing the price of reserve class milk, 
other forms of economic index formula could also be 
considered. As long as the price support program 
stood available as an outlet for reserve product, the 
short-run concerns with the formula establishing a 
"bad" price would be relatively limited. Required 
adjustments in the formula could be made. Support-
reserve prices on the high side would be constrained 
' by reaction to price support expenditures and by pub-
lic-consumer opposition. Prices on the low side 
would generate upward price adjustments in the for-
mulas in order to meet adequate supply requirements. 
Both instances are not unlike the situation that char-
acterizes price support decisions currently. 
The second context is that in which there is no 
price support program and there is no manufacturing 
grade milk. The question is whether or not an eco-
nomic index formula could be used to price reserve 
class milk in such a situation. The problem that 
emerges in attempting to establish a minimum reserve 
class price in this situation is that there is no room for 
error. There is neither an alternate usage nor a gov-
ernment purchase program to provide a market outlet 
for milk which comes onto the market but which no 
one is willing to pay for because the established price 
is too high. Or, in the instance where the price is too 
low, there would be no incentive to shift milk from 
lower value uses to higher value uses. In fact, milk 
might be diverted from higher value uses, and de-
creased producer prices would lead to lower milk pro-
duction than is deemed necessary. Since it is recog-
nized that an economic index formula can, in fact, es-
tablish reserve prices that will not perform a market 
clearing function, a fair conclusion is that an eco-
nomic index formula would not be feasible for pricing 
reserve milk in the absence of a price support pro-
gram. If there is a price support program, an eco-
nomic formula would be feasible only when product 
markets are at price support levels. 
Conceivably, if an economic index formula was 
used to price reserve milk, and if milk supplies were 
left "homeless" as a result, cooperatives would (or 
could) process that milk into storable products. This 
would mean that pool compensation might have to be 
made to those cooperatives at the difference between 
the established reserve price and the equivalent mar-
ket values of the excess products. However, such an 
arrangement would, in effect, be building one set of 
provisions (cooperative payments) in order to correct 
another set of provisions (economic index formula). 
As such, it would be poor policy to utilize an eco-
nomic index formula to price reserve milk when such 
an arrangement would likely generate uneconomic 
effects. 
In summary, three different marketing situations 
for reserve milk have been described in relation to 
economic index policy. These include: 1) pricing 
reserve Grade A milk while manufacturing grade 
milk continues to be a factor in the market, 2) pricing 
reserve Grade A milk after full conversion and with 
a price support program, and 3) pricing reserve 
Grade A milk after full conversion and without a 
price support program. The use of an economic in-
dex formula to price reserve milk could be counter-
productive and create disorderly marketing condi-
tions in the first and third situations. An economic 
formula logically could be implemented to price re-
serve milk in the second situation where all milk mar-
keted is Grade A quality and where a price support 
program was in operation. In that event, the sup-
port price and the reserve class price would have to 
be integrated to the point that they were synonymous. 
The economic index formula utilized to establish the 
support-reserve price would probably be the same as 
the parity formula or some other economic index. 
SUMMARY-CONCLUSIONS-IMPLICATIONS 
The principal objective of this study was to pre-
sent and analyze alternative mechanisms for pricing 
Grade A milk used for manufactured dairy products 
in Federal order milk markets. Currently, reserve 
milk is priced at the average level of prices paid for 
nonregulated manufacturing grade milk in Minnesota 
and Wisconsin-the M-W manufacturing milk price 
series. Although this price series has been criticized 
in several respects, it has provided a reasonable guide 
to plants of the value of milk used in manufactured 
dairy products. The mechanism appears to have 
avoided problems of homeless milk or shortages for 
fluid uses in Federal order markets. These two prob-
lems may occur when milk prices are set at inappro-
priate levels. The most serious criticisms of the M-
W price have occurred when the price of cheese was 
high relative to butter and powder price. This 
created a situation where the M-W price was high 
relative to the value of milk used for butter-powder. 
The need to examine alternatives to the existing 
pricing mechanisms arises because of the declining 
volume of nonregulated manufacturing grade milk. 
Manufacturing grade milk fell from 30% of all U. S. 
milk marketings in 1966 to 19% in 1976. For Min-
nesota and Wisconsin, the percentage of Grade B milk 
fell from 63% to 39% during the same period. Some 
nonregulated manufacturing grade milk is likely to 
be available for quite a number of years. However, 
at some time before Grade B milk disappears, the vol-
ume may be so small that pay prices for it will not be 
representative of the average value of milk for manu-
facturing uses. 
Four mechanisms for administratively fixing 
prices for milk used in manufactured dairy products 
·under Federal orders were examined: 1) competitive 
price series, 2) product price formulas, 3) economic 
indicator formulas, and 4) direct pricing by public 
hearing. The method and the strengths and weak-
nesses of each mechanism were examined in detail. 
1. The competitive price series procedure ties 
the prices for milk in manufacturing uses in Federal 
orders to prices paid for manufacturing grade milk 
in nonregulated markets. The Minnesota-Wisconsin 
manufacturing price is a competitive price series and 
it is currently used to price Federal order manufac-
turing use milk. It is basically a competitively deter-
mined price, however, only when wholesale product 
market prices are higher than CCC purchase prices. 
The M-W price itself becomes largely an administra-
tively determined price when product prices are at or 
close to CCC purchase prices. Manufacturing grade 
milk prices are supported by government purchases 
of butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk powder. Al-
though the plants are still free to bid for available 
milk supplies, the prices they can pay producers are 
constrained by the prices they receive for the prod-
ucts. Major advantages of competitive series for 
pricing reserve milk in Federal orders are that usually 
they automatically reflect changes in processing costs, 
product values, and product yields. Competitive 
conditions force firms to maximum processing effici-
ency regardless of the level of support. 
A single competitive price series also provides an 
incentive for regulated plants to allocate reserve milk 
to the highest return manufactured dairy products. 
One disadvantage of the currently used competitive 
price series is that the price is strongly influenced by 
cheese prices. At times, this effect places plants mak-
ing other products, such as butter-powder, in the posi-
tion of having to pay prices higher than they can get 
out of the milk they process. Several positive and 
negative factors associated with the use of competitive 
pay price series were noted in that section of this re-
port. 
Even after there is. no longer any nonregulated 
manufacturing milk, use of a competitive price series 
could be continued by some setting aside of manu-
facturing dairy product plants from minimum Fed-
eral order pricing provisions. One possibility is to 
exempt from minimum pricing all plants in the upper 
Midwest that are producing only Class III products. 
Exemption of these plants would permit them to pay 
whatever price that competition among them would 
establish. The average pay price for these plants 
would be used as the Class III price for all other 
manufacturing use milk in Federal orders. Produ-
cers shipping milk to exempt plants would receive an 
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equalization payment in addition to the plant pay price 
to make their returns comparable with returns to pro-
ducers shipping to nonexempt plants. 
The equalization payment would be the differ-
ence between a specified equalization price and the 
blend price to producers shipping milk to nearby non-
exempt plants. Collections for the equalization 
could or should be from all other Federal order mar-
kets. In addition to providing a competitive pay 
price series, the rationale for equalization payments 
is that classified pricing of milk is a discriminatory 
price system that depresses manufacturing milk prices 
while raising total returns for milk in all uses. The 
procedure extends the pooling concept to provide for 
more equal sharing of Class I sales and more equal 
sharing of reserve milk supplies across all regulated 
markets. 
2. The product price formula approach to 
Class III pricing utilizes product prices, product 
yields per hundredweight of milk, and processing 
costs to develop pay prices for manufacturing use 
milk. Two types of product formulas have been used 
in Federal order pricing-a butter-powder formula 
and a cheese formula. These formulas were dropped 
in most Federal orders as a matter of policy because 
they reflected excessive differences in prices between 
regulated and nonregulated manufacturing milk 
plants, due in part to difficulties in specifying appro-
priate make allowances. If all manufacturing use 
milk were to become regulated, the differential price 
problem would cease to exist. 
Inputs for product price formulas normally have 
been obtained from a number of sources. Additional 
sources are possible. Wholesale prices for butter and 
cheese are reported on commodity exchanges. The 
Market News Service of the USDA reports wholesale 
selling prices for nonfat dry milk, cheese, and butter 
at various assembly points. Reported plant prices 
are available for nonfat dry milk but not for butter or 
cheese. Observers generally believe that f.o.b. plant 
prices for butter and cheese could be developed if in-
dustry cooperation could be secured. 
Yields of product per hundredweight of raw milk 
are not fixed factors. They vary with solids content 
of raw milk, product specifications, and solids recov-
ery in the processing operation. However, for ad-
ministered price purposes, average values may be used 
to simplify the process. 
Processing allowances for product formulas can 
be derived from several sources. As long as substan-
tial quantities of nonregulated milk are marketed, 
average apparent margins can be calculated by sub-
tracting the reported plant pay prices from the gross 
returns per hundredweight of milk. Gross returns 
from the sale of product are determined from yields 
and wholesale market prices for the product. 
Analysis of plant records from a sample of manu-
facturing plants can be used to determine costs. How-
ever, this report illustrates a number of major prob-
lems with the method, including allocating of costs 
in multi-product plants and firms, different deprecia-
tion schedules, different capital costs, and different 
methods of valuing inventories. Furthermme, the 
plant record procedure is likely to be a costly method 
of margin determination. 
Indexing of some base period cost or margin is 
another way of determining processing allowances. 
The index could be computed from reported wage 
rates and prices or price index for specified inputs. 
In the course of the study, considerable effort 
was directed to evaluating and refining the types of 
product price formulas generally considered most 
relevant. Assuming the estimation of an acceptable 
make allowance, and assuming agreement on the ade-
quacy of product prices, the following product price 
formulas with specified yield factors were advanced 
to estimate prices per cwt of milk testing 3.5% butter-
fat. 
1. Butter-powder formula 
(Grade AA butter price per pound at Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange times 4.27) plus 
(nonfat dry milk price (spray) per pound 
in Central States area times 8.3) minus 
make allowance (currently $1.16) . 30 
2. Cheese formula 
(Weighted average of Wisconsin primary 
market, barrel and 40-lb block, cheddar 
cheese price per pound times 9.66) plus 
(Grade A butter price per pound at Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange times 0.3) plus (edible 
dry whey .powder price per pound in Cen-
tral States area minus 10 cents times 5.5) 
minus make allowance (currently $0.88) .30 
3. Butter-powder-cheese formula 
The preceding product price formulas for 
milk used for butter-powder and milk used 
for cheese are weighted annually in propor-
tion to the relative quantities of milk used 
to produce nonfat dry milk and cheddar 
cheese in Minnesota and Wisconsin in the 
preceding year. 
The product price formula approach has often 
been considered ·by some interests in the dairy in-
dustry to be an appealing method of pricing Class III 
milk. It is easily understood and it directly ties the 
• '°The make allowances for butter-powder and cheese are taken 
from Tables 37 and 39. The 10 cent make charge per lb of dry 
whey is a 1977 breakeven cost estimate for dry whey costs and prices. 
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milk price to the prices received for the products. If 
product prices are not at government purchase price 
levels, the formula price reflects, at least partially,· 
competitive market clearing forces. Also, if multiple 
reserve classes are adopted, pro~uct price formulas 
are better adopted to establishing the separate usage 
values for butter-powder and cheese. 
3. A third option for pricing Class III milk is 
an "economic indicator formula." This mechanism 
sets price by ad justing a base period price by an index 
which represents supply factors, or demand factors, 
or both. The procedure has been used in past years 
for pricing Class I milk in some Federal order mar-
kets. The adjusting index was determined by weigh-
ting measures of consumer incomes, wholesale prices, 
and input prices. · The current price support and 
parity pri.ce for milk are computed with an economic 
indicator type formula. 
If economic indicator formulas had been used 
for pricing manufacturing use milk, they undoubtedly 
would have presented substantial differences between 
prices of regulated and nonregulated milk. Again, 
as most or all milk becomes regulated, the problem of 
different prices disappears. 
The major problem of an economic indicator 
formula for manufacturing use milk pricing is the un-
certainty that it will balance milk supply with de-
mand. In the situations where manufacturing grade 
milk continues to be in substantial supply, or where 
the price support purchase program was absent, de-
termination of reserve milk prices that accurately re-
flect current market values would be ·essential. An 
economic index formula could not serve that pur-
pose effectively. With no Grade B supplies but with 
a price support program available, closer coordina-
tion between the Federal milk order program and the 
dairy price support program would be required if an 
economic indicator formula were used. Even so, ex-
treme difficulty would be experienced in maintaining 
a m_arket clearing price. 
4. The preceding mechanisms of Federal order 
pricing are all types of automatically adjusting pric-
ing formulas. Another alternative is to directly fix 
the reserve milk price solely on the basis of evidence 
presented at public hearings. No class price adjust-
ments would occur until the next hearing. The pro-
cedure was used in early years of the Federal order 
program, but for fluid use prices only. 
The use of the hearing process to directly fix 
manufacturing milk prices has the advantage of per-
mitting almost any relevant factor to be considered in 
the pricing process. The formula approaches adjust 
only to those far:tors included in the formula. There 
are, however, some basic disadvantages in establishing 
reserve milk prices directly by public hearing. 
°' 
" 
TABLE 47.-Analysis Summary: Effectiveness or Impact of Alternative Milk Pricing Mechanisms. 
Objective or Criterion 
Objective 
1. Maintain adequate manu· 
facturing outlets 
2. Establish price related to value 
of manufactured products 
a. Does not encourage 
withholding from Class I 
b. Does not price undercut 
manufacturing grade milk price 
c. Price will clear the 
market of supplies 
3. Allocates reserve supply 
to highest value use 
4. Price does not arbitrarily 
affect resource allocation 
5. Price will provide equity 
within and among morkcits 
Administrative Criteria 
6. Establishes price on 
current and efficient basis 
7 •. Price mechanism not complex 
8'. Mechanism must be workable 





















































2 =Meats objmtive 5 =Does not adequately meet objective 
3 =Tends to meet objective 6 = Does not meet objective 








































*Assumes M-W price in <ra1 kets where volume of reserve is large and can be handled more efficiently, and U. S. average in markets where quantity of reserve is relatively small and 
irregular. 
tLevel approximating U. S. rranufacturing price. 
:!:Level approximating M-W level. 
First, the hearing is a costly procedure for par-
ticipants. Since more frequent hearings would be 
required if hearings are used for direct pricing, the 
cost of the procedure is likely to be very large. Sec-
ond, the hearing process is unwieldy and time-con-
suming. It may not be able to adjust prices rapidly 
enough to changing economic conditions. 
Of the four mechanisms for pricing manufactur-
ing use milk under Federal orders, a competitive price 
series or a product price formula are likely to lead to 
the fewest problems in clearing the market. Both 
assure that if total milk supply expands relative to 
demand, prices will adjust downward (to the price 
support level) and cause more products to move into 
consumption and discourage production. Converse-
ly, with expanding demand relative tO supply, the two 
mechanisms will bring increased milk prices. In 
other words, these two mechanisms are more likely 
to bring about necessary resource adjustments in a 
regulated dairy industry than either economic indica-
tor formulas or direct pricing through public hear-
ings. 
The relative applicabilities of the four pricing 
alternatives can be evaluated in more specific terms 
by relating each alternative to: 1) the several reserve 
milk pricing objectives, 2} the specif~ed administrative 
criteria, and 3) the three complex issues of reserve 
milk pricing that were analyzed. In the tableau that 
follows, the objectives and the criteria are assigned 
values, on a scale of one to seven, that reflect the esti-
mated effect of a given pricing procedure on the rele-
vant objective or criterion. 
Since any evaluation of the pricing procedures, 
especially of the competitive pay price and the prod-
uct price formula, is substantially affected by the level 
of prices generated by the procedure, columns reflect-
ing a higher price level and a lower price level are in-
cluded for the two primary alternatives. The matter 
of different price levels for the same procedure is an 
integral part of the reserve pricing problem. For ex-
ample, competitive pay prices are usually several 
cents per cwt higher in the Minnesota-Wisconsin price 
series than they .are in the U. S. average manufactur-
ing price series.. Similarly, product price formulas 
using the derived margins approach reflect a smaller 
make allowance and therefore a higher reserve price 
than do product formulas using the higher make al-
lowances associated with CCC purchase prices. The 
differential effects of the level of reserve price estab-
lished are indicated in. the low .price and high price 
columns for the competitive pay price and the prod-
uct price formula approaches .. 
It is evident from the assigned values that the 
competitive pay price series and product price for-
mula alternatives· relate to the eight objectives and 
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three criteria on a superior basis relative to the other 
two approaches. Also, with respect to the matter of 
low and high reserve prices that may be established by 
a given approach, a low /high reserve price estab-
lished by competitive pay price procedures obviously 
would have some similar impacts to a low/high re-
serve price established by product formula. Within 
a given approach, however, a lower price will be more 
apt to maintain adequate manufacturing outlets 
while a higher price will be more apt to discourage 
any withholding of Class I shipments. The high 
price-low price differences are subtle but need to be 
recognized. 
The two primary alternatives of competitive pay 
prices and product price formulas also need to be 
weighed in relation to the complex issues in reserve 
milk pricing, i.e., the matter of the same or different 
reserve prices in different markets, the matter of how 
many reserve usage classes to define, and the level of 
efficiency to which the reserve price should be geared. 
If different reserve prices were used in different 
markets depending on market characteristics, product 
price formulas could be adopted on a more precise 
basis to reflect the appropriate reserve price for a mar-
ket. For example, in a smaller volume market where 
butter-powder dominated reserve usage and most re-
serve handling was the responsibility of one coopera-
tive, a product price formula clearly would offer the 
best fit to that market's situation and to meeting the 
objectives of reserve pricing. However, if a single 
reserve price is used in all markets, a competitive pay 
price, for the several reasons noted elsewhere, would 
serve the objectives of reserve pricing on a superior 
basis. 
Multiple reserve class pricing would be better 
served by product formulas than by competitive pay 
prices. Product formulas could be specified sepa-
rately for butter-powder and for cheese. Most of the 
objectives of reserve pricing relate positively to pro-
duct formulas in the multiple reserve class context. 
The only apparent shortcomings would be in the areas 
of allocating reserve supplies to the highest value use 
and price equity among markets. With a single re-
serve class, however, the specific advantages of prod-
uct formula pricing diminish, and the advantages of 
competitive pay pricing in relation to market clear-
ing, supply allocation, and equity within and among 
markets are substantial. 
With respect to the issue of what level of effici-
ency the reserve price should be established, both the 
competitive pay price and the product price formula 
approaches may be constructed in ways that tie di-
rectly to the efficiency level desired. For the compe-
titive pay price approach, the sample and location of 
plants to be used is basic to the efficiency level speci-
fied. In product price formulas, make allowances 
may be adjusted arbitrarily to pursue the recognized 
efficiency level. Both pricing approaches are suit-
able for handling the efficiency issue. Other factors 
than the issue of efficiency level must be looked to in 
rationalizing the choice of pricing procedure. 
Although the comparable effects of the competi-
tive pay price series and product price formula may 
be arguable, the consistent assignment of higher val-
ues to the competitive pay price series relative to ob-
jectives and administrative criteria suggests that syste-
matic efforts be directed to retention of such a proce-
dure. The primary basis for shifting to product price 
formula procedures is the pragmatic consideration 
that it can be available in the future without resort-
ing to significant changes from current procedures. 
To the extent that competitiye pay price procedures 
may in fact reflect a superior performance if they can 
be retained, the pragmatic considerations associated 
with the product price formula approach should be 
weighed less heavily. As for the three complex issues 
that were noted, competitive pay pricing equates very 
well with the objectives of reserve milk pricing in the 
single reserve class and price in all market situations, 
while product formula pricing would better serve the 
objectives where reserve prices are different in differ-
ent markets and multiple reserve classes are defined. 
Temporal Aspects of Reserve Milk Pricing 
Mechanisms for pricing reserve milk are not un-
der immediate time pressures since the manufactur-
ing grade milk market continues to provide an ample 
basis for generating competitive pay price series. 
However, substantial differences in the values of milk 
for butter-powder and cheese during the 1973-76 per-
iod and the substantial weight cheese has in the M-W 
price series have caused some interests to argue for 
alternative means of pricing reserve milk even while 
Grade B supplies are in substantial quantity. In the 
longer run, the continued erosion of Grade B supplies 
will necessitate the development of different pricing 
procedures. In specifying the several alternatives 
that might be pursued in reserve milk pricing, the 
question of when a given procedure might be used 
must be recognized. The availability or nonavail-
ability of a viable manufacturing grade milk market 
is a key determinant of the relevaµce of any particu-
lar choice among the reserve pricing alternatives. 
Retention of a form of a competitive pay price 
~eries by some type of suspension of Class III pricing 
of pooled milk in the upper Midwest primarily is a 
long-run consideration. It is neither necessary nor 
advantageous to attempt to implement such a proce-
dure in the immediate future because prices from the 
manufacturing grade milk market are performing 
that task. 
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Product price formulas have different temporal 
implications, depending on the particular ways in 
which they are constructed and used. For example, 
the use of the "apparent margins" application of 
product formulas requires that a competitive pay 
price series be available to measure the apparent mar-
gin. Therefore, the apparent margin can be used 
only as long as there is a legitimate Grade B market. 
This requirement limits interest in the approach some-
what because the availability of a competitive pay 
price series detracts from any obvious need to use ap-
parent margins. However, the apparent margins ap-
proach could be used directly in the short run in lieu 
of direct use of a competitive pay price series, especial-
ly if separate prices for milk used for butter-powder 
and cheese were desfred. Through lagging or aver-
aging procedures, month-to-month price changes in 
reserve milk prices could be made. Of course, this 
could complicate market clearing problems in periods 
when the apparent margins price deviated• significant-
ly from,.the competitive pay price: For longer run 
purposes, (when all .milk is- Grade A), the apparent 
margins that were generated while Grade B supplies 
still reflected a competitive price could be adjusted 
with various cost indexes to provide an estimated con-
tinuing make allowance for a product price formula. 
In this sense, the apparent margins approach would 
serve as an initial input to product price formulation 
after conversion to Grade A largely has been accom-
plished. 
Product price formulas appear to be a feasible 
method of pricing reserve milk in both the short run 
and the long run. In the long run, in spite of prob-
lems associated with adopting appropriate factors in 
the formula, product price formulas clearly represent 
an important alternative for pricing milk used for 
manufactured dairy products. 
Prospects of using either the public hearing pro-
cess directly or an economic index formula to price 
reserve milk are more remote because of the problems 
associated with generating realistic market value 
prices through such procedures. Neither alternative 
has persuasive attributes as long as competitive pay 
prices are available from the manufacturing grade 
milk market. In the long run, with most milk con-
verted to Grade A, the hearing process or the eco-
nomic index process could be used, but would likely 
perform in an inferior manner relative to product 
price formulas or other procedures that might be de-
veloped. In the situation where most milk marketed 
is Grade A and where a dairy price support program 
is in operation, the support price, which is a type of 
economic index price, and the reserve milk price could 
be viewed as one, and price support operations could 
be geared to effecting that price. 
In summary, the relevance and feasibility of any 
given reserve milk pricing procedure is partly related 
to whether manufacturing grade milk supplies are 
sufficient to provide a competitive market situation, 
or whether conversion to Grade A production and 
marketing largely has been accomplished. 
Two other issues in pricing manufacturing use 
milk were examined in the study: 1) the number of 
manufacturing use classes in each market, and 2) 
different prices between markets for given manufac-
turing uses. The arguments for multiple manufac-
turing prices are that processing cost differences be-
tween markets and plants are caused by factors that 
do not apply to nonregulated plants. Therefore, 
minimum prices in each regulated market should re-
flect these differences. Cost differences occur be-
cause of large differences in daily and seasonal varia-
tions of milk receipts, low total volumes of manufac-
turing use milk in many of the fluid milk markets, 
and differences in net returns between manufactured 
dairy products. The latter argument is supported 
by the fact that cheese plants in Minnesota and Wis-
consin have, during past decades, generally paid more 
for milk than butter-powder plants. Although all 
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the arguments have some validity, there are impor-
tant advantages in maintaining a single price both 
within and between markets. A single price tends 
to assure maximum processing efficiency as well as 
allocations of milk to highest return uses. 
The essential implications of this study are that 
changes in the milk market will require new pricing 
arrangements in Federal milk orders. Leadership 
across the dairy industry as well as public agencies as-
sociated with the dairy industry should be directing 
increased attention to this problem. Administered 
price regulations require systematic procedures for 
price establishment. Such procedures have to ac-
complish the key objectives of reserve milk pricing. 
In the past, the availability of competitive pay price 
series has provided an easy and effective alternative 
for reserve milk pricing. The evolution toward an 
all Grade A regulated milk industry in the United 
States will remove access to a competitive pay price 
series as it is now defined. The alternatives posed in 
this study provide a starting point for developing a 
method or methods for pricing reserve milk that will 
prove workable in the market and measure up to the 
purposes of reserve milk pricing. 
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Ohio's major soil types and climatic 
conditions are represented at the Re-
search Center's 12 locations. 
Research is conducted by 15 depart-
ments on more than 7000 acres atCenter 
headquarters in Wooster, eight branches, 
Pomerene Forest Laboratory, North Appa-
lachian Experimental Watershed, and 
The Ohio State University. 
Center Headquarters, Wooster, Wayne 
County: 1953 acres 
Eastern Ohio Resource Development Cen-
ter, Caldwell, Noble County: 2053 
ocres 
Jackson Branch, Jackson, Jackson Coun-
ty: 502 acres 
Mahoning County Farm, Canfield: 275 
acres 
Muck Crops Branch, Willard, Huron Coun-
ty: 15 acres 
North Appalachian Experimental. Water-
shed, Coshocton, Coshocton County: 
l 047 acres (Cooperative with Science 
and Education Administration/ Agri-
cultural Research, U. S. Dept. of Agri-
culture) 
Northwestern Branch, Hoytville, Wood 
County: 247 -acres 
Pomerene Forest Laboratory, Coshocton 
County: 227 acres 
Southern Branch, Ripley, Brown County: 
275 acres 
Vegetable Crops Branch, Fremont, San-
dusky County: l 05 acres 
Western Branch, South Charleston, Clark 
County: 428 acres 
